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1 Introduction 
 
“Not too long ago, Argentina was better known for fascist-style militarism (since the 1930s), 
dirty wars (until the 1970s), a pointless war (against England in the early 1980s), reckless 
macroeconomics and presidential crises (until the 2000s), institutional disarray and crazy pop-
ulism (to this day), and one of the most heterosexual and gender-stereotypical dances in the 
world (the tango).”  
(Corrales & Pecheny, 2010) 
 
The legalisation of same-sex marriage in Argentina in 2010 failed to match our assumptions about Ma-
chismo and heteronormativity in the country. Two years after being the first country in Latin America 
that opened the institution of marriage for same-sex couples on the national level, the Argentine parlia-
ment passed ground-breaking legislation on legal gender recognition (LGR), allowing trans1 and intersex 
people to change their legal gender on official documents such as birth certificates and passports. A legal 
gender change in Argentina is now easier than anywhere else in the world. It is a mere administrative act, 
without the involvement of court decisions or invasive requirements such as having to undergo sex change 
surgery. Why out of all countries does Argentina grant such far reaching sexual rights to LGBT (Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Trans) people? 
South Africa is another country that surprises with permissive sexual rights policies. In 1994, South Africa 
legalised abortion on demand. In 2003, the South African parliament passed a law regulating the legal 
recognition of gender changes. And finally, in 2006, South Africa was the first (and, at the time of writing, 
remains the only) country on the African continent to legalise gay marriage. How do these policies fit with 
the high incidence of homophobic violence and “corrective rape”, i.e. the rape of a lesbian to “cure” her 
homosexuality, faced by LGBT people in South Africa (Thoreson, 2008, pp. 694–695; Thoreson, 2013)? 
 
                                                     
1 The word “trans” is used as an umbrella term for various identities in the trans spectrum. In other words,  identities that do 
not confirm to the male/female binary, such as transsexual, transgender, trans-identified, transvestite, gender non-conforming, 
intersex, gender-fluid, gender-queer, etc. 
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This dissertation aims to explain the surprising regulations of abortion, same-sex marriage and legal gender 
recognition (LGR) in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina. The primary argument brought for-
ward in this study is that the overall permissive pattern of what I will refer to as sexual rights policy in 
South Africa and Argentina is a result of the legacy of what I will term an ideological symbiosis between 
both state and church2, during Argentina’s last military dictatorship (1976 until democratisation in 1983) 
and the apartheid regime in South Africa (1948 until 1994). This is the case because the church’s associa-
tion with these authoritarian regimes creates unfavourable political opportunity structures for their post-
democratic era access to the policy process. Concurrently, these post-authoritarian contexts create fa-
vourable conditions for policy influence by social movements, who employ human rights framings for 
their claims to gain support by democratic politicians for sexual rights policy passage. 
What South Africa and Argentina have in common is that they are two countries of the global South that 
underwent regime transition during what is known as the third wave of democratisation (Huntington, 
1991b). Argentina (re)-democratised in 1984 after seven years under a violently repressive military dic-
tatorship. South Africa held its first non-racial democratic elections in 1994, after half a century of rule by 
the racist apartheid regime. During both authoritarian regimes, the merging of nationalism and Christian-
ity delivered the ideological legitimation of authoritarian rule. The traditionally high societal importance 
of churches went hand in hand with a high political importance of religious institutions during authoritar-
ianism. The Catholic Church in Argentina and the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa had close 
ideological ties to the authoritarian state, informing public policy decisions and doctrinally justifying hu-
man rights abuses, such as political murder and torture in Argentina and the policy of “separate develop-
ment” (apartheid in Afrikaans) in South Africa. However, state/church relations were to transform funda-
mentally during democratisation. Churches associated with the former regimes were blocked from ac-
cessing secularised democratic politics. 
Sexual rights policies in South Africa and Argentina are surprising on various levels. Perhaps due to the 
discursive conflation between permissive women’s and LGBT rights regulations, modernity and Western-
ness, South Africa’s and Argentina’s location in the Southern Hemisphere has led many to overlook their 
anomalous regulatory paths. Anecdotal references about cultural machismo and sexism but also reports 
on the grim reality faced by women and LGBT people in both countries contributes to an impression of 
misfit between the far-reaching legal protection of sexual rights and the reality of South African and Ar-
gentine societies. 
                                                     
2 When I use the term “church“, I mean to designate the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Christian churches, not the entirety of its 
adherents. 
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Scholarship on religious influence on policy output argues that the religious stratification of society shapes 
the restrictiveness or permissiveness of policies regulating issues that touch upon fundamental societal 
norms and values (Budde, Knill, Fernandez-i-Marin, & Preidel, 2017; Castles, 1994; Minkenberg, 2002). 
On a theoretical level we would expect the societal importance of Catholicism in Argentina and the reli-
gious devoutness of South Africa’s population to mobilise voters and strengthen churches’ bargaining po-
sitions to shape policy output according to religious doctrine. Yet, South Africa and Argentina have passed 
permissive sexual rights policies against the doctrinal preferences of and protest by their respective 
churches. Thus, from the perspective of existing theories of religious influence on policy output, South 
Africa and Argentina represent deviant cases.   
The explanation I offer for the failure of religious influence to prevent permissive sexual rights policy 
passage in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina is macro-historical in that it explores the past as 
the history of South Africa and Argentina’s present. This present is “post-authoritarian” in that both coun-
tries’ current constitutional identities are shaped by the experience of authoritarianism. “The broad un-
derstanding of how past and present relations are constructed and preserved is reflected in the conception 
and usage of the term ‘post’. Postcolonial, post-apartheid and post-liberation are all terms that define an 
historical period in contraposition to the previous one.” (Bompani 2006, S. 1139)  
Democratic South African and Argentine politics are a collective response to their respective authoritarian 
past. The political cleavage between authoritarianism and democracy marks the boundaries between two 
historical periods and the association with one of the two shapes the positioning of political players and 
arguments as either legitimate or illegitimate participants in the political discourse on sexual rights policy. 
In that way the ideological endorsement of authoritarian regimes by religious institutions would later dis-
qualify religious doctrine as a source of guiding principles for sexual rights policies. At the same time, the 
regime transition during the international normative context of third wave democratisation made human 
rights a readily available frame for social movements to claim sexual rights. When framed as human rights, 
permissive regulations proposed by women’s and LGBT rights movements gained support by policy makers. 
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1.1 Existing Explanations for Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage and LGR Policy Output 
Comparative morality policy scholarship and literature on religion and politics offer potential explanations 
for sexual rights policy output. Morality policy research is a growing branch of scholarship on the public 
regulation of issues which touch upon fundamental societal and often religious values. Abortion, same-sex 
marriage and LGR), or sexual rights policies, belong to some of the quintessential morality policies because 
they touch upon deep rooted societal constructs of gender, sexuality and the role of religious doctrine. 
Scholars in the field have argued that the religious stratification of society matters for morality policy 
output. Castles (1994; Castles, 1998; 1998, 1998) and Minkenberg (2002), for instance, have argued that 
Catholic countries in Western Europe regulate more restrictively than Protestant ones. Furthermore, 
Minkenberg (2002) has used the degree of religiosity of the population, measured as church attendance 
rates, as a proxy for conservative values held by the population. In the US-American context, scholars 
have linked adherence rates to evangelical Protestantism within a state with morality policy restrictiveness 
(Scheitle & Hahn, 2011).  
After decades of the domination of secularisation and modernisation theory in the social sciences (predict-
ing the disappearance of religion as societies modernise), we must credit morality policy scholarship for 
contributing to our understanding that religion still matters for political phenomena. However, when it 
comes to the theorisation of the causal pathways of religious influence and religious non-influence, we 
only stand at the beginning.  
Recent case studies have complemented structural explanations by stressing that the informal relationship 
between state and church is a decisive factor in accounting for religious influence on sexual rights policies 
and related issues such as divorce. For instance, Hennig (2012) argues a historically grown pattern of 
cooperation between state and church to belong to the conditions for church influence on policy output.  
Grzymala-Busse (2015) contends that the opposition of churches to foreign hostile regimes, such as the 
cases for the Catholic Church in Poland during Communism or Chile during the military dictatorship 
under Pinochet, led to a fusion of political and religious identities. The causal mechanism Grzymala-Busse 
suggests leads from the church defending the nation to high moral authority of churches after regime 
change that can be used to gain institutional access to politics. Her argument is aimed at explaining why 
and how churches can gain institutional access to the political system and shape policy output. For the 
opposite scenario, that is when churches oppose democracy, Grzymala-Busse (2015, p. 13) simply diag-
noses “no mechanism of influence”. 
What remains undertheorised is exactly how churches are blocked from exerting policy influence and how 
this produces permissive sexual rights policies. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by proposing a causal 
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mechanism that can explain why permissive sexual rights policies were passed in South Africa and Argen-
tina, despite the opposition of historically powerful religious institutions.  
Building on Grzymala-Busse’s insight that moral authority of churches is a brittle resource that can be in 
vain if churches do not conduct themselves according to their own moral standards and on Htun (2003, 
p. 6) and Grzymala-Busse’s (2015, p. 39, 47) remarks that support for authoritarian regimes can lead to 
a loss of moral authority of churches, I theorise a causal mechanism that connects an ideological fusion of 
church and state during authoritarianism with sexual rights policy output after democratisation. I expand 
on existing explanations by fleshing out the causal connection between state/church ideological symbiosis 
and permissive policy output and adding social movements as the pivotal counterparts to religious institu-
tions in trying to shape sexual rights policy output to the explanation.  
 
1.2 The threefold Research Question 
Chile and Poland have received considerable scholarly attention as the prime cases of religious influence 
on morality policy (Grzymala-Busse, 2015a; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003). Neither of the two countries 
has legalised same-sex marriage, LGR, or abortion. A common characteristic of the religious landscape of 
Chile, Poland, Argentina and South Africa is that all four have religious institutions espousing conservative 
moral views. For specificity, that are the respective national Catholic Churches in the former three coun-
tries, and the Dutch Reformed Church and a multitude of smaller evangelical Protestant churches in South 
Africa. Religion holds a large societal importance in all four countries, yet religious institutions in South 
Africa and Argentina were unsuccessful in their attempts to prevent permissive sexual rights policy passage 
after democratisation.  
Three aspects of South African and Argentine sexual rights policies are peculiar. First, the permissiveness of 
their regulatory approaches compared to Poland and Chile’s restrictive regulations. Second, these two coun-
tries have opted for unusual regulatory trajectories. When parliaments in South Africa and Argentina passed 
abortion laws and LGBT rights policy, they did so from relatively restrictive status quos and went towards 
very permissive regulatory approaches. Both countries have legalised gay marriage without the additional 
preliminary step of passing a partnership regime. Apart from Spain and Portugal, most other European coun-
tries have progressed from partnership regimes with fewer rights than marriage to gay marriage. Third, 
Argentina’s restrictive abortion regulation stands in stark contrast to its LGBT rights policies, which deviates 
from a standard pattern of rights succession in Europe which moves from abortion policy change decades 
before LGBT rights policies were passed. 
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1.3 Research Approach 
The overall logic of this dissertation is a comparative case study, tracing the causal mechanism connecting 
the state/church ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule with sexual rights policy output after de-
mocratisation. South Africa and Argentina not only represent enormously interesting and under re-
searched cases, but they are also deviant cases from the perspective of theories on religious influence on 
public policy. A deviant case is a case “that, by reference to some general understanding of a topic (either 
a specific theory or common sense), demonstrates a surprising value [outcome]” (Gerring, 2007, p. 105). 
A deviant case selection strategy is particularly useful for refining existing theories (Levy, 2008, p. 3) as 
by explaining why those cases deviate from theoretical predictions, researchers are enabled to modify and 
refine theory or specify its scope conditions (ibid., p. 5, 8).  
Theory-testing process tracing is a method of enquiry for the assessment of the presence of a hypothesised 
causal mechanism. Process tracing goes beyond the co-occurrence of two phenomena and enables the 
researcher to establish whether there is indeed a causal connection between them within a single case 
(Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 165). Tracing the unfolding of the causal process in South Africa and Argen-
tina, two cases that are geographically and politically independent from each other, adds a valuable com-
parative element to process tracing. The mechanistic understanding of causality that underlies process 
tracing demands for set-theoretical causal propositions, i.e. meaning the theoretical claim is limited to a 
specific set of cases.  
The causal mechanism I propose is set-theoretical, meaning that it “seeks to uncover middle-range theories 
formulated as a causal mechanism that works within a bounded context, .i.e. spatially or temporally” 
(Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 60). Considering this, three criteria must be fulfilled in order to belong to 
this set of cases. First, countries must display a religious stratification of society that would lead us to 
expect religious influence on policy, but which nevertheless pass permissive sexual rights policies. Second, 
countries must have a clearly identifiable historical pattern of state/church ideological symbiosis during 
their previous authoritarian regime. Third, these countries must have democratised during what is known 
as the third wave of democratisation (from the 1970s onwards).  
The regime change is an important scope condition for the mechanism because it represents a powerful rupture 
in path dependent processes and spawns new constitutional identities and power relations. Indeed the timing of 
the regime change is also relevant because third-wave democratisations take place in a particular international 
normative environment. This context involves the growing in density and importance of international law and the 
evolution of the international human rights regime to increasingly include gender and sexuality as human rights 
issues (Rebouche, 2011, p. 12). Apart from South Africa and Argentina, Spain and Portugal fulfil these criteria 
and the explanatory relevance of the causal mechanism for those cases will be discussed in the conclusion.  
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To solve the threefold research question, we will proceed as follows: Chapter two will examine sexual 
rights policies in South Africa, Argentina, Poland and Chile. We will find that prominent theories in mo-
rality policy literature cannot explain why South Africa and Argentina regulate sexual rights policies per-
missively, and not as restrictively as Poland and Chile do. The third chapter contains the conceptualisation 
of each step of the causal mechanism of religious blockade, and empirical tests for the tracing of this process 
in South Africa and Argentina.  
Chapters four through seven constitute the empirical investigation and each chapter reviews an element 
of the causal chain, chronologically tracing the causal process that led from the historical state/church 
symbiosis in South Africa and Argentina to the permissive policy output of the present. More specifically, 
chapter four examines the causal condition, how the state/church ideological symbiosis manifested itself 
in apartheid South Africa and the military dictatorship in Argentina. The fifth chapter investigates the 
effects of the past-alliance structures for the democratic constitutional identities that develop after regime 
change. The sixth chapter looks at social movements and analyses the different opportunity structures of 
interest groups in the abortion and LGBT rights policy processes. In chapter seven we will see how the 
former components of the causal chain relate to political decision making in debates on sexual rights pol-
icies in the present era. It will be shown that the strategic human rights framing by social movements 
created a rhetorical trap for politicians such that opposing policy reform would equal betrayal of the dem-
ocratic constitutional identities.  
The eighth and final chapter concludes by highlighting the key findings for solving the research puzzle 
and discusses the implications of this study for morality policy scholarship, literature on religion and 
politics and secularisation theory more generally. This study closes by critically exploring the real world 
relevance of permissive sexual rights policies when they are embedded in conservative societies with 
high levels of inequality. 
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2 Surprising Patterns of Sexual Rights Policy Output  
 
In recent years we have witnessed a remarkable increase in scholarship on morality policies. Such policies 
reflect a conflict about first principles, touching upon fundamental societal values (Knill, 2013, p. 309; 
Mooney, 1999, p. 675). While studies on morality policy have diverse research interests, such as the 
categorisation of morality policy as its own type of policy (Hurka, Adam, & Knill, 2016; Mooney & 
Schuldt, 2008; Studlar, Cagossi, & Duval, 2013), the specific politics behind morality policy-making 
(Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996; Mooney & Lee, 1995b; Tatalovich, Smith, & Bobic, 1994) or the expla-
nation of cross-national policy variance (Blofield, 2006; Engeli, 2009; Knill, Preidel, & Nebel, 2014; 
Minkenberg, 2002), only the latter is relevant for this study. Abortion and same-sex marriage are two of 
the quintessential morality policies but others such as euthanasia regulations, gun control, prostitution, 
pornography and drug regulation can and have been studied as morality policies (Knill, Hurka, & Adam, 
2016). With a wealth of analyses looking specifically at abortion and/or same-sex partnership regulation, 
LGR is thus far a relatively understudied phenomenon (but see Taylor & Haider-Markel, 2015). Within 
the framework of morality policy research, the various policies are treated as members of a specific class 
of policies that function according to a common logic that differs from other types such as redistributive 
policy. Accordingly, most explanatory factors for policy output hold relevance not just for one specific 
policy, but for morality policy as a group and thus can be applied to LGR as well. 
In the second half of the 20th century, we see an emerging trend towards regulatory permissiveness in 
many Western countries. Because of the association of permissiveness, Westernness and modernity, most 
comparative studies in the field limit their case selection to Western-Europe and the US (e.g. Brooks, 
1992; Knill et al., 2014, 2014; Kollman, 2007; Kreitzer, 2015; Levels et al., 2014, 2014; Medoff, 2002; 
Medoff & Dennis, 2011; Minkenberg, 2002; Outshoorn, 1996; Schmitt, Euchner, & Preidel, 2013; Stud-
lar et al., 2013; Studlar & Burns, 2015; Wetstein & Albritton, 1995; Yishai, 1993 etc.). 
Interestingly, countries such as South Africa and Argentina have largely gone unnoticed, having funda-
mentally reformed some of their legal provisions regarding moral issues. This is a striking omission be-
cause, as we will see in this chapter, their sexual rights policy output is not only intriguing in itself, but a 
study of these two cases can also contribute to refining theories on religious influence on policy. 
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2.1 Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage and LGR Policy in South Africa and Argentina 
Abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR are issues related to sex and gender, as well as the social norms 
and roles attached to the binary concepts of women/men and of female/male. Moreover, these issues 
touch upon fundamental societal values around themes of sexuality, reproduction, gender relations and 
family. Hence, the regulation of these issues by the state has provoked profound moral conflicts and heated 
political debates in many countries across the globe. 
Abortion policy regulates whether a woman can legally end an unwanted pregnancy, and if so, under 
which conditions. Owing to women’s reproductive potential, abortion policy is targeted at women only. 
LGR refers to the legally established procedures and hurdles that trans individuals must comply with in 
order to invoke a change of name and legal gender on official documents, such as birth certificates and 
passports. Same-sex marriage refers to opening up the legal institution of marriage, with all its rights and 
duties afforded to same-sex couples. 
Until 1975, abortion was illegal in South Africa, except when the life of the mother was endangered. The 
Abortion and Sterilisation Act of 1975 (Act No. 2 of 1975), as amended in 1982, permitted abortions on 
further grounds, notably in cases of a threat to the woman’s life or physical and/or mental health, physical 
or mental defects of the foetus and in the case of the pregnancy having resulted from unlawful behaviour 
such as rape, incest or intercourse with an “idiot or imbelice”. 
After democratisation in 1994, the South African parliament passed a new abortion law. The Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act was enacted in 1996 and, as the name suggests, legalised a choice-based 
model or abortion on demand (Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (No 2 of 1996), 1996). More 
specifically, under this act an abortion can be obtained upon request during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy. Thereafter, from the thirteenth up until the twentieth week of pregnancy, an abortion is legal 
if a medical practitioner deems the pregnancy a risk to the woman’s physical or mental health, the foetus 
to be at risk of physical or mental abnormality, the pregnancy to have resulted from rape or incest or if 
the continuation of pregnancy would impact significantly upon the economic or social circumstances of 
the woman. From the twentieth week of pregnancy up until birth, an abortion can be performed if two 
medical professionals agree that a continuation of pregnancy endangers the mother’s life, or that it would 
pose a risk of injury or malformation in the foetus. 
Another noteworthy aspect regarding additional procedural requirements in South Africa’s current abor-
tion regulations is that women who seek an abortion must be informed of their rights when requesting the 
procedure. Counselling is not mandatory and there is no requirement of spousal or parental consent, even 
in the case of a minor. Accordingly, the country’s abortion regulations are not only exceptional on the 
African continent but South Africa affords women more legal options to obtain an abortion than most 
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countries in the world. This is especially the case regarding the legality of abortion up until the twentieth 
pregnancy week on socio-economic grounds (see e.g. Budde, Knill et al., 2017 for an overview of abortion 
regulatory approaches in OECD and BRICS states). 
Another case of an exceptional regulation can be found in South Africa’s same-sex marriage policy. In 
2006, South Africa became the first and only country in Africa to extend marriage rights to same-sex 
couples. The Civil Union Act (No 17 of 2006) provides for the solemnisation of civil unions by way of 
civil partnership or marriage. Previously, marriage in South Africa was regulated by the Marriage Act of 
1961 (Act 25 of 1961) which was based on the common law definition of marriage, precluding same-sex 
couples (Vos, 2008). In section 1 of the Act of 2006, a civil union is defined as “the voluntary union of 
two persons who are both 18 years of age or older, which is solemnized and registered by way of marriage 
or a civil partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Act, to the exclusion, while it 
lasts, of all others.” Section 13 determines that both heterosexual and homosexual couples entering into a 
Civil Union marriage have the same rights, duties and privileges as those entering a marriage under the 
Marriage Act. As a result, the Civil Union Act amended all existing South African legislation referencing 
marriage so that they apply equally to same-sex couples (Vos, 2008, p. 169). 
It is important to note that marriages in South Africa can currently be solemnised under the Marriage Act 
of 1961 (heterosexual couples) and under the Civil Union Act of 2006 (heterosexual and homosexual 
couples). Furthermore, couples can also form a civil partnership under the Civil Union Act (heterosexual 
and homosexual couples). Both the Civil Union marriage as well as marriage in terms of the Marriage Act 
can be officiated by public servants and religious officials (ibid., p. 171). 
What is interesting about South Africa’s marriage legislation is that the Civil Union Act of 2006 was not 
preceded by the creation of a partnership regime, as was the case in most European countries that legalised 
gay marriage, such as the Netherlands, Denmark and France. Rather, South Africa went directly from no 
legal recognition of same-sex partnerships (even having criminalised homosexuality under apartheid up 
until ten years before) to wholly legalising gay marriage and also creating a partnership regime at the same time. 
Same-sex marriage is not the only set of LGBT rights enshrined in South Africa’s legal system. In 2003, 
the country passed the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act (Act 49 of 2003, commencement 
date: March 15th 2004). Subsection 2.1 of this Act allows for a change in gender in legal documents for 
“[a]ny person whose sexual characteristics have been altered by surgical or medical treatment or by evolve-
ment through natural development resulting in gender reassignment, or any person who is intersexed” 
(Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 2003, 2003). Individuals can apply for the alteration of 
the sex description on their birth register to the Director-General of the National Department of Home 
Affairs. With the application they must submit a report by a medical practitioner stating nature and results 
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of performed medical treatments, and another report by a second medical practitioner who has medically 
examined the applicant regarding their new sexual characteristics (subsec. 2.2a and 2.2b). Once the ap-
plication is granted, the person concerned is deemed for all purposes to be a person of the new sex as from 
the date of legal gender change (subsec. 3.2). 
Turning our attention to Argentina, it became the tenth country in the world when it legalised gay mar-
riage in July 2010 (Law 26.618 on Civil Marriage). This was achieved by passing a law that alters the 
provisions of the civil code pertaining to marriage, so that reference to heterosexuality or opposite sex 
partners was changed into a gender neutral form (Congreso de la Nación Argentina, 2010). In art. 42 of 
the law it states: “No judicial norm in Argentina shall be interpreted or applied in a sense that limits, 
restricts, excludes or suppresses the enjoyment of the same rights and duties pertaining to marriage con-
stituted of persons of the same sex or formed by persons of distinct sex.” Under this law, not only marriage 
but also adoption by gay couples was legalised. Just as in South Africa, Argentina opened up marriage to 
same-sex couples without introducing a partnership regime with fewer rights than marriage beforehand. 
While the introduction of gay marriage in Argentina came as a surprise to many international observers, 
the most astonishing development in Argentine LGBT legislation was yet to come. 
In 2012, Argentina reformed its LGR regulations. Law 26.743 on Gender Identity “establishes the right 
to gender identity of persons” (Ley de Identidad de Genero, 2012). According to art. 3 of the law, anybody 
can request an official rectification of sex and change of name if these do not coincide with the self-per-
ceived gender identity. Article 4 contains ground-breaking provisions as it explicitly states that “[i]n no 
case will it be required to have undergone surgical intervention for total or partial genital reassignment; 
neither will it be required to have undergone hormone therapy or other psychological or medical treat-
ment.” The gender and name change is a mere administrative act without cost to the individual concerned 
or involvement of courts or lawyers. As a result it is easier to change one’s legal gender in Argentina than 
in any other country in the world, and the passage of the bill was celebrated by human rights activists 
internationally (OutRight Action International, 2012). 
In contrast to Argentina’s far developed LGBT rights legislations stands its regulation of abortion. Argen-
tine Criminal Law art. 86 prohibits abortion except in cases of rape3 or threat to the woman’s life (Artículo 
86, 1922). The law dates back to 1922 and regulations have not been modified substantially since. The 
                                                     
3 The exact choice of words in Argentina’s abortion regulation of 1922 that is still law today is not clear as to whether abortion 
is permitted in the case of rape generally or only in the case of rape of a mentally handicapped woman. Interpretations of this 
passage have varied historically in Argentina and only in 2012 a high court decision clarified that any victim of sexual violence 
has the right to abortion (Diario Judicial, 2012). 
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fact that Argentina has advanced LGBT rights legislation while abortion is still criminalised in many cir-
cumstances is a peculiar situation. In Europe, the progression of gender and sexuality rights has followed 
a common pattern that included an early reform of regulations of reproductive rights, followed by LGBT 
rights legislation in later decades (Belgrano Rawson, 2012, p. 173). Argentina’s non-legalisation of abor-
tion on demand not only differs from this common pattern of rights succession (from reproductive rights 
in the 1970s to LGBT rights emerging in the 1990s) as observed in Europe, but also stands in contrast to 
other sexual rights policies in Argentina.  
 
2.2 Permissive versus Restrictive Regulatory Patterns 
To systematically compare morality policy output, scholars often classify countries’ policies on a restric-
tiveness/permissiveness axis, the former conforming to traditionally conservative political views and the 
latter to more liberal ones (Budde, Knill et al., 2017; Knill et al., 2016; Mooney, 1999; Studlar et al., 
2013). In the context of this study, restrictiveness and permissiveness can be understood in terms of how 
fully a policy grants or restricts the individual’s legal ability to autonomously decide regarding their bodies 
and livelihood in the scope of abortion, marriage and LGR (see e.g. Budde, 2015; Budde & Heichel, 2016; 
Heichel, Knill, & Schmitt, 2013). Permissive policies grant individuals the right to choose to end a preg-
nancy, marry a partner of the same sex or legally live in a different gender to the one assigned at birth. On 
the other hand, restrictive policies limit individual choice by precluding certain options for individuals on 
the basis of their sex or gender identity. The prohibition of abortion limits a woman’s right to choose over 
her own body. A ban on gay marriage precludes the option to marry a partner of the same sex, such that 
some cannot marry because they are legally classified as either male or female and their partners are clas-
sified as the same. Restrictive LGR policy forces trans individuals to legally live in the gender that matches 
the assigned birth sex, rather than according to their gender identity. 
Countries all over the globe, but also in direct geographical proximity, vary greatly in the permissiveness of 
their morality policies (see e.g. Knill et al., 2016). In the case of abortion, countries’ regulations can straddle 
anything from total prohibition of abortion under all circumstances, as was the case in Chile4 until 2017, to 
leaving the decision entirely to the woman concerned up until a certain week during pregnancy, as we observe 
in South Africa. In terms of permissiveness, remaining in between the choice model and total prohibition the 
so-called indication model, under which certain indications have to be fulfilled in order for an abortion to be 
                                                     
4 Since 1980, Chile`s Constitution establishes a right to life that guarantees the protection of unborn life (1980). While Article 
119 of the Sanitary Code [Codigo Sanitario] of 1967 still permitted abortion on strictly medical grounds, one of the last acts of 
the Pinochet dictatorship was to change the Sanitary Code in 1989, ensuring that this option no longer existed (Dudley 1998, 
p. 49; see also law 18.826 substituting article 119 (Art. 119, 1989)). 
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legally obtainable. These include the pregnancy posing a threat to the mother’s health or being the result 
of rape or incest. Despite unsuccessful attempts to completely outlaw abortion in 2016, Poland’s current 
legislation5 is an example of such an indication model, as is Argentina’s regulation and Chile’s6 newly 
passed abortion law introduced in 2017. 
Regarding to gay marriage, the most permissive type of regulation is to include same-sex couples in the 
definition of marriage. South Africa and Argentina are among those countries that redefined the existing 
institution of marriage to include homosexual couples. Other countries, such as Chile7, chose to create a 
separate partnership system instead of redefining marriage. These usually entail fewer rights than marriage, 
especially when it comes to the adoption of children by same-sex couples. Most restrictive, however, are 
those countries that do not have any legal recognition of same-sex couples, as is the case in Poland. 
When it comes to LGR, some countries do not have any regulation in place, meaning the handling of requests by 
trans individuals to change their legal gender is up to the discretion of judges (e.g. Chile8, Poland9), resulting in 
arduous legal battles without certainty of an outcome for those concerned. The countries most supportive of 
individual choice are those in which the legal gender change is mostly an administrative process without invasive 
requirements, as in both South Africa and Argentina. In the middle of the spectrum in terms of permissiveness lie 
certain countries that have specific regulations in place to deal with requests of gender changes but impose the 
requirement of invasive and often lengthy procedures such as years of psychotherapy, forced sterilisation and di-
vorce or sex reassignment surgery to be met in order to change one’s legal gender. For instance, Germany’s law 
on transsexuals of 1980 requires sterilisation and divorce but these provisions were struck down by the constitu-
tional court10. Table 1 sums up the possible regulatory approaches in all three policy areas categorised according 
to their permissiveness, or how fully they grant or restrict individual choice in the matter under regulation. 
                                                     
5 Law of 7 January 1993 on family planning, protection of human foetuses and the conditions under which pregnancy termina-
tion is permissible (Zgromadzenie Narodowe [Parliament of Poland] (1993)). 
6 Law 41.866 of 2017 regulating the depenalisation of the voluntary interruption of pregnancy under three indications (Law 
41.866 of 2017 regulating the depenalisation of the voluntary interruption of pregnancy under three indications, 2017). 
7 Law 20.830 of 2015 Law of civil unions (Crea el Acuerdo de Unión Civil, 2015). 
8 On the 23rd of January 2018, a bill on gender identity was passed in the Chilean House of Representatives. At the time of 
writing the bill awaits further discussion in the senate. Should the senate approve, it is likely that the bill will have to pass 
through the constitutional court as well. However, the Chilean LGBT movement’s efforts may be thwarted as the newly elected 
conservative president Piñera will take office in April 2018. If the bill is not passed by then, chances for successful passage are 
slim (El Mostrador, 2018). 
9 In 2015 both chambers in Poland passed the Gender Accordance Act, which would have regulated LGR. However, a presi-
dential veto stopped the passage. In such cases, the vote of at least 50% of parliament can override a presidential veto. However, 
such a vote did not even take place as the relevant parliamentary committee failed to prepare a necessary report in time. As a 
result, Poland still remains without a codification of LGR procedures until today (ILGA, 2015). 
10 Germany passed transgender legislation in 1980 with very restrictive provisions. The German Constitutional Court struck 
down most of these provisions one by one, including mandatory divorce and sterilisation, a minimum age of 25 and compulsory 
surgery. While no new law has been passed by parliament, the constitutional court decisions shaped the provision so that 
currently ‘only’ two psychological or psychiatric evaluations certifying the person’s gender identity are needed to apply for a 
gender change (Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen 
Fällen, 1980).  
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Table 1. Classification Scheme of Regulatory Approaches in Sexual Rights Policy 
Policy Restrictive Medium Permissive 
Abortion Total Prohibition Indication Models Choice Models 
SSM No Recognition Partnership Regimes Marriage open to Same-Sex 
Couples 
LGR No Regulation Invasive Requirements Non-invasive Requirements 
Note: Invasive requirements for legal gender recognition include the following: sex reassignment surgery, sterili-
sation and divorce in case of the individual being married. Non-invasive requirements include medical diagnosis of 
gender dysphoria and the like, proof of medical treatment such as hormone therapy (but no surgery) and proof of 
psychotherapy. 
 
This classification scheme is applied to the three policies in South Africa, Argentina, Poland and Chile in 
Table 2. In the table we see that Argentina and South Africa have an overall permissive pattern of regula-
tion, while Chile and Poland regulate more restrictively in almost all policy areas and thus relatively ho-
mogenous regulatory patterns across policy issues within countries. This supports the idea underlying 
morality policy scholarship that such policies form a class of policies with common explanatory factors. 
 
Table 2. Sexual Rights Regulation in Argentina, Chile, Poland and South Africa 
Country Policy Permissiveness in the area of:  
 Abortion Same-sex mar-
riage 
LGR Overall  
Pattern 
Argentina  M (1922) X (2010) X (2012) X 
Chile M (2017) M (2015) 0 0 
Poland M (1993) 0 0 0 
South Africa X (1996) X (2006) X (2004) X 
Note: X: Permissive Regulation; M: Medium Regulation; 0: Restrictive Regulation, year in parenthesis. 
Source: own classification 
 
However, more puzzlingly from the perspective of morality policy scholarship, Argentina and South Africa regu-
late permissively. As we shall see, most of the prominent theories in the field would lead us to expect South Africa 
and Argentina to regulate at least as restrictively as Poland and Chile, rather than more permissively. 
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2.3 Existing Explanations for Sexual Rights Policy Output 
In recent decades, scholars have stressed various types of factors accounting for the permissiveness or 
restrictiveness of sexual rights policy output. Structural explanations focusing on culture and values of 
countries co-exist with approaches concentrating on the influence exerted by political parties and party 
systems, and with institutional explanations in studies investigating the impact of formal and informal 
state/church relationships on policy output. 
Explanations of the structural kind are prominent in morality policy research, because such policies regu-
late value conflicts and are therefore likely to be influenced by the values held by the electorate and poli-
ticians. These values are either measured directly, as is the case in accounts of public opinion, or approx-
imated through levels of socio-economic modernisation and religious adherence. 
Political parties play an important role in democratic decision making processes. Partisan theory, as one 
of the classic theories in comparative public policy scholarship, has also left its mark on analyses of morality 
policy (e.g. Brooks, 1992; Gindulis 2003; Levels et al. 2014; Budde et al. 2017). Furthermore, with the 
two-worlds theory by Engeli et al. (2012), an explanatory approach developed specifically for the context 
of morality policy argues that the presence or absence of a religious party cleavage is decisive for the 
politicisation of moral issues. 
Two related but fundamentally differing theoretical arguments exist about the impact of the relationship 
between state and church. Accounts stressing the importance of the formal state/church relationship look 
at the legal ties between those two institutions, i.e. whether a state has an official state-church, both are 
completely separated or something in between (e.g. Minkenberg, 2003). In contrast, scholars stressing 
the role of the informal state/church relationship assess historically formed cultures of conflict or coop-
eration between these institutions that can provide opportunities for church influence, independently from 
formal ties (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003; Knill & Preidel, 2014). 
When testing the explanatory potential of these theories for South African and Argentinian sexual rights 
regulations, the puzzling nature of their policy output becomes apparent. As we shall see, both countries 
deviate on almost all accounts from what we would expect according to theories, except in terms of their 
informal state/church relationship structures.  
 
Structural explanations: culture and values 
Structural explanations for policy output seek to account for cross-national variance in policies through 
the social and economic structure of polities. In morality policy research, theories that stress the role of 
 
- 16 - 
the levels of socio-economic modernisation and inequality of a country, of the denominational composi-
tion, religiosity of the population and of public opinion can be classified as structural explanations. For 
clarity, we will review each of these. 
Modernisation and inequality. As one of the most influential paradigms in social science re-
search (Stockemer & Sundström, 2016, p. 696), modernisation theory has also left its mark on compara-
tive morality policy scholarship. Perhaps this is the case because the notion of modernity is inextricably 
linked to progressive values. For instance, Borrillo (2009) observes that same-sex marriage policy has 
developed into a “thermometer of modernity”. 
Modernisation theory in comparative policy analysis posits that as a country’s level of socio-economic 
development rises, the state must to respond to an increasingly differentiated and individualistic society. 
Modernisation theory contains a functionalistic logic in which policy change is a state’s response to new 
demands emerging from a modernising society (Obinger, 1998, 2015). This is especially the case for the 
processes accompanying the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial society, such as rising education 
levels and living standards, urbanisation, technological advancements, demographic change, declining fer-
tility rates and women entering the labour force (Bell, 1974; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Norris & Inglehart, 
2004). Moreover, modernisation theory propounds that these processes trigger value shifts in the popu-
lation from material security towards self-expression and individualism, creating a demand for policies 
that reflect such post(modern) values. Studies that focus on or control for the role of socio-economic 
modernisation in morality policy research therefore predict high levels of modernisation in a country to 
be commensurate with permissive morality policy output (Asal, Brown, & Figueroa, 2008; Gindulis, 
2003; Mooney & Lee, 1995a, p. 622). 
A sub-variant of modernisation theoretical studies of particular importance for an investigation of non-
Western contexts stresses the importance of structural measures of inequality. Simon Kuznet (1955) fa-
mously argued that inequality relates to economic modernisation in an inverted U-shaped manner (Kuz-
net’s curve), rising in the early stages of economic development and falling again as modernisation ad-
vances. Viewed in that light, both Argentina and South Africa fall in the stage of economic development 
that is characterised by heightened inequality. 
In one of the few studies that explains morality policy output not in exclusively Western contexts, Blofield 
(2006) makes a structural argument about the relationship between socio-economic inequality and the 
divorce and abortion policies of Spain, Chile and Argentina. Blofield contends that moral reforms were 
successful in Spain because of its comparatively low inequality, whereas the conditions of high economic 
inequality in Chile and Argentina make it difficult for interest groups to accomplish their policy goals. 
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Accordingly, the causal chain of this argument is that high levels of inequality produce particularly influ-
ential political elites, many of whom do not have an interest in morality policy reform. Blofield argues 
that moral conflict regarding a policy issue can divert attention away from inequality. A religious moral 
conflict in a country can thus provide legitimacy to a discourse that focuses on a lack of morality as being 
the root cause for social problems instead of economic inequality. According to Blofield, this lack of sup-
port from the disproportionately influential elites make morality policy change in conditions of high ine-
quality less likely. 
To specifically account for abortion policy, various other studies test for the influence of structural 
measures of gender inequality (Asal et al., 2008; Budde & Heichel, 2016; Gindulis, 2003). The causal 
logic behind these studies is that decreasing gender inequality in societies not only influences female pref-
erences to embrace more pro-abortion stances, but also gives them the political clout to claim reproduc-
tive rights. 
The empirical expectations that can be derived from modernisation theory generally, as well as specific 
accounts on inequality, are that high levels of socio-economic modernisation go hand in hand with per-
missive policy output while high levels of inequality are equally congruent with restrictive regulations. 
Table 3 contrasts various measures of socio-economic development and inequality with the overall pattern 
of permissiveness of moral regulation in South Africa, Argentina, Poland and Chile. In addition to GDP per 
capita, a classic measurement for economic development, Table 3 includes the Human Development Index11 
(HDI) to better capture the social aspects of socio-economic modernisation. Regarding inequality, Table 3 
also includes the Gini Coefficient, a standard measurement of income inequality, and the Gender Inequality 
Index12 (GII), a composite measure which captures gender inequality in three dimensions – reproductive 
health, empowerment and economic status. While the Gini Coefficient ranges between 0 (full income equal-
ity) and 1 (maximal income inequality), the GII assigns a country’s ranking according to their relative position 
in terms of gender equality with other countries. Rank position 1 is assigned to the most equal country, while 
151 equates to the comparatively most unequal position available. 
  
                                                     
11 Apart from income per capita, the HDI also includes measures of education and life expectancy in order to comprehensively 
capture a country’s level of development. 
12 The Gender Inequality Index (GII) is the latest measure of Gender Inequality used by the UNDP. It was introduced to remedy 
the shortcomings of previously used measures, such as the Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM). The GII measures gender inequality on three dimensions. The first, reproductive health, is measured by 
maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates. The second dimension, empowerment, is measured by the share of women 
in parliament and with secondary education levels. The third is economic status, which is measured by labour force participa-
tion. 
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Table 3. Measures of Modernisation and Inequality contrasted with Patterns of Moral Regulations 
Pattern of 
moral regu-
lation 
Country GDP HDI Ranks  Gini Coefficient 
 
Gender Inequal-
ity Index Rank 
Permissive Argentina 12337.59 
(Up. Mid. Inc.) 
49  44.5 77 
South Af-
rica 
7508.78 
(Up. Mid. Inc.) 
118  63.1 94 
Restrictive Chile 12526.56 
(High Income) 
41 52.1 68 
Poland 16700.9 
(High Income) 
35 32.7 26 
Note: Up. Mid Inc. short for Upper Middle Income; GDP values 2010 from source: Penn World Table (Feenstra, 
Inklaar, & Timmer, 2013); HDI Ranks 2012; Gini Coefficient 2003-2012; Gender equality Index 2013 (ranked 1 
to 151), Source of all: (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015) UNDP 
 
Interestingly, with its permissive regulations, South Africa is the least modernised country in all measures 
listed compared with the others featured in the table. Furthermore, with a GDP of roughly $7 500 per 
capita in South Africa and $12 300 in Argentina respectively, both are classified as “Upper Middle Income” 
countries by the World Bank, while Chile and Poland are “High Income” countries. Despite that catego-
risation, Chile and Argentina actually display a very similar level of economic modernisation in terms of 
GDP, which would lead us to expect similar types of moral regulations. Even more surprising, with 
around $16 700, Poland’s GDP is more than double the size of South Africa’s. Thus, we would expect 
more restrictive regulations in South Africa. Yet, the opposite is true. 
Regarding the other measures, the situation is equally puzzling. Contrary to what we would expect and 
despite its restrictive sexual rights regulation, Poland takes the lead in terms of HDI ranking, followed by 
Chile. Argentina and South Africa occupy higher HDI ranks, indicating lower development, than the other 
two. Income inequality alone cannot explain why South Africa and Argentina regulate more permissively 
than the other two countries either, as both countries have substantively higher levels of inequality than 
Poland and Chile and we see a similar picture for the gender inequality index that ranks Poland and Chile 
as more equal than South Africa and Argentina.  
In summary, we find that the levels of development and inequality in South Africa and Argentina compared 
with Poland and Chile would lead us to expect sexual rights regulations in the former two to be at least as 
restrictive as in the latter two. 
Denominational composition and religiosity. The most important influence factor in the liter-
ature on morality policies is religion. The regulation of life and death, sexuality and reproduction touch 
upon many aspects of religious core doctrine (Heichel et al., 2013). This intimate connection between 
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morality and religion (Engeli, Green-Pedersen, & Thorup Larsen, 2012), and the fact that religious insti-
tutions are among the most outspoken opponents against morality policy change towards permissiveness, 
has provoked great interest in religion by scholars seeking to account for cross-national differences in 
moral regulations. 
Structural explanations of religious influence argue that the denominational composition of societies and 
levels of religiosity within the population shape policy output. Despite variations in operationalisation, the 
common expectation behind studies in this area is that countries with a high share of adherents to denom-
inations with conservative moral stances and/or religious devout populations regulate more restrictively 
than countries whose main denominations have more permissive moral standpoints, or possess a less reli-
giously devout population. 
Ever since Minkenberg (2002) used church attendance rates in his pioneering study to measure the reli-
gious devoutness of populations, this figure has been included in most studies on religious influence on 
morality policy. However, the picture is less clear cut when it comes to the denominational factor, as it is 
operationalised differently according to the cultural context under investigation. Possibly inspired by what 
Paternotte (2015, p. 660) calls the Scandinavian experience, i.e. same-sex partnership policy originating in 
the Protestant Scandinavian countries, studies set in a European context mostly use the strength of Catholi-
cism to operationalise denominational composition (Castles, 1994; Castles, 1998; Minkenberg, 2002). Con-
versely, in the context of the United States, scholars have focused on the role of evangelical Protestantism 
and the effect of its strongly opposed stance on permissive moral regulations (e.g. Scheitle & Hahn, 2011).  
This presents a complication in the application of arguments regarding the denominational composition in 
the context of the present study. Argentina, Poland and Chile, with their Catholic cultural heritage, would 
lend themselves to the European approach, while the structure of South Africa’s religious landscape is 
more akin to the US- American context, in that it has a great factionalism within Christianity that includes 
various, mostly Protestant churches with often conservative but diverging moral standpoints. 
In other words, while the share of the Catholic population represents a reasonable approximation of the 
prevalence of religious conservativism in the three Catholic societies, this is not the case in South Africa. 
Therefore, an investigation into the religious stratification of South African society must be a two-step 
process, comprising of a detailed measure of the various denominations present followed by an assessment 
of their moral standpoints. 
I tackled this challenge by first consulting the most recent South African national consensus on religious 
affiliation (the 2001 Census) to learn about the numerical representation of the various denominations. 
Afterward, I proceeded to code the degree of moral conservativism of the various Christian denominations 
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present from information on their individual websites, church publications and indirectly via their mem-
bership in international church associations that differ in levels of conservativism. This approach is similar 
to the one employed by Budde, Knill et al. (2017), with the difference that the latter article did so only 
for the one most prevalent denomination in every one of its sample countries, however this ventures into 
more detail by investigating the moral standpoints of any and every Christian denomination with more 
than 1 percent of the population adhering to it. 
Tables 4 and 5 contain data on the religious stratification of South African, Argentine, Polish and Chilean soci-
ety. South Africa’s more complex denominational structure is displayed separately from the others in Table 5. 
 
Table 4. Structural Measures of Religion contrasted with Patterns of Sexual Rights Regulations 
Pattern of sexual 
rights regulation 
Country Protestant Catholic  Church Attend-
ance > once per 
month 
Permissive Argentina 0.1 0.75 35.9 
South Africa   69 
Restrictive Chile 0.11 0.76 36.6 
Poland 0.00 0.88 67.2 
Data Sources: Denomination Composition: World Religion Dataset- National Religion Dataset, Christian Adher-
ence in 2010; Church Attendance Rates: World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014: Argentina 2013, Chile 2011, 
Poland 2012, South-Africa 2013. 
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Table 5.Christian Denominations and their Moral Stances in South Africa 
Denomination 
Percentage of Total 
Population 
Moral Stance 
Dutch Reformed 6.71 conservative 
Zion Christian 11.09 conservative 
Roman Catholic 7.1 conservative 
Methodist 7.37 permissive 
Pentecostal/Charismatic 7.64 conservative 
Anglican 3.84 permissive 
Lutheran 2.52 permissive 
Presbyterian 1.86 conservative 
Baptist 1.54 conservative 
Congregational 1.14 conservative 
Apostolic churches, including Apostolic Faith Mission 13.06 conservative 
Other Zionist churches 4.21 conservative 
Other African independent churches, including Ethiopian type 
churches 3.43 
conservative 
Other Christian churches 9.99 n.a. 
Source for Denominational Composition: Statistics South Africa, 2001 (Census 2001), Source for moral conserva-
tivism: own investigations 
 
Table 4 shows that the majority of the population in Argentina, Poland and Chile is Catholic. Due to their 
shared Catholic heritage, we would expect all of them to regulate restrictively13. While Poland has the highest 
percentage of Catholics in its population, Argentina and Chile have almost exactly the same share of Catholics, 
leaving us wondering why religion seems to have impacted upon Chile’s legislations, but not on Argentina’s. 
According to the last South African census that asked about denominational affiliation, over 80 percent of the 
population adheres to Christianity (Statistics South Africa, 2001, Census 2001). As displayed in Table 5, most 
of the Christian churches in South Africa have conservative stances on moral issues. Exception to this come in 
the form of the Methodist, Anglican and Lutheran churches. While the different data sources and approaches for 
South Africa vis-á-vis the other countries limit comparability between them, Table 5 shows that there is no wide-
spread moral permissiveness of churches that could explain permissive sexual rights policy output in South Africa. 
                                                     
13 The growing strength of conservative Evangelicalism in Latin America probably underestimates religious conservativism in 
Argentina and Chile, which would make them even more similar to Poland. 
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Table 4 also contains data on the religious devoutness within the four countries’ populations. South Africa 
and Poland have comparatively highly religious populations with almost 70 percent attending church at 
least once per month. Chile and Argentina have almost identical high church attendance rates to each 
other, around 35 percent. Thus, it is not the religious devoutness that explains the differences in regulatory 
permissiveness for those cases. 
Values in the Population. Public opinion holds an obvious importance for public policy in rep-
resentative democracies in general. Since morality policies are salient issues characterised by a high public 
involvement due to their technical simplicity, the stance of the population on moral issues should be very 
visible to politicians and the link between public opinion and policy output should be even more pro-
nounced than for other policies (Camobreco & Barnello, 2008; Mooney, 1999, p. 676). 
Modernisation theory and arguments about the influence of religion on morality policy and other cultural 
explanations all implicitly include the values of the population in their causal logic. These theories empha-
sise different factors and associated processes that shape the preferences of the electorate, which are then 
assumed to be translated into policy via the electoral democratic system. Morality policy research that 
includes public opinion as an explanatory variable (e.g. Badget 2009; Wetstein & Albritton 1995; Kreitzer 
2015) examines a shorter, more direct causal chain by refraining from testing those factors that influence 
values in order to directly assess whether the public’s stance on certain issues translates into policy. 
The empirical expectations that can be derived from public opinion as an explanatory factor for mo-
rality policy output is that high levels of public support for a certain issue should go hand in hand with 
a permissive regulatory pattern, and low levels of public support in countries should translate into 
more restrictive regulations. The direction of influence, however, is not as straightforward. It could 
also be the case that once a policy is adopted public opinion gradually changes. For example, opening 
up marriage to same-sex couples could normalise homosexual relations in the eyes of the public and 
decrease public aversion against homosexuality.  
The World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Survey (EVS) are the largest surveys of their kind on 
the value sets held by populations. Both include questions on stances on abortion and homosexuality but no 
specific question on gender change or gender identity. For a first non-policy specific test of the nexus between 
postmodern values prevalent in the population and sexual rights policy output, the twelve-item based Post-
materialism Index included in the survey datasets can be used. Table 6 lists results of the latest World Value 
Survey Wave (2010-2014).  
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Table 6. Post-Materialist Values in the Population contrasted with Pattern of Moral Regulations 
Pattern of moral regulation Country Mostly Post-Materialist Values, 
2010-2014, share of population in 
percent 
 
permissive 
Argentina 32 
South Africa 36 
Restrictive Chile 49 
Poland 36 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 (variable y002). 
Note: The Likert-Scale responses have been condensed by adding up all response categories that lay closer to the 
Postmaterialism end of the scale than to the Materialist end (i.e., the variable includes 6 response categories – 
Materialist, 1,2,3,4, Post-materialist). Included in the table as “Mostly Post-Materialist” are the accumulated re-
sponses of Post-materialist and categories 3 and 4. 
 
Contrary to what theory would lead us to expect, with 49 percent of the population, Chile has the highest 
prevalence of post-materialist values and Argentina has the lowest percentage (32 percent). Divergently 
regulating South Africa and Poland display the same relatively low spread of post-materialism (36 percent 
each). It can be seen that none of these four countries have a majority of the population who hold post-
materialistic values, which underlines the curiosity of South Africa and Argentina regulating  sexual rights 
issues permissively. 
Table 7 lists results from the WVS questions that ask respondents whether they agree that homosexuality 
and abortion are ever justified. These are contrasted with the disaggregated policy output for these issue 
areas. In order to rule out the potentially confounding effect of policy change on public opinion, the table 
lists the survey wave that precedes the first introduction of a permissive policy in the respective issue area 
(that is the 1989-1993 wave for data on abortion and the 1999-2004 wave for data on homosexuality). 
 
Table 7. Public Opinion contrasted with Sexual Rights Policy Output 
Country SSM Policy Homosexuality 
never justified 
Abortion Policy Abortion never 
justifiable 
Argentina X (2010) 36 M (1922) 45 
South Africa X (2006) 46 X (1996) 59 
Chile M (2015) 35 M (2017) 75 
Poland 0 56 M (1993) 43 
Source: World Values Survey Wave 1999-2004 (Question: Is Homosexuality justifiable?), World Value Survey 
Wave 1989-1993 (Is abortion justifiable?). 
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When it comes to homosexuality, the percentage of the population that found homosexuality unjustified under any 
circumstance was highest in Poland (56 percent) and South Africa (46 percent), with Argentina and Chile being 
roughly equal (36 and 35 percent, respectively). In Poland the high percentage of rejection of homosexuality corre-
sponds to the lack of legal recognition of same-sex partnerships. In contrast, in South Africa a relatively high percent-
age of the population opposing homosexuality stands at odds with the country having legalised gay marriage. In Chile 
and Argentina, still more than one third of respondents found homosexuality to be unjustified, and that just refers to 
homosexuality in general and not to the more far-reaching state recognition of homosexual relationships through 
legalising same-sex marriage. 
When looking at abortion policy and public opinion, Table 7 shows that very high levels of anti-abortion stances in 
the population of Chile (75 percent) go hand in hand with limited abortion rights in the country. A still considerable 
but lower 43 percent of Polish respondents found no circumstance to justify abortion. Notably, levels of strict anti-
abortion stances in South Africa and Argentina are even higher than in Poland (45 and 59 percent). Here especially, 
the opposing stance of a clear majority of the South African population forms a puzzling contrast to the country’s 
very permissive regulation of abortion. 
All in all, the values of the population as measured in public opinion data would lead us to expect South Africa and Argentina 
to regulate at least equally restrictively as Poland and Chile. More specifically, while the values of most indicators corre-
spond to policy output in the latter two, Argentina and South Africa clearly deviate from theoretical expectations. 
 
Political explanations: Political parties and party systems 
Partisan theory holds that the partisan composition of government influences policy output (Schmidt, 
1997). From this theoretical perspective, political parties are expected to systematically differ in the pol-
icies they pass. If parties are assumed to display policy-seeking behaviour, that is trying to pass policies 
that express their party’s ideological position (regardless of the popularity of that policy in the population), 
then an assessment of parties in power at the time of policy passage can provide insight into the causes of 
policy change or stagnation (Wenzelburger, 2015). 
While partisan theory is one of the classical approaches in comparative public policy research, an account 
specific to morality policy is the two words theory, by Engeli et al. (2012). Here the focus rests not on 
government participation by specific parties but historically formed religious party cleavages that shape 
party incentives to politicise moral issues in the first place. 
Partisan influence. Most comparative studies that use partisan theory to account for morality 
policy output use the strength of certain party families in government to test whether parties actually play 
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a role in morality policy creation. For the US context, studies have investigated the influence of Demo-
cratic control of government on policy output (e.g. Kreitzer, 2015, p. 46). Cross-national studies have 
mostly taken into account the role of leftist parties in government (Brooks, 1992, pp. 352–353; Budde, 
Heichel, Hurka, & Knill, 2017; Gindulis, 2003, pp. 62–64; Levels et al., 2014, p. 103). Since leftist 
parties tend to occupy more lenient positions on socio-cultural issues, the empirical expectation is gov-
ernment participation by leftist parties to lead to more permissive morality policies than under conserva-
tive governments. 
After studying government parties in South Africa, Chile, Poland and Argentina, we see that parties on 
the left held government responsibilities in all of them at some point since their respective democratisa-
tions. The exception to this is Argentina, which’s party system defies classification in traditional party 
families. In Chile, leftist parties formed part of governing coalitions multiple times since the end of the 
Pinochet regime. The Concertación por la Democracia, the centre-left party coalition that formed after the 
Pinochet regime has won several consecutive elections, dominating Chilean politics since the return to 
democracy. The coalition has since included the Socialist Party, the Radical Social Democratic Party, the 
Christian Democrats and the Party for Democracy (Alemán & Saiegh, 2007). Nevertheless, Chile’s gov-
ernments refrained from passing very permissive policies. Similarly, Poland has repeatedly been ruled by 
the Democratic Left Alliance (that formed as a centre-left electoral coalition in 1991 and later became a 
party in 1999) since democratisation without substantively reforming morality policies towards permis-
siveness (Szczerbiak, 2016). 
Since democratisation in 1994, South Africa has been governed nationally by the African National Con-
gress (ANC), Nelson Mandela’s liberalisation movement turned political party. The ANC was formed as 
an extra-parliamentary organisation in 1912 with the aim to represent the interests of the non-white (i.e. 
Black, Coloured, Indian) population that was excluded from participating in the electoral parliamentary 
system (Botha, 1996). During apartheid, race was the main political cleavage, rather than left and right. 
The phase that led up to democratisation restructured the main cleavage to be between a party’s “role in 
the apartheid system vis-a-vis their role in the liberation struggle” (ibid., p.  215f.). Despite this peculiarity 
of the South African party system, the ANC can still meaningfully be classified as a leftist party. Scholars 
describe the ANC as influenced by socialist principles (ibid: 221), as a mass-based party with increasing 
clientilistic and neopatrialistic tendencies (Lodge, 2014, p. 3), as a leftist mass-party (Heichel & Rinschein, 
2015) or as social democratic (Manifesto Project Dataset Version 2014b by Volkens et al., 2014). Due to 
the ANC’s uninterrupted rule since democratisation, all sexual rights policy reforms have been passed 
under the rule of a leftist party. 
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The picture is different in Argentina, where neither of the two dominant parties – the Peronist Party 
Partido Justicialista (PJ) and its main competitor the Radical Party Unión Civica Radical UCR) fit into the 
logic of cross-nationally comparable party families. The main political cleavage in Argentina is not between 
left and right, but rather between Peronism and Anti-Peronism (Ostiguy, 2009, p. 1). Both straddle the 
full spectrum of positions on the left and right and have historically crosscut the left-right axis. Since the rise 
of Peronism in the 1940s, a mass movement named after its founder and former Argentine president Juan 
Peron, scholars have struggled to categorise it (Kitschelt, 2010, p. 93; Lupu & Stokes, 2009, p. 58). Among 
others, the PJ has been labelled by experts as national-populist, social-Christian, neoliberalist and popular con-
servative (Ostiguy, 2009, p. 2). 
The passage of permissive sexual rights policies culminates during the second presidency of Cristina Fer-
nández de Kirchner (2011-2015). Kirchner’s second term in office represents the seventh presidential 
term led by the Peronist PJ since democratisation in 1984. Directly after the regime change, President 
Raul Alfonsín, member of the PJ’s main competitor UCR whose party unexpectedly won the first newly 
democratic elections, legalised (heterosexual) divorce. Only after years of stagnation in the legal moral 
landscape, the second presidency of Kirchner witnessed not only the legalisation of gay marriage in 2010 
but also the passage of the Gender Identity Law and also the Dignified Death Law on euthanasia regulations 
in 2012, as well as regulation on surrogacy motherhood in 2013. While that means that most sexual rights 
policy change towards permissiveness happened under PJ’s rule, the fact that all these changes happened 
during one PJ presidency only and that no change happened during the six PJ led governments before that 
suggests that PJ party ideology is not the main determining factor for policy change in Argentina. Further-
more, the defiance of the Argentine party system to conform to traditional party families underlines what 
other scholars have suggested before; a limited applicability of partisan theory for morality policy outside 
of the Western context, where it was developed (Blofield, 2006; Burns, 2005; see also Adam, Heichel, 
& Knill, 2015, p. 713). 
Still, more promising as an explanation of sexual rights policies in the cases under study might be not to 
focus on party ideology, but rather on the facilitating and restricting contextual factors in which parties 
operate. For instance, the institutional environment in which parties are embedded affects their room to 
manoeuvre in passing their preferred policies, and can even shape party preferences. As suggested by 
Engeli et al. (2012), the existence of a religious/secular cleavage in the party system can produce an in-
centive for parties to politicise morality issues. 
Two worlds theory. The two worlds theory by Engeli et al. (2012) posits that the configuration 
of a state’s party system produces distinct patterns in the politicisation of moral issues. Engeli et al. dis-
tinguish between what they call the religious and the secular worlds, with the presence or absence of a 
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historically formed religious party cleavage as the distinguishing factor between the two. If a religious 
cleavage is present in the party system, the country is classified as belonging to the religious world. Con-
versely, if there is no such cleavage, it belongs to the secular world (p. 2f.). The authors argue that polit-
icisation of moral issues is more widespread in the religious world. In the historical development of such 
party systems, a conflict between state and church has led to the formation of religious-based parties, 
typically in the form of a Christian democratic party (p. 15, 18). Morality issues play out unfavourably for 
these religiously influenced parties because nowadays these parties need to have a broader appeal to the 
public, not just devout Christians. However, when confronted with moral issues, these parties tend to 
position themselves according to traditional Christian values in order to stay true to their basic values. 
This reduces their appeal to the broader electorate, a conundrum secular parties exploit by intentionally 
politicising moral issues (p. 15-19). 
The central argument of Engeli et al. refers to the politicisation of moral issues rather than policy output. 
While politicisation can be seen as a necessary condition for policy output, it is not a sufficient one as it 
does not automatically translate into policy passage. When looking solely at policy output, this means that 
the co-occurrence of permissive morality policy output with a religious party cleavage would conform to 
the expectations of the two worlds theory. Permissive policy output, in the absence of a religious party 
cleavage, would oppose the two world theory. However, a case that displays both restrictive policies and 
a religious party cleavage would not say anything about the explanatory value of the theory, as it might be 
the case that politicisation is high but nevertheless no policy was passed. 
The first step in investigating whether there is a religious party cleavage in the party system is to identify 
whether there are any religious parties in a country at all. Secondly, it must be evaluated whether these 
parties have a significant proportion of votes in order to have sufficient seats in the legislature, and thus 
constitute a veritable cleavage in the party system. The example of Norway, which Engeli et al. study in 
their book, helps to guide an evaluation as to the threshold of what constitutes a religious cleavage. The 
Norwegian Christian Democratic party has traditionally gained around 5 to 14 percent of the votes. In the 
absence of a consistently stronger result, Engeli et al. (2012, p.188) argue the party was too weak to 
provoke a religious party cleavage, and so they that find the country to belong to the secular world. 
Historically, neither Argentina nor South Africa had a religious cleavage in their respective party systems. 
In the 19th century, where the foundation of many cleavages that still impact upon today’s party systems 
were laid, the societal cleavage between state and church in Argentina was rather mild and did not trigger 
the formation of religious parties (McGuire, 1995, p. 227). “[A]nticlericalism was weaker in late nine-
teenth-century Argentina than in Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, or Mexico.” (Ibid.) Even though a Christian 
Democratic party emerged in Argentina as early as 1954, it was never able to earn more than 5 percent 
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of the vote in legislative elections, and thus was not strong enough to create a religious cleavage in Argen-
tina’s party system. During the last military dictatorship (1976-1983), the ruling military junta endorsed 
a Catholic nationalistic agenda but since opposition was oppressed and the junta was not a party in a dem-
ocratic sense, we cannot speak of a religious party cleavage in Argentina during the dictatorship either. 
In South Africa, the picture is similar. During Apartheid (1948-1994) there was no religious party in the 
party system (Botha, 1996, p. 217). However, the Dutch Reformed Church was very closely linked to 
the National Party, the leading political force in the apartheid regime. Only after democratisation in 1994, 
religious parties emerged in the South African party system. The African Christian Democratic Party 
(ACDP) is based on Christian values, and so is the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP). But nei-
ther has ever achieved more than two percent of the vote in national elections (Heichel & Rinschein, 2015) 
and as a consequence, like Argentina, South Africa belongs to the secular world.  
In Chile, however, the presence of a strong Christian democratic party slants the country towards the 
religious world. It has a historical Catholic/secular cleavage in the party system that preceded the Pinochet 
military regime, and re-emerged after democratisation (Bornschier, 2009, p. 8). Poland also displays a 
strong religious cleavage in its party system (Bértoa, 2012), and therefore belongs to the religious world. 
Table 8 sums up the worlds inhabited by these countries under the two worlds theory, and contrasts it 
with patterns of sexual rights policy output. 
 
Table 8 Religious/Secular World Memb. contrasted with Patterns of Sexual Rights Policy Output 
Pattern of moral regulation Country Two worlds Classification 
Permissive Argentina Secular 
South Africa Secular 
Restrictive Chile Religious 
Poland Religious 
Note: Own classification based on the concept of Engeli et al. (2012) 
 
After studying the above, the empirical pattern is diametrically opposed to what we would expect to 
discover according to the two worlds theory. Theoretically, we would have expected the presence of a 
religious party cleavage in Chile and Poland to increase the chances for sexual rights policy change to-
wards permissiveness, as there is a large incentive for Christian Democratic parties’ opponents to po-
liticise such policies. However, since politicisation does not equate to policy change, these two cases, 
while not confirming to two worlds theory, do not contradict it either. In contrast, in Argentina and 
South Africa, we would have expected the lack of a historically formed religious party cleavage to result 
 
- 29 - 
in low chances of politicisation, and thus no policy change. Yet, as we have seen, this could not be 
further from the truth. 
 
Institutional explanations: Formal and informal state/church relationship 
The final important strand of explanations for morality policy output looks directly at religious institu-
tions. However, aside from the structural arguments explored above, institutional explanations examine 
certain characteristics of the relationship between state and church that shape how institutionalised religion 
can intervene in the policy process as an actor or interest group. 
Accounts on the formal ties between state and church claim the degree of legal separation between these two 
institutions, e.g. whether there is an established state-church that impacts on the effectiveness with which 
churches can influence policy. Theories that focus on the informal dimension of state/church relations stress 
the importance of historically grown cultures of conflict or cooperation between these two institutions, and 
the moral authority held by churches as a resource they can draw from to influence public policy. 
Formal state/church relationship. The rationale of the formal state/church relationship as ex-
planatory factor is based on scholarship on what is known as the economics of religion approach, which 
argues that a degree of separation between state and church leads to churches competing in a religious 
market and therefore become more appealing to the public because they work harder in light of the reli-
gious competition, i.e. other churches (Iannaccone, 1998). On the other hand, a church that is established 
as a state-church acts as a public institution and has little or direct real competition on certain pertinent 
issues in the public domain, resulting in a diminished effectiveness in attracting new adherents and keeping 
the old ones (ibid.). Relying on this reasoning, Minkenberg (2003) has employed the state/church rela-
tionship as an independent variable to explain political outcomes. Minkenberg takes church/state relations 
as the institutional setting that provides opportunity structures for religious interests to influence state 
policy (ibid., p. 196). He argues that a state/church relation “at the ‘separationist’ or ‘non-establishment’ 
end of the continuum provides a more favourable opportunity structure for the presence of religious in-
terests in the political process than does a privileged position of churches in countries with officially es-
tablished state-churches“ (p. 209). Regarding expectations for policy output, this means that higher de-
grees of separation should go hand in hand with more restrictive patterns of morality policy, since churches 
can be expected to become more impactful due to the favourable independence from the state. Con-
versely, a close state/church relationship should limit the effectiveness of churches and result in more 
permissive policies. 
In recent decades, scholars have considerably improved the classic trichotomy of state/church separation, 
cooperation and state-religion. For instance, Chavez and Cann (1992) developed a composite measure of 
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state and church proximity based on thirteen variables, covering 18 European states. Jonathan Fox’ “Re-
ligion and State” dataset (Round 2) represents the most comprehensive dataset of its kind in terms of 
country coverage (177 countries), and detail (151 variables). The data has been compiled on a yearly basis 
since 1990. The index on government involvement in religion comprises of fourteen categories, ranging 
from hostile to a religious state. Table 9 lists where Argentina, South Africa, Poland and Chile are ranked 
on Fox’s government involvement in religion index. 
 
Table 9. State/Church Relationship contrasted with Pattern of Sexual Rights Regulations 
Pattern of moral regula-
tion 
Country State/church Relationship 
 
permissive 
Argentina Active State Religion (11) 
South Africa Accommodation (4) 
Restrictive Chile Preferred (9) 
Poland Multi-tiered preferences (8) 
Note: Data Source: The Religion and State Project Round 2 (Jonathan Fox). Variable used: SBX* “Official Govern-
ment Involvement in Religion” 
 
The four countries cover a wide range of legal ties between state and religious institutions. South Africa 
scores lowest, with the state merely accommodating religion while Argentina has the highest score, clas-
sified as possessing an active state religion by Fox. Chile and Poland’s ranking in between the other two 
shows that formal state/church relations cannozt explain Argentina’s and South Africa’s more permissive 
policies. In the case of South Africa, the merely accomodationist state/church relations would even make 
us expect the most restrictive policies. 
Interestingly, these findings are in line with newer case study evidence that suggests it is not the formal 
state/church relationship that determines policy output, but rather the informal aspects of the nexus be-
tween religious institutions and the state that build the decisive opportunity structures for religious influ-
ence on policy. 
Informal state/church relationship. Newer comparative case studies stress the influence of 
historically developed patterns of conflict and cooperation between state and church that can foster or 
hinder churches’ abilities to influence policy (Grzymala-Busse, 2015, 2015b; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003; 
Knill & Preidel, 2014; Warner, 1961). These historical characteristics of state/church interaction can be 
independent from the formal or legal relationship between the two. Arguments on the role of the informal 
state/church relationship are based on a completely different logic than those relating to formal ties be-
tween them. As discussed above, a formal closeness between the two institutions is expected to decrease 
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church’s abilities to exert influence. However, scholars studying the informal aspects of this relationship 
find such informal cooperation to actually increase church influence on policies. 
Hennig’s (2012) detailed study on abortion, artificial insemination and same-sex partnership in Poland, 
Italy and Spain focuses on the interplay of religion and politics to account for the diverging regulatory 
approaches of those three countries. Hennig argues that a historically evolved pattern of conflict or coop-
eration between state and church impacts upon the contemporary interaction between political and reli-
gious actors. According to her, the critical distance of state and church in Spain allowed for politicians to 
opt for confrontation with the church in the policy processes. However, a culture of cooperation in Poland 
and Italy, make a reform towards permissiveness of morality policies less likely, as politicians ultimately 
shy away from opposing church views out of tradition and respect for the church’s moral authority (p. 388f.). 
Among other factors, Htun (2003) also underlines the importance of the informal state/church relations. 
Employing an institutional perspective in her study on abortion, divorce and family policies in Brazil, 
Argentina and Chile, she stresses the importance of liberal issue networks whose successes in influencing 
policy is contingent upon their fit with state institutions. She argues the state/church relationship to be 
among the various factors determining this fit. As a result, Htun (2003, p. 12) points out “that conflict 
between church and state create a window of opportunity for change, while Church-state cooperation 
precludes it”. In the case of Chile, Htun (3003, p. 8) argues that “church-state collaboration posed an 
obstacle to divorce. Chile’s progressive Church helped usher in the transition to democracy and was seen 
to play a crucial role in the consolidation of democratic rule and the protection of human rights.” 
In a recent study by Grzymala-Busse (2015) on the influence of religious institutions on morality policy in 
Poland, Croatia, Canada, the US, Italy and Ireland, the author argues that the degree of fusion between 
national and political identities shapes churches’ moral authority. A fusion between these two identities 
emerges historically in the genesis of the nation. A high degree of fusion translates into high moral author-
ity, which churches can use as a political resource to shape policy. Grzymala-Busse accordingly explains 
that the restrictive morality policies in Poland are due to the merging of Polish national identity with 
Catholicism that grants high moral authority and with that great policy influence to the Catholic Church there.  
Of the many important insights from these studies, the most crucial to this study concerns the informal 
aspects of state/church relations, such as cultures of cooperation and conflict to matter and, more practi-
cally, that religious influence on policy in Poland and Chile is enabled by the close ideological ties between 
state and church. Both Hennig (2012) and Grzymala-Busse (2015) assert that a high degree of moral au-
thority of the Catholic Church in Poland makes politicians willing to conform to the church’s policy prefer-
ences. Quite similarly, in the case of Chile, Htun (2003) has underlined the important role the Chilean Catholic 
Church played in bringing about democracy that led to state/church cooperation under democracy. 
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Applying these insights to the question of why Argentina and South Africa reformed their sexual rights 
policies against church preferences after democratisation (while policies remained mostly restrictive in 
Chile and Poland) brings us closer to answering the research question. If informal state/church coopera-
tion channelled the church’s doctrinal preferences into policy in both Chile and Poland, could an (infor-
mal) split between state and church in South Africa and Argentina block the influence of institutionalised 
religion in these cases? 
Whilst not looking at policy influence but rather explaining how churches choose their political allies, we 
largely owe the insight that state/church alliances can change when a regime changes to a study by Warner 
(1961). Warner explains the behaviour of the Catholic Church in Italy and France after World War II, 
with a recourse to the churches’ behaviour during Fascism. She asserts that the church neither opposed 
nor aligned with Fascism in Italy, allowing the church’s reputation to remain intact. Therefore the Catholic 
Church in Italy emerged as a legitimate ally for the Christian Democratic Party during democratic consol-
idation. In France, on the other hand, the church overly mingled with the Vichy regime, which Warner 
suggests to be the reason the tentative alliance between the church and the Christian Party in post-war 
France turned out to be unstable and faded away. 
Thus, while informal state/church relations develop historically, they are not necessarily stable over time. 
As Warner has shown, church behaviour during World War II Fascism has shaped political alliances for 
the churches post-fascism. A possible contention could be that the close ties between the apartheid regime 
in South Africa and the military dictatorship in Argentina created unfavourable opportunity structures for 
the church’s influence post-democratisation, which would imply a dramatic transformation of informal 
state/church relations during democratisation. Is a close relationship between state and church during 
authoritarianism key to understand the surprising patterns of sexual rights regulations in South Africa and 
Argentina today? Or more specifically, do the close ties between state and church during the last authori-
tarian regimes block religious influence on sexual rights policies in South Africa and Argentina today? If 
so, how does a causal mechanism connecting cause and outcome look like? 
 
Conclusion and implications 
Across the scope of reviewing sexual rights policies in the four third-wave democratisation countries of 
Argentina, South Africa, Chile and Poland, we see that the former two regulate very permissively, having 
some of the most permissive sexual rights policies worldwide. In contrast, the latter two belong to the 
most restrictively regulating countries. Chile and Poland’s sexual rights policies are in line with expecta-
tions derived from most of the prominent theories in morality policy research. Regulatory approaches of 
both countries reflect conservative attitudes towards abortion and homosexuality in the population, which 
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also corresponds with high levels of adherence to a religious denomination with a conservative moral 
outlook (Catholicism), and a very high and high church attendance rate in Poland and Chile, respectively. 
In fact, Chile and Poland are often the prime examples of religious influence on policy in studies on the 
subject (e.g. Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003). 
In contrast, when considering the empirical data on Argentina and South Africa, we see a most puzzling 
picture. While having similar or even higher rates of conservative stances concerning these issues in their 
populations than Chile and Poland, both countries regulate sexual rights issues permissively. Furthermore, 
just as their restrictively regulating counterparts, Argentina’s and South Africa’s populations predomi-
nantly adhere to religious denominations with conservative moral stances. Additionally, people attend 
church roughly equally as often in Argentina as they do in Chile, and even slightly more in South Africa as 
they do in Poland.  
Reviewing prominent theories in the literature on morality policies, Chile and Poland’s restrictive regu-
lations are not surprising. However, Argentina and South Africa’s regulatory patterns are curious to say 
the least. The question that flows from the regulation of abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR in South 
Africa and Argentina is threefold.  
- First, why do they display a permissive pattern of moral regulations where we would expect them 
to regulate as restrictively as Chile and Poland do?  
- Second, rather than moving incrementally towards more permissive policies, if they reformed 
regulations, the changes were extreme and sudden. Why did both countries jump from restrictive 
regulatory status quos to very permissive options without major intermediate steps? 
- Third, Argentina’s abortion regulation deviates from the generally permissive pattern of sexual 
rights policies in the country, as well as from the succession of rights observed in Europe where 
countries granted reproductive rights decades before LGBT rights. 
Despite these unusual patterns of regulations in South Africa and Argentina, there is a striking omission of 
scholarship concerning these countries in morality policy literature. With few notable exceptions, the vast 
majority of studies have focused on the European and US context, often even defining morality policy 
change as a Western phenomenon. As the policies in South Africa and Argentina clearly illustrate, this 
focus is no longer justified. However, a study on sexual rights policy in South Africa and Argentina does 
not simply fill a gap in the literature in terms of overlooked geographic and cultural contexts. Looking at 
cases in which religious influence on policy is absent despite widespread religious conservativism also con-
tributes to the literature canon by helping to refine existing theory on religious influence on policy. In 
light of what studies on morality policy and religion and politics have taught us and also considering that 
even in the most secular societies, rites of passage such as births, weddings, and funerals are still celebrated 
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in religious terms, the question we need to ask now is not why churches matter but how church influence 
can be defeated. 
An exciting new body of research has ventured into the concrete pathways and mechanisms through which 
religious doctrine can translate into policy (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003; Knill 
& Preidel, 2014). What remains unexplored, however, is how religious institutions can be blocked from 
influencing policy in highly religious contexts. In short, we are lacking a mechanism of religious defeat. 
This study aims to fill this gap. 
A mechanism of religious blockage is not simply an inversion of a mechanism of religious influence. Both 
solve different questions and require a focus on different actors. For instance, Grzymala-Busse (2015), 
aims to solve the question whether churches can influence policy in secular states at all. Her argument is 
that a fusion of national and political identities fosters churches’ moral authority. The proposed causal 
chain is that churches with high moral authority can gain institutional access to the political system, ena-
bling them to influence policies through the sordid backroom of politics. With less moral authority, she 
argues, churches only have the option to form less effective party alliances. Finally, Grzymala-Busse (2015, 
p. 13) posits that no moral authority means there is no mechanism of religious influence. 
However, it is worth adding that the simple absence of a mechanism of religious influence doesn’t suffi-
ciently explain why permissive policies are passed, and precisely how religious institutions can be blocked 
from exerting influence. A mechanism explaining permissive policy output must give recognition to social 
movements as the main antagonists of religious institutions, and must contain a substantiation of how these 
social movements manage to overpower religious influence – often against all odds. 
This study will attempt to build on the portentous insights provided by existing studies that contend 
informal state/church relations, although formed historically but often unstable over time, to be signifi-
cant for policy output and that alliances with authoritarian regimes reduce the chances of churches to 
allying with political parties after regime change. The following chapter will develop a causal chain that 
leads from close ties between state and church during authoritarian rule to permissive sexual rights policy 
outputs today. 
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3 Hypothesising a Causal Mechanism: From Ideological  
Symbiosis to Sexual Rights Policy 
 
Having identified the informal aspects of the state/church relationship during South Africa and Ar-
gentina’s last authoritarian regime as the potential causal condition for sexual rights policy output, 
what we are still missing is a detailed conceptualisation of an empirically testable mechanism causally 
connecting these two phenomena. 
According to Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 29),  a causal mechanism for a process tracing study should 
be conceptualised “as a series of parts composed of entities engaging in activities” such that the causal 
mechanism represents a theory that is composed of interlocking parts that transmit causal forces from X 
to Y (ibid. p. 29). Such a conception is useful as it necessitates us to be explicit about the actors as well as 
the actions that bring about change (transmitting causal force). Figure 1 visualises the hypothesised causal 
chain consisting of the causal condition that triggers three intermediate steps, eventually leading to the 
outcome of permissive sexual rights policies. 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesised Causal Mechanism 
Source: Own illustration. 
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As illustrated in Figure 1, what triggers the mechanism to unfold is a mutually beneficial ideological rela-
tionship between church and state, which I term ‘ideological symbiosis’, during authoritarian rule. This 
leads to permissive sexual rights policy output in third-wave democratisation countries because the demise 
of the former regime goes hand in hand with a delegitimation of religious influence on politics. If a religious 
institution has become complicit in the ideological legitimation of the regime and its human rights abusing 
practices, then religion can no longer be used as a tool for identification and legitimation after democratisation. 
Thus, the newly democratic regime needs to look for an alternative source of political and moral legitimacy. 
Human rights, the most legitimate principle of the time of third-wave democratisations, then functionally 
replace religious principles as the meta-source of moral values for politics and thus the focus of the nascent 
democratic identity of the country. A constitutional identity focused on a secular interpretation of human 
rights creates favourable political opportunity structures for social movements wishing to push for policy 
change. Social movement actors can frame their claims as human rights issues and their liberation as a 
litmus test for the credibility of the new democratic government’s commitment to the constitutional iden-
tity. As a result, politicians face rhetorical entrapment in that their commitment to human rights demands 
the mitigation of current human rights violations by passing sexual rights policies. All the while, religiously 
based counter arguments can easily be dismissed as non-democratic and diametrically opposed to human 
rights. This proposition will become clearer as we explore further in more detail below. 
Process tracing is a qualitative method that allows for a context sensitive, in-depth analysis of the causal 
mechanism that connects cause and effect within a specific case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Trampusch & 
Palier, 2016). Process tracing is particularly useful for “obtaining an explanation for deviant cases” (George 
& Bennett, 2005, pp. 214–215) and it is the method of choice whenever the researcher is assessing “not 
only whether something mattered or made a difference but also how exactly it influenced the outcome.” 
While comparative methods are based on the logic of variation and co-variation of potential causes and 
effects across cases, causality in process tracing is established by evaluating the congruency between pre-
dicted information and actual empirical information for each part of a hypothesised causal chain within a 
case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 4). Employing process tracing as a method for the analysis of Argentina 
and South Africa enables a thorough test of the unfolding of the hypothesised mechanism in both cases, 
and therefore rule out mere coincidental covariation between hypothesised cause and outcome. 
The drawback of process tracing as a stand-alone-approach is that inferences are limited to the case(s) 
under study. “On its own merits, a single process-tracing theory test is unable to produce any cross-case 
inferences but can only update our confidence in the presence/absence of a causal mechanism in a partic-
ular case, enabling strong within-case inferences to be made but not cross-case inferences.” (ibid., p. 152) 
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For inferences across a broader set of cases, process tracing needs to be combined with cross-case com-
parison. Carrying out process tracing in two cases rather than one adds a comparative element to process 
tracing as a single case method, and suggests a broader scope of applicability for the theoretical proposi-
tion. South Africa and Argentina are geographically and politically independent cases, and establishing a 
common causal mechanism in these very different contexts suggests a strong case for the mechanism’s 
explanatory potential beyond those two cases. The conclusion of this study will explore the theoretical 
proposition’s suitability to other cases as well. 
Currently, various types of process tracing exist. Beach and Pedersen recommend what they call theory 
testing process tracing whenever existing theories allow to add and order the components of a causal 
process and thus allow the researcher to create a hypothesised causal mechanism that can be tested (Beach 
& Pedersen, 2013, p. 65). Following some more elaboration on process tracing, the remainder of this 
chapter fleshes out the macro-historical mechanism. This will be done by drawing on the insights and 
concepts of qualitative studies on the religious influence on politics, and complement them with concepts 
originating in historical institutionalism as well as social movement theory. 
 
3.1 Process Tracing 
While the tracing of causal processes is part of most small-n research designs, process tracing has devel-
oped as a distinct approach of analysis in political science in recent years (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 
p. 79). Its rapidly growing popularity has encouraged many scholarly contributions in the field of qualita-
tive methods, aiming to more strongly define the somewhat fuzzy usage of the term as a label for any study 
that includes some type of causal narrative into a distinct stand-alone research approach with its own in-
ferential logic, terminology and best practice rules (among the most important contributions on process 
tracing methodology are (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Bennett, 2008; Bennett & Checkel, 2015; George 
& Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012, 2012; Hall, 2008; Mahoney, 2010, 2012; 
Rohlfing, 2012; Trampusch & Palier, 2016; Waldner, 2012). 
Ironically, increased scholarly interest in recent years in shaping process tracing into a stand-alone method 
has led to the development of heterogeneous and sometimes even incommensurable definitions and views 
about what process tracing is and best practices when applied to research. In a recent overview article 
about process tracing, Trampusch and Palier (2016, p. 438) identify 18 different variants of this method and 
describe “the current situation as one of internal debate, considerable disagreement, and occasional confusion.” 
Starting with an abstraction from the diverging views on process tracing, it has become generally agreed 
that it is a method for in-depth case study research that allows for within-case causal inference by focusing 
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on the processes that link causes to their effects (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 23; Blatter & Haverland, 
2012, p. 81). Consequently, process tracing can help opening up the black box of causality (Beach 
& Pedersen, 2013; Trampusch & Palier, 2016). This is done by theorising a chain of events that, in tem-
poral and logical succession, lead from cause to effect (see Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Collier, Brady, & 
Seawright, 2004; George & Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2003). 
Most of the contributions in qualitative methods point out that the logic under which causal inferences are 
drawn in process tracing differs from the variance/co-variance logic that underpins quantitative research 
designs (as well as small-n comparative methods). As most prominently expressed by King, Keohane, and 
Verba (1994, p. 129), causality can be established based on the co-variation between values of X and Y 
across a range of cases. This understanding of causality is particularly useful when the research aim is 
finding the average effect of a variable across a population of cases. On the other hand, process tracing 
aims to specify the processes which causally connect independent and dependent variables within individ-
ual cases (Hall, 2008, p. 306). Causality in process tracing is established through an assessment of the 
empirical fingerprints left by a causal theory within a case. In other words, empirical information is eval-
uated by whether it suggests a hypothesised causal connection to be present or not. Thus, causal inferences 
in process tracing are drawn based on a careful comparison between predicted evidence (what we predict 
to find if the hypothesised causal relation is true) and actual evidence (what is actually revealed in empirical 
reality), (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Collier, 2011; George & Bennett, 2005; Rohlfing, 2012).  
The empirical information required for process tracing as a case-based research approach differs from 
quantitative research. Collier and Brady (2004, 2010, pp. 184–188) coined the term “causal process ob-
servations” (CPOs) to distinguish the type of empirical evidence required for qualitative research from the 
“data-set observations” (DSOs) that need to be gathered for variance-based designs. DSOs are “an insight 
or piece of data that provides information about the context or mechanism and contributes a different kind 
of leverage in causal inference. It does not necessarily do so as part of a larger, systematized array of 
observations” (ibid. 2010, pp. 184–185). Rather, it sheds light onto causal mechanisms and is an indis-
pensable supplement and/or alternative to variance-based inference. Other than the data matrices ana-
lysed by quantitative researchers, CPOs do not have to be in any particular standardised form. This means 
CPOs can take on the form of qualitative but also of numerical information (Collier, 2011, p. 825). While 
many scholars use different terminology for the empirical information required for process tracing, there 
is a general consensus that it differs from the empirical information used in other types of research. As a 
result, most scholars refer to the concept of CPOs when coining their own terminology, e.g. Bennett 
(2008) using the term “process tracing observations” and Beach and Pedersen (2013) using the term “evidence”. 
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The variant of process tracing employed in the present study is what Beach and Pedersen (2013) call “the-
ory-testing process tracing”. In this variant the researcher deduces a theory from the existing literature 
and then tests whether evidence shows that each part of a hypothesised causal mechanism is present in a 
given case, enabling within-case inferences about whether the mechanism functioned as expected in the 
case (...) (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, pp. 2–3). 
The aim of this variant of process tracing is to verify the presence or absence of a hypothesised causal 
mechanism in a specific case. Through a diligent application of this method, the prior certainty of the 
existence of the mechanism in the case can be updated or disconfirmed. However, no inferences regarding 
a broader set of cases can be done without combining process tracing with other methods. 
Each part of the hypothesised mechanism needs to be tested separately and the failure to demonstrate the 
existence of even just one part of the mechanism disconfirms the presence of the whole mechanism. Need-
less to say, each part of the theorised mechanism needs to be fastidiously translated into empirically ob-
servable manifestations. Thus, the researcher needs to reflect about what empirical traces could increase 
(or decrease) confidence in the presence of the mechanism prior to data collection. The expected empir-
ical information is then compared with the actual empirical information. 
It is important to note that pieces of empirical information differ with regards their inferential leverage. 
It is useful to think of the logic of process tracing as similar to criminology. In a murder case, finding a 
suspect at the scene of crime holding a smoking gun is normally a more valuable piece of evidence than 
finding a suspect’s DNA in the victim’s apartment. While few alternative explanations could account for 
a suspect being caught at the crime scene with the murder weapon in hand, more plausible explanations 
could be put forward to account for the DNA traces. For instance, the victim and suspect could have been 
friends, which means the suspect has probably visited the apartment before, leaving DNA traces without 
necessarily being the murderer. Consequently, a smoking gun would allow the identification of the mur-
derer unambiguously, while the DNA traces would not. However, the latter is more likely to be found by 
a detective than a coincidental stumbling across a smoking gun. If the detective is not as lucky as to be 
presented with unequivocal evidence, she has to collect an array of weaker types of evidence from which, 
taken altogether, she infers that the suspect is indeed the murderer beyond a reasonable amount of doubt. 
In order to determine the inferential leverage of pieces of information, process tracing scholars (e.g. 
Beach and Pederson 2013; Bennett 2010; Collier 2011) suggest using four types of empirical tests that 
build on the work of van Evera (1997). Each of the four tests – doubly decisive test, smoking gun test, 
hoop test, straw in the wind test - possess a unique combination of high/low theoretical certainty and 
high/low theoretical uniqueness. In these tests, certainty refers to the veracity or positive identification 
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of particular evidence if the mechanism is present. Uniqueness refers to whether the presence of a cer-
tain piece of evidence can uniquely discriminate between the hypothesised part of the mechanism and alter-
native explanations. 
A doubly decisive test is the strongest of all four tests as it combines high certainty with high uniqueness. In this 
case, the researcher can be certain that if the piece of evidence is not found, the mechanism is not present 
(certainty) and if it is found, it cannot be caused by something else than the mechanism (uniqueness). 
A ‘smoking gun’ refers to a piece of evidence that has high uniqueness. Should the test reveal that the 
evidence indeed is found, it follows that the specific part of the mechanism is surely present. Its name 
metaphorically draws from classic criminology where a detective finding a suspect with the smoking gun 
in hand provides overwhelming evidence that this person is indeed the murderer. However, a smoking 
gun test possesses low theoretical certainty; if the gun is not found, this does not prove the suspect is not 
guilty. Thus, while the presence of a smoking gun is telling regarding the presence of one part of the 
mechanism, the absence of a smoking gun is not allowing inferences regarding the absence of that part of 
the mechanism. 
Conversely, a hoop test works the other way around. It has high certainty in that evidence is very likely 
to be found if the mechanism is present, but a piece of evidence in a hoop test cannot discriminate between 
the presence of the mechanism and other potential causes. 
Finally, a straw in the wind test represents rather weak evidence in that it has both a low uniqueness and 
a low certainty. In itself the presence of evidence of this kind does not allow for causal inference. Such a 
test only becomes stronger when combined with other stronger types of evidence or in the presence of 
many Straw in the Wind tests, and when taken together make the presence of the mechanism plausible. 
Table 10 sums up the four test types and the inferential leverage they possess. 
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Table 10. Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference 
  Theoretical Certainty 
  Low High 
 
 
Theoretical 
Uniqueness 
 
Low 
1.Straw in the Wind 
 
a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hy-
pothesis, but does not confirm it. 
b. Failing: Hypothesis is not elimi-
nated, but slightly weakened. 
3. Smoking Gun 
 
a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis. 
b. Failing: Hypothesis is not 
eliminated, but somewhat 
weakened. 
 
High 
2.Hoop 
 
a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hy-
pothesis, but does not confirm it. 
b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis. 
4. Doubly Decisive  
 
a. Passing: Confirms hypothesis 
and eliminates others. 
b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.  
Source: Adapted from Beach and Pedersen (2013: 103) and Collier (2011: 825). Collier himself builds on Bennett 
(2010: 210) who in turn builds on categories formulated by Van Evera (1997, 31–32). 
 
3.2 Causal Condition. State/Church Ideological Symbiosis during 
Authoritarian Rule 
The hypothesised causal condition that sets off the mechanism leading to permissive sexual rights policies 
after democratisation is an ideological symbiosis between state and church during authoritarian rule. Ide-
ological symbiosis is a mutually beneficial alliance between state and church that includes the regime con-
structing its political identity as based on religion; and the church supporting this regime. What is ex-
changed is legitimacy for political influence; the regime gaining the former, granting the latter to the 
church in return. Such symbiosis can only grow in religious societies. Both institutions collude in using 
this societal importance of religion to justify increased church influence as well as the regime’s style of 
rule. Ideological symbiosis is a type of informal state/church relationship that differs from the official 
institutional ties captured by measures of state/church or state-religion closeness such as the ones by Fox 
(2011) or Chavez and Cann (1992) and it can occur independently from formal classification criteria. 
Ideological symbiosis is present when a) the state employs arguments based on religion to construct its claims 
of legitimacy, and when b) the church readily accepts this framing and supports the authoritarian regime. 
At least since Max Weber, the legitimacy of political rule has been a central topic in political science and 
political sociology. According to Weber, systems of power “establish and cultivate the belief in its legiti-
macy” (Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 1979, p. 213). The belief in the legitimacy of authority is directly linked 
to a system’s stability. Legitimate authority is less ‘costly’ than any other form of authority because it does 
not need to be enforced through force or rewards (Matheson, 1994, p. 157). Generally, the concept of 
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legitimacy denotes the acknowledgement or recognition of something or someone as rightful and appro-
priate. “Deployed by students of national legal systems, the concept of legitimacy is often used to postulate 
and explain what, other than a command and its enforcement, is required to create a propensity among 
the citizens generally to obey the rulers and the rules.” (Franck, 1990, p. 16) 
Divinely derived legitimacy has proven particularly appealing to statesmen across the ages. The advantages 
of religion as a source of political legitimacy are threefold. First, it exempts political rulers from having to 
prove their claim to authority. God cannot be proven and neither can God’s will, and thus support from 
religious institutions constitutes a convenient source of credibility. Second, political rulers and regimes 
can benefit from religion’s claim to transcendental or divine sanction and reward. Exploiting the belief in 
punishment or reward in the afterlife can be a powerful political coercion mechanism. Third, religions 
often offer a readily available infrastructure to spread (political) ideology to the masses. Through mass and 
other religious activities, church officials can reach even very remote parts of a country and directly influ-
ence all sections of the population. Priests, for example, preaching in support or against specific political 
ideas or leaders, can be an invaluable resource for politicians. All in all, the support from religious author-
ities or even an overlap between religious and state authorities can be a cost-effective and desirable source 
of political legitimacy. 
Equally, religious institutions can benefit from lending legitimacy to political leaders. From the oppor-
tunity to influence policy according to church doctrine to securing financial support and other privileges, 
there is a lot to gain for religious institutions by cooperating with the state. However, as Grzymala-Busse 
(2015) contends, mingling with politics can also be a dangerous route for churches. She argues that a 
church’s moral authority and its ability to influence policy can suffer from alliances with political parties 
as it can lead the church to being perceived as engaging in party politicking, rather than working for the 
common good of the nation. More generally, “moral authority can be squandered by failing to live up to 
standards the churches set for themselves, the standards by which they were judged worthy of authority 
in the first place.” (Grzymala-Busse, 2015, p. 39) In other words, churches’ moral authority can be de-
stroyed by actions regarded as immoral. For instance, the paedophilia scandal in the Irish Catholic Church 
has damaged the traditionally high moral authority of the Church there (ibid.). It is not hard to imagine 
that an ideological symbiosis with a human rights abusing authoritarian regime such as the apartheid regime 
or the Argentine military dictatorship is regarded as very immoral; and such alliance to damage moral 
authority of churches. 
For a symbiosis to be present it is necessary that both parties, state and church, are willingly involved. 
Chile can serve as an illustration of the conceptual boundaries of ideological symbiosis. In Chile, the Pino-
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chet regime used religious rhetoric but the Catholic Church rejected ideological entanglement. The mili-
tary junta that came to power in Chile after a coup in 1973 justified its regime with a defence of Western 
Christian values against Marxism and proclaimed the regime’s economic policies to be an application of 
social principles formulated by the Pope (Sigmund, 1986, p. 32). However, these sympathies proved to 
be unilateral as the Bishops Conference called for a restoration of democracy and criticised the regime for 
human rights abuses (ibid., p.33). The Catholic Church in Chile became the only institution that publicly 
criticised the violent repression of the regime, establishing the moral opposition against the dictatorship 
(Huntington, 1991a, p. 33). Thus, Chile did not have an ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule. 
Rather, the Chilean Catholic Church challenged the military dictatorship and earned considerable moral 
authority during democratisation and thereafter. 
Only when both state and church have actively allied, the causal condition of the mechanism is met. Thus, 
only such an active alliance triggers the onset of the causal mechanism. A relationship that was contested 
by one of the parties or that was more ambiguous and less visible would not become a disadvantage for a 
church under a new regime. That is the case because the discreteness of church influence rests on the 
potential of political opponents to use the immoral symbiosis to challenge religious influence on political 
matters under a new regime. 
 
3.3 Causal Mechanism Part 1. Constitutional Identity based on Human Rights 
An ideological symbiosis between state and church in the past has important repercussions for a country’s 
democratic present. The core argument here is that for third-wave democratisation countries, a past im-
moral alliance between these two institutions leads to the emergence of a new constitutional identity after 
democratisation that excludes religion and is rather based on a secular interpretation of human rights; the 
ladder functioning as a kind of political ersatz-religion. This then provides the legal and ideological context 
in which struggles about sexual rights policies take place later on and are the subject of subsequent parts 
of the causal mechanism. 
 
The international normative context of third wave democratisation 
Before unpacking the causal connection that forms this first part of the causal chain, we will need to first 
consider the international normative context of third wave democratisations, as it forms an important 
scope condition for the mechanism. 
One of the reasons for the third wave of democratisation was a deepening legitimacy crisis of authoritarian 
regimes in a global environment in which a focus on democracy and human rights was rapidly embraced 
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in the international community (Huntington, 1991b, p. 45). Since the end of WWII, the criteria for what 
constitutes legitimate government has evolved to be the protection of human rights, rather than territorial 
sovereignty alone (Selznick, 2008, p. 49). What’s more, by the time of the third wave of democratisation, 
the international discourse was shifting to include both reproductive and LGBT rights in the scope of 
human rights protection. 
For instance, the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and includes affirmations about women’s 
reproductive rights. It is important to note, however, that assertions of reproductive rights in international 
human rights treaties, including CEDAW, leave ample room for interpretation when it comes to abortion. 
This is the result of abortion being a hotly debated subject, often rejected on cultural and religious 
grounds. Therefore, a right to abortion would not obtain intercultural consensus. Even the less conten-
tious notion of reproductive rights triggered more countries to enter reservations to their ratification to 
CEDAW than for any other human rights treaty (Steiner, Alston, & Goodman, 2008, p. 185). 
While different interpretations of sexual and reproductive rights have existed from the earliest stages of 
the international human rights discourse, a clash between religious and secular interpretations became 
increasingly visible at the 1995 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). 
The link between religion and these rights was actively discussed and several Muslim-majority and Cath-
olic-majority countries, as well as the Holy See voiced reservations about provisions regarding sexual and 
reproductive rights in the Program of Action adopted at the Cairo Conference (United Nations Population 
Fund, 2016, p. 24). The ICPD does not include a right to abortion, but rather underlines the need for 
safe, affordable and effective health services, including reproductive health care. However, since the Cairo 
conference, abortion rights have “become a marker whether states are committed to women’s reproduc-
tive rights” (Rebouche, 2011, p. 12). 
LGBT rights explicitly found their way into international human rights discourse when the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled against Northern Ireland’s sodomy law in 1981 (Dudgeon vs. The United King-
dom). A similar case in the UN framework took place when the former UN Committee of Human Rights 
(UNCHR) struck down Tasmania’s sodomy law in 1994 (Toonen vs. Australia) (Sanders, 2002). After that 
landmark decision, other UN bodies declared that their respective treaties also apply to sexual minorities, 
among them the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Committee 
against Torture (CAT) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Lau, 2004, p. 1702). 
Legal gender recognition specifically was first acknowledged as a human right in the case of Lydia Foy in 
Ireland. Registered as a boy at birth, Dr Lydia Foy unsuccessfully tried to obtain a new birth certificate 
reflecting her female gender. After years of legal struggle, an Irish High Court Judge declared in 2007 that 
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the lack of LGR policy in Ireland is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (Farrell, 
2012). In the same year, a group of international human rights experts created the Yogyakarta Principles, 
the most important document for the incorporation of LGBT rights into international human rights. The 
principles feature the application of existing international human rights standards on sexual orientation 
and gender identity. Although not legally binding, they have influenced jurisprudence, practices and laws 
addressing discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. The UN High Commission for 
Refugees now cites these principles in its guideline for the protection of refugees (ISHR, 2016). 
In 2010, then U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for defending the human rights of LGBT people 
imprisoned for their sexual orientation, and on a different occasion in the same year he rallied against 
homophobic bullying (Gary & Rubin, 2012). A report titled “The United Nations Speak Out: Tackling 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity”, jointly published by the U.N. 
Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) and the Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 
in 2011 serves as an illustration that LGBT rights as human rights have become mainstream in the UN 
human rights framework (Gary & Rubin, 2012). However, the fact that several delegates left the room 
when Hillary Clinton famously proclaimed that gay rights are human rights, during a speech at the United 
Nations’ Palais des Nations in Geneva in 2011, shows that this notion is still strongly contested (Patel, 2015). 
While both reproductive and LGBT rights have featured prominently in the international human rights 
discourse over the years, they remain contested and up to each respective state to interpret and enforce 
whether human rights include reproductive and LGBT rights. This circumspect interpretation is contin-
gent upon the cultural, religious and political context of the state which can be shaped by past and current 
alliance structures with religious institutions. 
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Democratisation as critical juncture for constitutional identity 
As Smith (1991, p. 99) argues, an alteration of the political regime always marks a shift in the national 
identity of states. In that sense, a regime change can be conceptualised as a critical juncture in the identity 
of a country. The constitutional identity of countries is a specific political identity that is, while not inde-
pendent, conceptually distinct from national identity. As Jacobsohn (2006, p. 363) contends, constitu-
tional identity “emerges dialogically and represents a mix of political aspirations and commitments that is 
expressive of a nation's past, as well as the determination of those within the society who seek, in some 
ways, to transcend that past.” His conception of constitutional identity rests on the understanding of con-
stitutions as the foundation for social and legal relations of a polity (ibid. p.364). 
Constitutional identities are constructed within and by the political system. They contain more than the 
text of constitutions but also how this text relates to the national identity, how it is interpreted by the 
judicial and political system, and what narratives it contains about the essence of the nation and how the 
current form of government relates to that. It is central to the political legitimacy of governments as it 
translates certain aspects of the nation’s characteristics into claims of legitimacy for a particular form of 
government. Further, the constitutional identity sets the boundaries for what is recognised as a legitimate 
argument in political debates and constrains possible policy choices to what is considered appropriate given 
the fundamental values of the nation and constitution. What Smith (1991, p. 144) contends about national 
identity is also true for constitutional identity as I use it here; it “determines not only the composition of 
the regime’s personnel, but also legitimizes and often influences policy goals and administrative practices 
that regulate everyday lives of each citizen.” (Smith, 1991, p. 144) 
Regime changes constitute critical junctures in the constitutional identity of a country. In the words of 
Collier and Collier (1991, pp. 29–30), “[a] critical juncture may be defined as a period of significant 
change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (…) and which is hypothesised to 
produce distinct legacies.” When countries face such a juncture, the chosen path depends on various con-
textual and historical factors of that country. 
The antecedent condition of state/church ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule should make it 
less likely that religion will become part of the ideological fabric of the new regime. The constitutional 
identity that takes shape during democratisation then sets off path dependent processes because that new 
identity becomes institutionalised in law and practice and forms the legal and normative context for forth-
coming policy battles. 
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The critical juncture here consists of the following three elements 
1. the state/church relationship during authoritarian rule as the antecedent condition 
2. the democratic regime change as the trigger   
3. the timing of third wave democratisations as a scope condition that becomes paramount as it 
provides a specific international normative context.  
How exactly does the state/church nexus of the past produce a particular constitutional identity in the 
context of third wave democratisation? In that context, more than ever, authoritarian regimes are highly 
dependent on performance legitimacy that could easily disappear in the event of economic crisis, military 
defeat and the like (Huntington, 1991b, p. 45). What is essential is that third wave democratisations are 
the result of eroding regime legitimacy. If institutionalised religion supported the old regime, a simulta-
neous decrease in the legitimacy of religious influence on governance can be expected. It seems likely that 
this precludes churches to become politically influential in the new democracy. A similar dynamic has 
already been described by Warner (1961), who argued that the Catholic Church in France was too closely 
associated with the Vichy regime, which impeded successful political alliances after WWII. 
In the volatile times of regime change and democratic consolidation, a newly democratic regime needs to 
gain and project legitimacy, both locally and globally. A nascent regime’s legitimacy is an important driv-
ing force in the ratification of human rights treaties (Beetham, 2008, p. 115). Neoinstitutionalists, sociol-
ogists and constructivist political scientists have argued that by ratifying human rights treaties, states can 
represent themselves “as normal and legitimate actors to the broad international community and to their 
own citizens.” (Zhou, 2014, p. 480)  
The absence of religion as the highest normative principle should make a state more receptive for human 
rights norms than states that are normatively saturated. Human rights can become a kind of political ersatz-
religion in that they functionally replace religious doctrine as the highest source of moral standards for 
government action. The state/church ideological symbiosis of the past should thus not only heighten the 
degree to which human rights are embraced by the country, but also shape what kind of interpretation of 
human rights prevails. If religious influence on governance has become discredited, religious institutions 
should not be able to steer a country’s drive towards embracing human rights away from a secular and 
inclusive interpretation; the direction the international human rights discourse was taking at the time of 
third-wave democratisations. This proposition remains to be tested.  
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Empirical manifestations 
The main argument of this section of the mechanism that requires empirical testing is that a state/church 
ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule leads to the emergence of a constitutional identity that is 
based on a secular interpretation of human rights. An appropriate empirical test of this causal connection 
needs to demonstrate two findings: 
1. that the new constitutional identity does indeed rests on (secular) human rights 
2. that religion has been replaced by human rights as the legitimising value system of the political system.  
There is a strong element of temporality in that the test can only be successful if the new constitutional 
identity is considered new, i.e. when it differs from the previous regime’s ideologies. As a result, this 
requires a within-case comparison between constitutional identity pre and post-democratisation. 
Useful empirical data regarding the constitutional identity and its foundational values can be found in the fol-
lowing areas: a. constitutional texts (the content as well as the political discussions involved in the passage of 
the constitution); b. the ratification of human rights treaties; c. a country’s behaviour in international human 
rights related organisations; d. symbolic political communication (inaugural speeches, high profile state visits, 
etc.); and e. public communication by churches (press statements, official church documents, etc.). 
A. Constitutions. While not necessarily a reflection of a country’s material reality, constitutional 
texts reflect what the drafters see as a country’s core values, aspirations and how they want the country 
to be seen by its citizens as well as the international community of states. A profound change in constitu-
tional identity should be accompanied by the passage of a whole new constitution rather than mere changes 
in interpretation. If religious principles and mentions of God have a less prominent role in the new con-
stitution than they had in the previous one, and there is an explicit focus on international law and human 
rights, this would be an indicator of a shift in constitutional identity and its underlying values. Arguably, 
this constitutes a hoop test for this part of the mechanism only, as it is quite certain to be found but the 
predicted evidence in the empirical reality of a case cannot clearly discern between causes other than the 
ideological relationship between church and the former regime. For instance, a shift from religious prin-
ciples towards human rights as the raison d‘être of government action in the constitution could also be 
caused by general secularisation and modernisation processes. To this end, four further tests will be undertaken. 
B. Human Rights Treaties. Another revealing source of information about a regime’s stance and 
emphasis on human rights are its ratification status of international human rights treaties. If a new consti-
tutional identity is founded on human rights, there ought to be a swift ratification of all major international 
human rights treaties as well as a comprehensive incorporation of the international human rights regime 
into the national political system after democratisation. This should especially be the case if human rights 
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have not featured in a major role in the country’s value system before. Finding that the country swiftly 
ratifies all major human rights treaties after the regime change is theoretically certain. Without commit-
ting to uphold human rights, such rights could hardly be part of a country’s core values. However, it is 
not theoretically unique in that most states participate more or less in the international human rights re-
gime. A better indicator of authentic commitment would be the comprehensive incorporation of human 
rights standards into national law. As was the case for constitutions, the ratification of international human 
rights treaties constitutes a hoop test which can do little more than nudge our confidence in this part of 
the mechanism, while its absence would count as disconfirming evidence. 
C. International Organisations. The degree and kind of human rights a government supports can 
be inferred from the behaviour of the country’s representatives in international organisations. Do they 
actively advocate the increasing incorporation of women’s and LGBT rights into the international human 
rights regime? Or are they only mandated to support a more conservative scope of application of human 
rights? The explicit support of more controversial rights that are incompatible with the country’s domi-
nant religious denominations’ views would be as theoretically certain as it is unique. A country with a 
religiously based constitutional identity would surely not subscribe to or even actively advance rights 
whose underlying values are mismatched with that identity. Therefore, this represents a doubly decisive test. 
D. Symbolic political communication. If religious morality was replaced by human rights as the 
legitimising principles that underpin a new regime’s identity, there should not only be traces of an in-
creased emphasis on secularly interpreted human rights, but also reduced emphasis on religion in general. 
Instances of symbolic political communication such as the content of inaugural speeches, the first demo-
cratic parliamentary sessions and high profile state visits in the early years of democratic consolidation are 
an interesting area of investigation for assessing the constitutional identity, as it is simultaneously an ex-
pression of identity and a site for its construction. The absence of religion in such instances would be an 
indicator of the regime’s legitimising value system shifting away from religion. However, if religious cus-
toms or references are frequently invoked during symbolic political events, this would count as discon-
firming evidence. Investigating whether there was an absence of religion, where it was clearly present 
before regime change, constitutes an additional hoop test for this section of the mechanism. 
E. Official church statements. Discovering signs of dissent between state and church would be more 
theoretically unique than the mere absence of religion in political events with high symbolic value. Such 
dissent could be found in various empirical materials, including official church statements, interviews with 
church leaders in newspaper articles of the time, or publications by the church itself. While dissent be-
tween those two formerly colluding institutions would uniquely point towards the erosion of a formerly 
mutually beneficial relationship, finding such evidence is not certain which makes it a smoking gun type 
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of test. State and church could be acting covertly instead of publicly, working to keep conflict at a mini-
mum in times of democratic transition and the associated turbulence of a country during large-scale 
change. Thus, not finding this type of evidence would not disconfirm this section of the mechanism. On 
the other hand, overly amicable relations between state and church would disconfirm this section. 
Table 11 sums up the constitutive components of the first part of the mechanism, the empirical infor-
mation that ought to be found to confirm that this part of the mechanism indeed unfolded as hypothesised, 
what test type finding the predicted empirical manifestations constitutes, as well as the specific data re-
quired for conducting the test. Taken together, if the empirical tests presented can be passed, this would 
considerably increase our confidence in the existence of this section of the mechanism. 
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3.4 Causal Mechanism Part 2. Legal and Discursive Opportunity Structures  
The first step of the causal mechanism hypothesises that a new constitutional identity emerges during 
democratisation to form the legal and ideological context in which actors operate during the sexual rights 
policy process. While churches are among the most vocal opponents of morality policy change towards 
permissiveness, social movements are among the most important reform proponents. Many scholars have 
highlighted the paramount importance of the LGBT rights movement for LGBT rights policies (e.g. Koll-
man, 2007; Tremblay, Paternotte, & Johnson, 2011) and of the women’s movement for abortion policy 
making (e.g. Githens & McBride Stetson, 1996). Therefore, the second section of the mechanism focusses 
on social movements and how the newly emerging constitutional identity creates favourable political op-
portunity structures for social movement actors seeking to anchor their claims onto the political agenda. 
Political opportunity structures have received considerable attention in comparative scholarship on social 
movements (Wilson, 2006, p. 326). “Political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configu-
rations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which 
facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others.” 
(Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58) According to Kitschelt, political opportunity structures can influence the strate-
gies through which movements advance their cause, and their ability to impact on policy decisions. 
The concept of political opportunity structures has been developed further by scholars who assess so-
called legal and discursive opportunity structures. The former designates law as well as national and su-
pranational courts as opportunity structures for movements to push for change (Hilson, 2002; Wilson, 
2006). In the present analysis, the legal manifestations of the new democratic identity, such as interna-
tional human rights commitments and the enshrinement of a secular interpretation of human rights into 
constitutions and national laws, represent such legal opportunity structures. 
A discursive opportunity structure, on the other hand, refers to the broader ideological context that facil-
itates or constrains successful social movement action (Koopmans & Statham, 1999). The protection of 
human rights as the main ideological framework for legitimate government action in both newly demo-
cratic South Africa and Argentina should help a social movement’s claims resonate with the constitutional 
identity, and be perceived as legitimate. These type of opportunity structures determine the ideas consid-
ered sensible, which constructions of reality are regarded as realistic and which claims are taken as legiti-
mate regarding a policy in each specific moment (ibid., p. 228). With that they are closely related to the 
problem framing, another important concept in the social movement literature. A problem framing de-
fines the legitimate participants of debate and the scope of answers the state can give as well as the bound-
aries of the general debate. 
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From this perspective, social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings 
that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies. Ra-
ther, movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance 
of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613). 
Therefore, movement actors are involved in what Hall (1982) calls “the politics of signification.” When 
the women’s and LGBT movements in Argentina and South Africa strategically frame their cause as human 
rights matters, the significance of their claims becomes greater than the issues themselves. A successful 
human rights frame is likely to be taken seriously by both the judiciary and legislators; after all what is at 
stake is nothing less than the fledgling democratic identity of the country and the credibility of its legiti-
mising values. 
Thus, the new constitutional identity focused on a secular interpretation of human rights represents ben-
eficial legal and discursive opportunity structures. The institutionalisation of human rights in national law, 
constitutions and international human rights commitments should significantly increase the odds of success 
of legal action undertaken by movement actors. These discursive opportunity structures are equally effec-
tive, as movement actors can frame their claims in a way that resonates with the dominant political dis-
course and the values it entails. Especially the gay rights movement is too small in numbers to have suffi-
cient mobilisation potential. By framing and discursively connecting its struggle with the broader struggles 
of the society, gay rights groups can gain allies in form of the larger, more established human rights groups 
in civil society and independent specialised human rights bodies in government. Framing gay and women’s 
rights as human rights and arguing that a true democracy needs to respect the rights of women and sexual 
minorities, helps to increase social movements’ bargaining clout. This is especially true in the absence of 
a as legitimate perceived religious counter discourse, as the social movement’s framing can become dom-
inant when religious opposition to this framing can be quashed by referencing the immoral relationship 
between the church with the past regime. In other words, the movement actors’ claims have a better 
chance of being acknowledged as rightful when their framing resonates with the country’s constitutional 
identity. In the context of a human rights focused identity, this is easy to achieve for social movement 
actors pushing for policy change and substantially more difficult for religious institutions attempting to 
create a religious frame for the subject. 
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Empirical manifestations 
A test of this section of the mechanism must show that the new constitutional identity has indeed produced 
discursive and legal opportunity structures that can be successfully exploited by social movements. 
The tangibility of legal opportunity structures makes them easier to observe in the empirical reality as the 
discursive structures, which is why a doubly decisive test will suffice for testing the legal aspects of this 
part. International human rights commitments and their incorporation into domestic law should dramat-
ically increase the expected and actual pay-off for social movements to use legal channels to advance their 
causes. Thus, a strong focus for women’s and LGBT rights movements on legal strategies would count as 
evidence of the existence of favourable legal opportunity structures. Moreover, movement actors using 
the judiciary (new constitutions, laws, human rights commitments, courts, constitutional appeal, etc.) to 
advance their cause represents a doubly decisive test for legal opportunity structures, since the absence of 
secularly interpreted human rights in domestic law would not provide a legal basis to take matters to court 
and find a decision in the movement’s favour most unlikely. Also, it is quite certain that actors in favour 
of policy change towards permissiveness use these legal opportunity structures, i.e. go to court to gain 
rights, when they present themselves. Therefore, successful legal action by social movements would 
greatly increase our confidence in the existence of favourable legal opportunity structures. Conversely, 
social movements not using legal channels would count as disconfirming evidence. 
Since matters associated with ideology are notoriously difficult to observe, four empirical tests will be 
conducted to assess the successful exploitation of discursive opportunity structures by social movements. 
The first assesses the movement’s framing itself, while the second focuses on a movement’s reactions to 
the inevitable religious counter discourse on the moral matters under discussion. The third test looks at 
the reception of the movement’s framing by the broader civil society and specialised human rights bodies 
in government. Lastly, the fourth test assesses the congruence between arguments in the reasons for judge-
ments in relevant court cases on the one side, and arguments brought forward by religious institutions and 
women’s and LGBT rights groups on the other. 
A. Social movements’ framing. The new constitutional identity and its associated ideology in-
formed by secularly interpreted human rights create a rhetorical advantage for actors who can frame their 
claims in the language and logic of the nation’s dominant ideological discourse at the time. If social move-
ments make use of this discursive opportunity structure, they should be found to deliberately frame their 
cause as a human rights matter and as an essential component of democracy. Finding such a human rights 
and democracy frame in public communications (such as newspaper ads, websites, publications, banners 
at protests, press releases and so forth) of important women’s and LGBT rights groups would constitute 
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the success of a hoop test. It is quite certain that the presence of favourable discursive opportunity struc-
tures creates a strong incentive for movement actors to use them. On the other hand, the increasing glob-
alisation and transnationalisation of women’s and LGBT rights activism could just as well influence fram-
ing, regardless of local political ideologies. Accordingly, the absence of strategic human rights and democ-
racy framing by social movements would disconfirm this section of the mechanism, while its existence 
only adds minimal confidence at this stage. 
B. Reactions to religious frames. While a new democratic identity focused on a secular inter-
pretation of human rights should create a discursive advantage for women’s and LGBT rights groups, it 
should do the opposite for churches with conservative stances on sexual rights policies. Former alliances 
between religious institutions and authoritarian regimes, combined with a new constitutional identity that 
deemphasises religious principles should make it difficult for the church to frame its claims in a way that 
resonates with the dominant ideologies of the time. Religious challenges to the framing of social move-
ments can be countered by referencing the collusion of the church with the past regime, weakening and 
even delegitimising the church’s claims. Finding that religious arguments are countered by referencing the 
church’s poor human rights record and the illegitimacy of religious influence on policy in the new democ-
racy is as theoretically certain as it is unique. We can conclude that this represents a doubly decisive test. 
We also gain additional confidence in the existence of this section of the mechanism by testing which of 
the competing problem frames (the church’s or the social movements’) is adopted by the broader civil 
society and state institutions, which is the focus of the following two empirical tests. 
C. Human rights bodies support the claims of social movements. An indication of a successful 
human rights framing strategy by LGBT and women’s rights groups is when they gain the explicit support 
of human rights bodies and organisations, such as human rights-based civil society groups or independent 
human rights commissions within the state. Active support in the form of joint marches, petitions, public 
statements in support of the movement’s claims and other lobbying and supportive activities would 
uniquely indicate the acceptance of that framing in the broader civil society and by specialised state agen-
cies. However, this finding is contingent upon the existence of a strong and coordinated civil society 
and/or specific independent state bodies designated for the protection of human rights, which is why 
finding traces of support from human rights bodies represent a smoking gun type of test. In other words, 
such a finding would be quite unique but not certain to be found, and so its absence has no inferential value. 
D. Reasoning of judges. Another smoking gun type evidence could be found in the reasoning 
for verdicts rendered in court cases that deal with the issues subject to this study. If a ruling is justified 
with arguments congruent to the ones brought forward by movements, featuring arguments such as “in 
our democracy religion ought not to impede the realisation of human rights”, this would be unique proof 
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of successful strategic framing by social movements formally embraced by state institutions. However, 
finding such evidence is not certain as deliberations for judgements and verdicts may be authored more 
technically without referencing higher order value systems, like religion. 
In summary, a convincing case for the presence of favourable legal opportunity structures and their causal 
connection to the constitutional identity can be made upon finding that women’s and LGBT rights groups 
successfully employed strategic litigation to further their cause. This includes pushing their claims onto 
the political agenda via constitutional appeal. Empirical indicators of favourable discursive opportunity 
structures include the strategic framing of movement claims as human rights matters and their liberation 
presented as a litmus test for the constitutional identity of the new democracy. Furthermore, the adoption 
of the movement’s framing by human rights organisations, specialised state institutions and in the deliber-
ations of judges would underscore the success of this framing strategy.  
Analogous to the table for the first part of the mechanism, table 12 sums up predicted evidence, test type 
and required data for the second section of the mechanism. 
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3.5 Causal Mechanism Part 3. Parties and Politicians Face Rhetorical Entrapment 
The legislative arena is the final battleground for the passage of policies within democratic systems, which 
is why the third and final missing link of the causal connection focuses on policy makers and their decision 
making in the parliamentary arena. If the preceding elements of the causal mechanism indeed unfolded as 
hypothesised, social movements have not only anchored their claims on the political agenda but the scope 
for acceptable policy design is now limited. In other words, when social movements have successfully 
framed their claims as human rights issues and made full use of the discursive and/or legal opportunity 
structures the post-authoritarian constitutional identity can afford them, parties as well as individual pol-
iticians face rhetorical entrapment that leads to support for permissive sexual rights bills. Even if compet-
ing bills with less far-reaching reforms are on the table, a strongly permissive option will be chosen due 
to the fact that the framing regarding the regulatory status quo is that it violates the human rights of women 
or LGBT people, and a policy that violates human rights somewhat less than the status quo is clearly not a 
feasible option. 
This also helps to explain the noticeable difference in the passage of gay marriage in South Africa and 
Argentina compared with most of their European counterparts; proceeding to fully legalise gay marriage 
without the intermediate step of a civil partnership regime. More precisely, the successful exploitation of 
discursive and/or legal opportunity structures by social movements should each limit the scope of the 
outcome of the policy process in its own way. Regarding the former, a favourable constitutional court 
decision obliges parliament to remedy the declared unconstitutionality of a regulation. Oftentimes judge-
ments can even limit the scope of acceptable political solutions and prescribe components of future poli-
cies, leaving little choice for parliamentary actors but to conform. 
If court decisions leave considerable room for variants of policy design or if strategic litigation is less cen-
tral to a social movement’s strategy, the usage of discursive opportunity structures only can have powerful 
effects on its own. When social movements have successfully presented their cause as an essential test of 
credibility for a constitutional identity based on the protection of human rights, opposition against that 
cause, by other religious or political actors, can simply be disqualified as being opposed to democracy and 
its founding values.  
That is not to say that passing these policies does not involve struggle. It is likely that religious institutions 
still attempt to prevent policy adoption and reframe the issue on more religious grounds. However, when 
given the choice to side with a church disassociated from the democratic constitutional identity, or with 
the credible claims for human rights of an oppressed group, sufficient legislative actors should choose to 
side with social movements. 
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“Rhetorical entrapment” is a concept elaborated by Schimmelfennig (2001) in his work on the European 
Union (EU). Lai (2017) explains that, 
The European community committed rhetorically to the integration of all European countries 
based on their liberal and democratic values, and this rhetorical commitment allowed Central and 
East European states to justify their bids for EU membership claims according to the EU’s essential 
identity: liberal democracy, multilateralism, and unity. The strategic use of rhetorical commit-
ment turned into rhetorical entrapment by highlighting the importance of the EU to honor its 
previous commitment. (Lai, 2017, subsec. 3.2) 
In post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina, political parties and politicians have rhetorically com-
mitted to human rights as a way to stabilise democracy and regain legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community of states. This rhetoric commitment allowed women’s and LGBT rights movements to justify 
their claims for sexual rights on human rights grounds. The strategic human rights framing by social move-
ments turns into rhetorical entrapment for political actors not wanting to undermine the credibility of 
their commitment to constitutionally protected human rights. Once a human rights framing of sexual 
rights is adopted by those with authority “this gradually becomes the guiding framework or rhetorical 
common ground in which actors contest and legitimate the issues” (Hansen, 2006; Lai, 2017, subsec. 3.2). 
Especially in light of the contrasting human rights record of the previous regime, parties most likely do 
not risk to openly oppose reform (and human rights) as it would make them susceptible to the charge of 
hypocrisy. Thus, parties and politicians facing rhetoric entrapment have strong incentives to support per-
missive reform, even against the religious beliefs of their constituents. 
Furthermore, research has shown that even religiously conservative voters care more about pocketbook 
issues rather than morality issues (e.g. Hillygus & Shields, 2005). For example, in South Africa, people 
strongly oppose homosexuality when specifically asked in surveys but do not state homosexuality as a 
priority issue, rather being more concerned with poverty, unemployment and crime (Thoreson, 2008, 
p. 686). The credible commitment to human rights, on the other hand, can be decisive for post-authori-
tarian electoral success. For instance, the surprising victory of Raúl Alfonsín as Argentina’s first demo-
cratic president after the military dictatorship was a result of his clear commitment to human rights (Viola 
& Mainwarning, 1984, p. 38).  
Religiously affiliated parties, such as Christian democratic parties, should not be a hindrance for sexual rights 
policy passage either. That is because not only the roots of party preferences lie in the past, but also of the 
composition of the contemporary party systems. For instance, the formation of Christian democratic parties 
in Western Europe can be traced back to state/church cleavages in the 19th century that triggered a politici-
sation of Catholicism to its defence against a secularising state (Engeli et al., 2012, p. 15; Kalyvas, 1996).  
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This also suggests that cordial relationships between state and church (as prevailed for most of South Af-
rica’s and Argentina’s history) can lead to the absence of strong Christian democratic parties in a country’s 
party system. It follows that, ironically, if churches have enjoyed relatively unchallenged political influence 
in the past, this can leave them without a natural ally in the party system after a political transition of the 
kind that is described in this causal mechanism. If religious parties do form post-democratisation, the 
delegitimation of religious influence on politics should limit their electoral success. This line of reasoning 
is supported by the lack of strong religious parties in South Africa’s and Argentina’s party systems. As 
shown in the previous chapter, after democratisation in South Africa, the ACDP and the UCPD formed 
but were never blessed by electoral success beyond 2 percent of votes, despite the highly religious elec-
torate of the country. 
In summary, I propose that a historically close state/church relationship leaves churches without a natural 
ally in the party system when the ideological links between state and church abruptly change during regime 
transition. This is because the lack of a historical state/church cleavage prevented the formation of reli-
gious parties, and the delegitimation of religious influence on politics prevents them from becoming strong 
in the new democratic present. 
The same reason should limit the incentive of conservative parties without explicit religious ties to con-
form to church demands. Thus, we end in a situation without parties in the party system that are likely to 
make preventing sexual rights policy change a priority. This explains the unlikely success of social move-
ments to have their demands enshrined in policy, despite the initial lack of intention or preference on the 
part of the population, parties or politicians. 
 
Empirical manifestations 
Three empirical tests can deliver evidence for this final theoretical proposition. The first test focuses on 
political parties’ and politician’s actions, while the other two aim to establish which reasons or influences 
are put forward to justify these actions. 
A. Collaboration with social movements. Testing whether women’s and LGBT rights groups’ 
claims are perceived as legitimate concerns by parties and their delegates can be done by observing the 
empirical fingerprints left behind by their active collaboration with such groups. These observations in-
clude joint legislative initiatives, joint press conferences and frequent invitations for movement actors to 
speak at parliamentary committee sessions. Conversely, excluding church leaders would count as evidence 
of politicians becoming increasingly sympathetic to the social movements’ cause. This represents a simple but 
doubly decisive test. In order to increase confidence that legislative actions are indeed influenced by the pre-
ceding components of the mechanism, it is interesting to trace the reasons politicians give for their stances. 
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B. Politicians’ use of a social movement’s framing. If politicians use the framing of human 
rights that has been shaped by the respective social movements, this would count as evidence for their 
actions being influenced by the successful framing strategies of movements. Frame adoption by politicians 
is theoretically certain and unique. It is a unique expression of the causal effect of the movements’ suc-
cessful exploitation of ideological opportunity structures, and its absence would disconfirm this section of 
the mechanism which is why it constitutes a doubly decisive test. 
C. Politicians explicitly reject church influence on public policy. What is equally informative 
in this regard is how religion features in the political debate around the policies in question. If many poli-
ticians chose to adapt the church’s religious frame of the issue, this would count as evidence against this 
section of the mechanism. However, if religion is explicitly invoked as not being a legitimate factor to 
consider for public policy issues, this would constitute smoking gun type evidence. Such evidence would 
uniquely indicate a process of religious delegitimation having taken place, which is key in explaining how 
even numerically strong religious institutions can fail to translate their doctrinal values into public policy. 
However, finding such evidence is not certain as explicitly rejecting religious influence in political state-
ments might increase the moral and political conflict of the debate, therefore politicians may not opt to 
mention religion at all. 
Important empirical material for this section include relevant parliamentary debates, press statements, 
newspaper articles that contain information on parties’ and politicians’ stances on and actions regarding 
the issue under debate and their justifications. As before, table 13 presents an overview on the evidence, 
test types as well as necessary data.
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4 Causal Condition. State/Church Ideological Symbiosis during 
South Africa and Argentina’s last Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Despite different historical and socio-political contexts, both South Africa and Argentina endured violently repressive 
authoritarian regimes in the recent past, indelibly shaping their policies and politics up until the present day. The last 
Argentine military dictatorship, in power from 1976 until democratisation in 1983, is widely accepted as among the 
most repressive in the history of Latin America. The regime waged a ‘dirty war’ [guerra sucia] against its opponents; 
during this period of state terror an estimated number of 30 000 people ‘disappeared’, or abducted by the authorities 
and never heard of or from again (Langer, 2013). The group of disappeared [desaparecidos] consisted mainly of stu-
dents, unionists and any sort of activists, unconcerned in distinguishing between women, men or children (Madres 
de Plaza de Mayo, n.d.). 
Over 300 clandestine detention camps were set up in which political opponents were often raped, tortured and the 
vast majority murdered (ibid.). The victims’ bodies were commonly disposed of in mass graves and those who sur-
vived the torture killed in death flights, that is extrajudicial killings conducted by the military where victims were 
injected with a venom rendering them unconscious, only to be dropped into the ocean from airplanes (Galván, 2013, 
p. 160). This costly method of killing via death flights was financed by robbing these same victims of their belongings, 
conducted as a ‘Christian kind of death’ to assuage the conscience of the militaries who carried out the operation, 
choosing to see God’s ocean as ultimately killing their victims and not themselves (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 2017b). 
Based on the personal account of a military official who participated in the killings, an article in the New York Times 
describes the eerie series of events on the death flights: 
Many of the victims were so weak from torture and detention that they had to be helped aboard the plane. 
Once in flight, they were injected with a sedative by an Argentine Navy doctor before two officers stripped 
them and shoved them to their deaths. (Sims, 1995) 
Pregnant women were kept alive in captivity, where they gave birth with hoods over their heads. Many were executed 
shortly after giving birth and their babies given up for adoption by families close to the military (Galván, 2013, p. 160). 
After the end of the dictatorship many military families moved abroad to escape persecution, burdening an almost im-
possible task upon an estimated 500 children and surviving members of their families of ever reuniting as the children 
grew up without knowing their past (ibid.). Thus far (state December 2017), only 126 of these children were identified, 
mainly through the work of the human rights organisation Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo [Grandmothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo] that was formed by the mothers of disappeared who became parents in captivity. The search for the missing 
children via large-scale gene testing in the Argentine population still continues. Despite only having been in power for 
seven years, Argentine society is trying to heal the scars of the past to this day (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 2017a).  
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The apartheid regime represents a similar dark episode in South Africa’s history like the military dictatorship in Ar-
gentina, despite the former being in place for a comparatively longer period from 1948 until 1994. In an effort to 
secure white supremacy, the apartheid government implemented strict racial segregation policies, including separate 
designated living areas for different races, entirely separate education systems and public facilities (including segre-
gated public transportation, entrances to buildings, benches on which to sit, areas on the beach, etc.), and the prohi-
bition of “mixed” marriages and inter-racial sexual relations. The government excluded the non-white population 
from almost any direct political participation and severely restricted their movements. Millions of non-whites were 
forcibly removed from their homes all over the country and made to live in designated areas, deprived of basic rights 
and infrastructure. Violence, crime and poverty ran rampant, much of which is still prevalent in many of these areas 
today. More than 80 percent of the country’s territory was reserved for the white minority (which made up only 20 
percent of the population) and individuals classified as non-white required passes to enter. Any form of political 
mobilisation or opposition by non-whites was outlawed and violently oppressed, which also applied to opposition to 
apartheid by white people (Worden, 1994). 
In an effort to discredit the South African regime, the UN declared apartheid a crime in international law in 1973. On 
this occasion, the UN defined apartheid as "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining 
domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them" 
(International Convention of the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973). Facing increasing iso-
lation internationally, the regime eventually crumbled and the first democratic elections14 were held in 1994. Today, 
the word apartheid [Afrikaans for separateness] is used as a generic label for discriminatory racial segregation worldwide, 
enshrining the aristocracies of the South African regime in everyday language. 
Both the authoritarian apartheid regime in South Africa and the military dictatorship in Argentina ultimately collapsed 
because their human rights violations led to a loss of legitimacy in the international normative context of human 
rights. That the regimes could stay in power as long as they did in the first place was significantly influenced by their 
ideological symbiosis with the respective main religious institutions, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) in South 
Africa and the Catholic Church in Argentina. Both regimes framed the repression they exerted in religious terms, 
gaining credibility through the explicit support of churches15. 
                                                     
14 South Africa had many self-designated “democratic” elections before that but until the end of apartheid, the majority of the 
population was excluded from participating. 
15 It is important to note that both the Catholic Church in Argentina and the DRC in South Africa were not monolithic actors. 
Both institutions also included dissident voices. However, these voices were systematically silenced through repression by the 
regimes and internally by the churches. Since the purpose of this chapter is not a critical appraisal of occasional resistance by 
some within the ranks of the churches but an analysis of the official positions of these institutions as expressed by their ecclesi-
astical hierarchies, the regime opposition by few religious actors will not be further considered. 
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4.1 An Immoral Alliance between State and Church during the last Argentine 
Military Dictatorship 
During the Argentine military dictatorship, religion and nationalism merged to form the ideological un-
derpinnings of the regime. Church and state formed a strong multilevel alliance that had a mutually legit-
imising function for both institutions. The military regime discursively constructed both the national as 
well as its own political identity as Catholic, thereby exploiting religion as a legitimising ideology for its 
rule and ensuing actions. In turn, the Catholic Church in Argentina validated the regimes legitimising 
religious identity through public support for the regime in general, moral support for the military and 
practical support in the implementation of state terror, deeply compromising its moral integrity. 
 
Instrumentalisation of religion by the dictatorship 
Religion was omnipresent in political rhetoric during the dictatorship. In 1976, Argentina was in the midst 
of political chaos related to a guerrilla war between extreme left and right wing militia. That is when a 
military junta overthrew the democratic government “with the help of God”, claiming to lead the country 
on “a quest for the common good, for the full recovery of el ser nacional”, which Feitlowitz (1998, preface, 
1998, p. 24) translates as the collective national essence, soul or consciousness. The discursive construc-
tion of this ser nacional as Christian and as under threat from subversive ‘terrorists’ played an important 
role in the military’s justification for its dirty war against allegedly left-wing minded Argentines. In an 
interview printed in the newspaper La Prensa on the 18th of December 1977, the first leader of the regime, 
Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla, broadly defined terrorists to be not only those carrying weapons 
“but also those who activate, through ideas that stand against our civilisation, other persons.” (General 
Jorge Videla, 1977, my translation). This deliberately open definition of terrorists left space for the inclusion 
of anyone opposing the regime, even if that opposition only included ideas the junta deemed threatening.  
Upon seizing power, the military junta published a document announcing its immediate overtake of the 
government and self-declaring its rule to be a ‘Process of National Reorganisation’ [Proceso de Reorgani-
zación Nacional], a euphemism for the regime’s effort to wipe out the left-wing guerrilla movement. 
“Swearing to God and the Holy Gospels to act with loyalty and patriotism,” the junta declared the Process 
of National Reorganisation to be necessary to reinstitute the “essential values and morality of society and 
eradicate subversion.” (Acta para la Reorganización Nacional del 24 de marzo de 1976, as documented by 
Tronosco, 1984) 
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The junta constructed the national identity being Christian and fundamentally under threat by atheist 
Communism. In that light, the left wing guerrilla movement was not merely a political enemy but repre-
sented the subversion of the Argentine nation itself, significantly raising the stakes of the dirty war. In light 
of this threat, taking extraordinary (and extra-legal) measures seemed more legitimate. Furthermore, 
prescribing a religious essence to the Argentine national identity drew a line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
along a strictly religious axis, excluding the subversive other from the definition of Argentineness and also 
from being worthy of state protection (see Barros, 2003).  
A statement by General Videla (1977, my translation) underscores this point: “I want to stress that Ar-
gentine citizens are not victims of repression. The repression is against a minority, who we do not consider 
part of Argentina.” Instrumentalising religion to draw the distinction between us (Catholic) and them 
(atheists) loaded these categories with the simple dichotomies of good vs. evil and morally right vs. morally 
wrong inherent in religious doctrine. Portraying left-wing minded Argentines as the evil other on a quest 
to destroy Argentine Catholic society served as justification for their destruction and rhetorically elevated 
the military operation to the status of a holy mission. The steadfast Catholic faith of the military served as 
proof for the military’s belonging to the us category and for the legitimacy of its rule. 
Magazines and newspaper articles that spread the word of the coup stressed military dictator Videla’s 
deeply held religious beliefs and moral persuasions (Feitlowitz, 1998). The regime subjected the press to 
strict censorship and provided journalists with ‘publication guidelines’ in order to ‘purify’ the public lan-
guage from words associated with subversive ideas (Galván, 2013, p. 158), essentially turning large parts 
of the press into a propaganda machine. Authorised language was only to be related to God, the fatherland 
and home [Dios, Patria, y Hogar] (ibid.). Accordingly, the newspaper La Prensa stated in a front page 
article after the coup that “the people must learn to recognize the ‘civilized’ man who does not know how 
to live in society and who in spite of his appearance and behavior harbors atheist attitudes that leave no 
space for God.” (Feitlowitz, 1998, p. 28; Stockwell, 2014, p. 26) The phrasing of this call for the popu-
lation to ostensibly denounce atheists (really those suspected to have a left-wing political affiliation) is a 
prime example of the religious framing the regime regularly employed for political purposes. 
The religious rhetoric aimed not only at legitimising the military’s rule in the eyes of the population but also 
amongst the military itself. Dictator Videla wrote a book called El Ejército de hoy [The Army of Today], in which 
he expressed his love for the fatherland, Christian principles and the Catholic Church as a spiritual guide. The 
book was recommended reading for members of the military and outlined the armed forces' duty to take charge 
in matters of “ethical purification” and upholding “of the historical-spiritual values” of the nation (Verbitsky, 
2012, p. 3). A passage of an interview with church official Padre Bernado conducted by Marchak and Marchak 
(1999) serves as an illustration of the Christian self-perception of the armed forces during the dictatorship: 
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[T]hey were convinced that they were the moral reserve of the country against communism, which 
was seen as the destruction of the nation. And above all – another sin of our western and Christian 
culture – communism is against our style of life as Christians, you see? So they took the flag of the 
country and of religion. If you want to be military, you must be baptised. (Padre Bernado in Marchak 
& Marchak, 1999, p. 264) 
In the aftermath of the coup, numerous members of the military stated that it was not easy for them to 
carry out the orders of the regime. As a result, so indicated members of the armed forces interviewed by 
Mallimaci (2012, p. 180, my translation), “they needed, asked for and obtained the ‘blessing’ of a priest 
who ‘sent’ them and authorised this just and holy mission to kill to ‘remedy’ the malaise of society.” This 
underlines the central role played by church and faith to act as the supreme moral authority, legitimising 
state violence (ibid.). The testimonies given by victims in the context of the first human rights report 
uncovering the abuses of the dictatorship, called Nunca Más [Never Again], published after the return to 
democracy, reveal how the regime’s discursive construction of the us vs. them binary played out in the 
concrete implementation of state terror on the ground. Compelled to act in the name of God, soldiers 
forced victims to recite Christian texts while being tortured. “They told us we were devils”; “they are 
atheists, children of the devil”; “if you did not know how to recite the Our Father’s prayer they hit you”; 
“if you were a Jew, they tortured you double for being subversive and for being a Jew.” (Argentina, 1986)  
How can the military have been so convinced to be on a holy mission according to the will of God? The 
answer lies in the institutional support from the Catholic Church that validated the religious framing of 
the regime’s identity and morally approved of the military’s holy mission. Arguably, without the church’s 
support the sacralisation of politics during the military dictatorship would not have been as persuasive; 
only the church’s active support for the regime justifies classifying the relationship of the dictatorship and 
Catholic Church as an ideological symbiosis. 
 
Church support for the regime 
The intersection between state and Catholicism in the Argentine dictatorship went far beyond the regime’s 
rhetorical exploitation of religion. The two institutions formed a veritable entente with committed par-
ticipation on the side of the church. Church support for the regime can be broken down into three com-
ponents: public support for the regime, moral support for the military and practical support in the imple-
mentation of state terror. 
Historically, the Argentine episcopacy has chosen to ally with the military and consequently oppose de-
mocracy. Past experience of losing influence in Argentine society during earlier attempts at democracy in 
the 19th century informed the church’s desire to collude with military interests to defend its privileged 
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position in Argentine society (Marchak & Marchak, 1999, p. 253). Apart from a short struggle with then-
president Peron in 1954-55, Catholic Church leaders regularly engaged in “cordial relations with whatever 
government was in power, concentrating their efforts on guaranteeing control over Argentine culture by 
legal decree. This policy led the vast majority of church officials to endorse (…) the most recent authori-
tarian government” (Gill, 1998, p. 149). Even though the Catholic Church‘s support for the regime is 
well documented, the church has long denied responsibility and only in 2012 (thirty years after the end of 
the dictatorship), was there a collective apology from the Argentine bishops about the failures of the 
church in the dirty war (Langer, 2013). However, the church only admitted to fault by omission, i.e. 
claiming to only not having actively opposed the regime. Furthermore, despite ample evidence to the 
contrary, church officials have steadfastly claimed not having known about the human rights abuses. 
Amongst the evidence for the church’s active support for the regime is that the night before as well as on 
the day of the 1976 military coup, both church and military leaders met to discuss the immediate future 
of the country. After the coup, Archbishop Adolfo Tortolo, who was president of the Bishop’s Conference 
as well as vicar of the armed forces, publicly called for the Argentine people to “cooperate in a positive 
way” with the new military dictatorship, increasing the legitimacy of the military overthrow (Mignone, 
1986, p. 2). Still convinced of the righteousness of the dirty war, ex-General Videla gave a series of inter-
views16 to newspapers in 2010 (which were only published in 2012), in which he revealed that he had 
many conversations about the dirty war with Cardinal Raúl Francisco Primatesta during the time of the 
military regime. Conversations also supposedly took place with other leaders of the Argentine episcopal 
conference and with Pio Laghi, the papal nuncio at the time. “They advised us about the manner in which 
to deal with the situation” (Jorge Videla 2010, as quoted in Mercopress, 2012). 
At the time, the symbiosis with the regime proved to be beneficial for the church as it maintained its 
influence in the education system, secured privileged access to the media and enjoyed an increased state 
support by the Junta in the form of pension plans and monthly salaries for bishops (Fabris, 2012). In return, 
the church had to pay the price of covering up the immoral behaviour of the regime and deeply compro-
mising its moral integrity by actively participating in the regimes inhumane practices. For example, then-
Archbishop of Buenos Aires, Juan Carlos Aramburu, denied the severe human rights abuses of the regime 
and repeatedly repudiated the fact that countless political opponents disappeared. In the same vein, six 
month after the coup, Archbishop Tortolo told the press: “I have no knowledge, I have no reliable proof, 
of human rights being violated in this country” (Goldfrank & Rowell, 2012, p. 38). However, an entry in 
                                                     
16 While sentenced to a lifetime in prison after the dictatorship during the Alfonsín administration, military leaders were later 
pardoned later by president Ménem, enabling Videla to give these interviews as a free man. That pardon was subsequently 
reversed under the Kirchner administration, and Videla died in prison. 
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the personal diary of vicar Mons. Bonamín at the time suggests otherwise. The diary states that Bonamín 
consulted with Tortolo (as president of the Bishop’s conference the relevant authority for such matters) 
about the moral dilemma felt by the soldiers while carrying out torture programmes. Tortolo recom-
mended establishing criteria for legitimate torture under Catholic morality. His reasoning was that since 
the death penalty can be justified in the Catholic moral code, so can torture as it is less harmful than the 
former (Mallimaci, 2012, p. 175).  
Not only individuals among the ranks of the church hierarchy were supportive of the regime and its prac-
tices. In one of the first public statements by bishops as a group in 1977, they legitimised the military rule 
and justified repressions, stating: “We are aware of the threat to national life that subversion has meant 
and continues to mean. We understand that those who are responsible for the welfare of the country have 
found it necessary to take extraordinary measures.” (Goldfrank & Rowell, 2012, p. 38, emphasis added) 
Apart from the ecclesiastical hierarchy being closely connected to the military leaders, lower rank church 
officials played an important role in the implementation of the regime’s practices. Argentina’s National 
Commission On The Disappeared revealed the direct participation of clergymen in extra-legal abductions, 
tortures and killings undertaken by the regime. In clandestine detention camps, clergy supported the mil-
itary by encouraging prisoners to confess in order to avoid additional torture (Goldfrank & Rowell, 2012, 
p. 38). In a participant testimony captured in Nunca Más, a former police officer testified that after being 
involved in the brutal extra-legal execution of three regime opponents, he was comforted by church offi-
cial Father Von Wernich. The latter told him that what he had done “was necessary; it was a patriotic act 
and God knew it was good for the country” (Testimony of Julio Alberto Emmed, file No. 683 in Nunca 
Más, Argentina, 1986). Church officials convinced the police and military that their actions constituted a 
holy duty and played a pivotal role in creating the ideological blindness of the state apparatus necessary for 
large-scale state terrorism. 
Having realised that ideological symbiosis with the regime brought only short-term advantages, the church 
has denied active involvement with the regime until this day. Especially considering the mounting allega-
tions against the current Pope (Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, now Pope Francis I) concerning his in-
volvement with the regime, it seems unlikely that it will ever be in the Catholic Church’s interest to 
investigate its role in the dictatorship. Despite the church’s opportunistic denial, the immoral alliance of 
the church and the military regime did not go unnoticed in Argentine society and severely damaged the 
church’s moral authority for the decades to come. 
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4.2 A Racist Church in Apartheid South Africa 
The intermingling of religion and national identity has played a part in South African history since the early 
days of European settlement in the Cape. Jan Van Riebeeck, a Dutch Christian, founded the Cape Colony 
in 1652 with a prayer. Shortly after, he founded the South African Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) (Bar-
nard, 2007, p. 502). Since then, the DRC sided with and supported the (white) political establishment. 
This was true for the early Dutch settlement, later with the British and then with the Afrikaners17 (Lalloo, 
1998, p. 42). The doctrine of apartheid that became institutionalised when the right-wing Afrikaner-con-
trolled National Party came to power in 1948 was modelled on racial segregation in the DRC congrega-
tions, and was as much a religious concept as it was a political one. The Afrikaner government ideology 
and DRC ideology were mutually constitutive and became the foundation that created the apartheid regime. 
 
The apartheid regime and its church 
The DRC became an essential component of Afrikaner nationalism ever since it sided with the Boers dur-
ing the Anglo-Boer war in 1899. When the right-wing Afrikaner-controlled National Party came to power 
in 1948, it was no coincidence that the first apartheid prime minister, Daniel Francois Malan, was a Dutch 
Reformed minister. The official church newspaper around the time the National Party came to power 
proudly stated that “apartheid can rightfully be called a church policy” (Lalloo, 1998, pp. 43–44). After 
seizing power, the National Party put into legislation the apartheid that was designed in the early 1940s 
by the church (Ritner, 1967, p. 29). “Very few of the laws that were implemented in 1948 weren’t already 
asked for by the NGK [Nederduitse Reformede Kerk, Afrikaans for Dutch Reformed Church) before that.” 
(Kuperus, 1999, p. 87) 
Shortly after Afrikaner pastor-turned-statesman Malan took office, parliament, at the insistence of the 
DRC, passed legislation forbidding mixed marriages and cohabitation between black and white persons 
(Barnard, 2007, pp. 502–504). Many other laws concerning racial segregation soon followed. Among 
them, the Immorality Amendment Act (Act No 21 of 1950), which prohibited the sexual contact of whites 
with members of any of the non-white races (Immorality Amendment Act, 1950, 1950). Throughout its 
rule, the apartheid regime used church and faith as legitimation of its authoritarian and racist policies. For 
instance, a law regulating publications was justified as follows: “In the application of this Act the constant 
endeavour of the population of the Republic of South Africa to uphold a Christian view of life shall be 
recognised” (§ 1 of Publications Act 42 of 1974, cited in van der Vyver, 1999, p. 636). Even though during 
                                                     
17 Descendants from mostly Dutch settlers that developed a unique identity as a white ethnic group on the African continent 
that included the formation of their own language: Afrikaans. 
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the 20th century no established state-church existed, references to God and faith were numerous in laws 
and the constitution (ibid., pp. 638). It is undisputed that the DRC provided a powerful moral and theo-
logical basis for the regime’s policies, “helping to present the Apartheid State as Christian, but creating no 
distinction between what it saw as Christian values and the need for the apartheid State to be the abode 
for these particular values” (Rasool, 2004, p. 97). The relationship between state and church was one of, 
close cooperation and mutual support. (…) The government acknowledged the right of the Afri-
kaans churches to influence public policy with regard to education, welfare and public morality 
especially. The Afrikaans churches saw it as their responsibility to lend moral and sometimes even 
theological support to the policies of government (Villiers, 2004, p. 224). 
 
The DRC and its regime 
“It was to certain Afrikaner theologians that the National Party ideologists turned for scriptural and theo-
logical justification for their racial policies and too readily obtained them (…)” (Gruchy & Gruchy, 2004, 
p. 33). The dominant theological position of the DRC was that God prescribed the separation of races and 
therefore the church must work for such (Lalloo, 1998, p. 43). This theological justification of apartheid 
significantly “prolonged the life of the paradigm” (Lategan, 2004, p. 54). Among other scripturally dubi-
ous interpretations, the DRC used the biblical metaphor of the tower of Babel in Genesis 11 to determine 
God’s wishes for racial segregation (Botman, 2004, p. 126). As the biblical story goes, the attempt of 
many peoples to build a tower to heaven together results in chaos and sin. The inability of different peoples 
speaking different languages to collaborate in building the tower, the DRC took as scriptural proof that 
God created separate people that ought not to mix (Lalloo, 1998, p. 48).  
During the roughly half a century rule of the apartheid regime, state and church were ideologically insep-
arable. As one of the most important institutions for Afrikaners, the DRC was a driving force behind 
spreading a nationalistic agenda throughout the population (Lalloo, 1998). For its involvement with the 
apartheid regime, almost all international church associations successively excluded the DRC from the 
1960s onwards until the last one, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, officially excluded the DRC 
in 1982 (Weisse & Anthonissen, 2004, p. 27). 
The informal aspects of state/church relations during apartheid were more important than the formal ties. 
The channel used by the DRC to influence government was one of “silent diplomacy” [koninklike weg, in 
Afrikaans] (Villiers, 2004, p. 225). During informal meetings and agreements, the state and church nego-
tiated the political pathway of the regime (Lalloo, 1998). DRC leaders met government representatives 
in confidential meetings to ensure the greatest possible commitment of the politicians to “their churches’” 
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[the three sister churches that collectively formed the DRC] view (Villiers, 2004, p. 225). This was facil-
itated by the fact that the political and administrative elite was made up of almost exclusively active mem-
bers of DRC congregations. Former clergyman Johan Heyns estimates that in 1993 (one year before South 
Africa’s regime change), 70 percent of members of parliament and 95 percent of cabinet members were 
DRC members (Corrado, 2013). Membership in the DRC also extended to other government branches, 
such as the police and military. The church providing military chaplains is one of the most criticised aspects 
of DRC involvement in the apartheid regime (Gruchy & Gruchy, 2004). By condoning the regime’s vio-
lent acts, military chaplains played a pivotal role in compromising the church’s moral credibility after the 
regime’s demise (Corrado, 2013; Rickard, 1998). 
Aside from the significant overlap between government and church membership, DRC clergy had close 
personal ties with the political elite, allowing them great influence over government decisions (Cornevin, 
1980). Kuperus (1999) conducted an interview with above mentioned DRC official Heyns in which the 
latter elaborates on the personal relationships between DRC and state officials that were an important 
pillar of the state/church ideological fusion during apartheid. 
 I had access to the ministers, the Prime Minister and the President. They were all members of 
my congregation. And I visited them regularly, and I prayed with them, and I had discussions with 
them on current affairs. You see there was a very, very close link and overlap between church and 
state. (Johan Heyns, as cited in Kuperus, 1999, p. 114) 
An analysis of state/church relations during apartheid must also mention the Afrikaner Broederbond, an 
influential secret organisation inspired by Nazi-ideology that “not only shaped public opinion, but created 
the conditions for the apartheid paradigm to survive” (Lategan, 2004, p. 60). Every president and prime 
minister during the half-century rule of the apartheid regime was a member of the Afrikaner Broederbond 
(Levy, 2011). By the end of apartheid in 1994, most of parliament and almost all of the National Party 
cabinet members were members of this organisation (ibid.). Furthermore, members of the Afrikaner 
Broederhood not only held key positions in all levels of government but also in business, police and mili-
tary, administration, Afrikaans press, state radio and television as well as Afrikaans churches and cultural 
organisations (Lategan, 2004, p. 61). 
The Broederbond was founded in 1918 to defend interests of the Afrikaners [the former Dutch settlers] 
in a society dominated by the British since the defeat of the Afrikaners in the Anglo-Boer war in 1902. 
Membership of the organisation was extended by invitation only and was contingent upon being white, 
Afrikaans-speaking, Protestant, male and well connected in society (Wren, 1990). The Broederbond il-
lustrates how Afrikaner nationalism, Protestantism and the South African state merged to create and up-
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hold apartheid ideology. The Broederbond closely supervised the conduct of its members and could ter-
minate their membership for various reasons including “divorce under unacceptable circumstances, (…), 
conviction of a criminal offence, alcohol abuse, regular participation in Sunday sport or joining a church 
other than the three Afrikaans churches.” (Lategan, 2004, p. 61) The Broederbond also strictly controlled 
national policy. Specialised committees, 
supervised the implementation of policy by their own members and by government. They also 
proactively researched and formulated policy. They were composed of highly competent people 
and experts in their specific fields (...). Virtually all important legislation in the 60s and 70s was 
prepared in this way before it entered the parliamentary system. (Lategan, 2004, p. 61) 
The Broederbond served a critical cohesive function between state and church, enforced the strict church-
sanctioned conduct of government officials and religious conformity of government policy, and at the 
same time ensured the political conformity of the DRC. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
The analysis of state/church relations during the last authoritarian regimes in Argentina and South Africa 
has revealed a mutually beneficial relationship between those two institutions in both countries, justifying 
the categorisation of the relationship as ideological symbiosis. In their own ways, both regimes acted in 
the name of religion to cover-up and justify their egregious human rights records. In Argentina, the mili-
tary junta argued that its coup saved the Christian nation from communism and presented the ‘dirty war’ 
against its opponents as a holy mission sanctioned by God. In South Africa, the apartheid regime employed 
religion to provide a moral justification for its policies of racial segregation and, similarly for the Argentine 
dictatorship, portrayed its rule as a mission ordained by God. 
Through the ideological symbiosis with the regime, the Catholic Church in Argentina and the DRC in 
South Africa were able to secure privileged positions in society that included financial support from the 
state and direct influence on regime policy through informal channels. In exchange, both churches con-
tributed to the stability of the regimes by lending moral credibility to the rulers and their policies. Argen-
tine Bishops denied the human rights abuses of the dictatorship to placate the growing public outrage over 
the disappearance of countless Argentines, all the while participating in the extrajudicial torture and kill-
ings administered by the regime. The DRC in South Africa even went a step further to create a complete 
theological justification of racial segregation, not only legitimising but inspiring many of apartheid crudest 
policies. In both countries, the churches’ moral and even spiritual support for the military helped to create 
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a powerful sense of moral righteousness necessary to implement the regimes’ immoral policies and prac-
tices. Both churches also displayed a remarkable theological flexibility to accept each regime’s practices as 
part of a genuinely moral cause. 
In both South Africa and Argentina, the ideological symbiosis between state and church was facilitated by 
the strong personal religious convictions of the respective regimes’ rulers and their personal friendships 
with church leaders, allowing regular interlocution through various informal channels of mutual influence. 
Considering that both regimes possessed a formal institutional separation of church and state, this illustrates 
that formal ties between these institutions are not representative of the actual degree of cooperation between 
religion and politics, and especially do not reflect the degree of policy influence churches can wield. 
The discursive construction of a particular constitutional identity based on religion played an important 
role in the legitimation strategy of both authoritarian regimes. However, the way this played out differs 
between South Africa and Argentina. In the case of the former, the boundary for which part of the popu-
lation makes up the nation was drawn along racial lines. The apartheid government explicitly aimed to 
create artificial nation states for the non-white population in desolate locations to realise the vision of a 
purely white South Africa. Religion functioned as a legitimising basis for the separateness or apartheid of 
the population along racial lines. On the other hand, the Argentine military dictatorship constructed the 
national identity as Christian with the aim to exclude those with left-wing political views (for the left’s 
allegedly inherent atheism) from the definition of Argentineness. In contrast to South Africa’s racial lines, 
religion was constructed as the primary axis of difference in Argentina. It goes without saying that left-
wing political affiliation did not really constitute a mutually exclusive category with being Catholic. Fram-
ing the battle as religious rather than political was a deliberate strategy employed by the dictatorship to 
demonise opponents and elevate the military’s actions to the status of a holy mission; as observed by Verbit-
sky (2005) the very requirement for the physical, psychological and moral eradication of the subversive. 
The incorporation of religious elements into the regimes’ identity constructions had a mutually legitimis-
ing and beneficial utility for state and church. On the one hand, religion functioned as a legitimising ide-
ology for the regime, and on the other, a religious identity construction also justified the moral influence 
of the churches on national policy. Importantly, the churches were willingly involved in this deal. 
This is the pivotal difference to other countries such as Germany and Italy. In Italy the church did not 
oppose but not align with Fascism either. Therefore its reputation was not damaged during Fascism and it 
emerged as a legitimate ally for the Christian Democratic Party in the phase of democratic consolidation 
(Warner, 1961). In Germany, the church responded to oppression with conformity but did not too en-
thusiastically support the regime. The regime itself did not primarily rely on religion to legitimate its 
violent repression, but rather on its own racial ideology and Hitler actively reduced the influence and 
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independence of institutionalised religion. While signing the Reichskonkordat with the Vatican in 1933, he 
repeatedly ignored it thereafter and subordinated the church to the state (Conway, 2001, c1968). Thus, 
there was no ideological symbiosis and the church could ally with the Christian Democratic party upon 
democratisation (Warner, 1961). 
For South Africa and Argentina, the historic temporal position of the regimes in the second half of the 20th 
century is a decisive context factor that shaped the unfolding of state/church relations. Paradoxically, 
secularisation processes in the Christian world and the rise of human rights and democracy to the most 
legitimate principles in the international community of states helped shape the incentive structures for 
state and church to cooperate in the first place. With both secularisation and modernisation posing threats 
to its social influence, the churches had a strong incentive to cooperate with the regimes to secure an all 
but dominant position in society. Among other benefits, the churches enjoyed the privilege of their defi-
nition of morality to be enshrined into policy, likely heightening moral influence on national policy far 
beyond what could have been reached under traditionally democratic conditions. Conversely, inherently 
weak legitimacy of an authoritarian regime with questionable human rights standards increased its own 
need for a religious backing to help legitimise its rule. 
While the world historical context of the second half of the 20th century enabled the state/church symbi-
osis in Argentina’s and South Africa’s last authoritarian regimes in the first place, ironically, it ultimately 
also led to their demise. While the state/church entente prolonged the life of the authoritarian regimes, 
both eventually fell apart, paving the way for more democratic, representative governments that followed. 
Their flagrant human rights abuses contributed to the deterioration of the regimes’ legitimacy, leading to 
increasing international isolation for each that, combined with other domestic factors, eventually lead to 
democratisation. While in other epochs, a state/church alliance could have had very different repercus-
sions, these churches’ ideological symbiosis with these authoritarian regimes within that specific era 
proved disadvantageous for the churches as it challenged religious institutions’ most important resource: 
their moral authority, as we shall see preventing religion to shape the constitutional identities that emerged 
after regime transition. 
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5 Mechanism Part 1. Democratic Constitutional Identities 
in South Africa and Argentina 
 
“We will seek freedom and democracy for the Argentineans, with the firmness that comes with 
having lived the dramatic experience of totalitarianism and repression, and we will fight for 
freedom and democracy in the world.” 
 (Alfonsín, 1983) 
 
 “[W]e must (…) engage in an historic effort of redefinition of ourselves as a new nation. Our 
watch-words must be justice, peace, reconciliation and nation-building in the pursuit of a dem-
ocratic, non-racial and non-sexist country.”  
(Mandela, 1994e) 
 
At the end of their violent reigns of repression, both the apartheid regime in South Africa and the last 
Argentine dictatorship faced deep legitimacy crises. Against the backdrop of economic decline and rising 
international and internal pressure due to the military regime’s human rights abuses, the Argentine dicta-
torship entered the Falklands/Malvinas War against Britain in April 1982. The war was a last ditch attempt 
to regain the vanishing glory of the armed forces. The British victory in the same year accelerated the 
regime’s disintegration, and after mass protests the military junta finally called democratic elections, 
which were carried out in 1983 (Viola & Mainwarning, 1984, p. 38). 
Around the same time in South Africa, internal resistance against the apartheid regime grew stronger; 
increasing political violence and international isolation, which in turn further damaged the economy and 
finally resulted in a slow shift in approach of the apartheid government. In order to prevent “growing 
violence, tension and conflict”, President de Klerk (1990) of the ruling National Party began giving con-
cessions to the regime opposition. Among these concessions granted was the unbanning of the ANC, in 
the vain hope of remaining in control of an inevitable political process of transition. As the ANC emerged 
from the underground around 40 000 exiled members returned to South Africa in the early 1990s, paving 
the way for the multiparty negotiations that would lead the country towards its first fully representative 
democratic elections in 1994 (Byrnes, 1997). 
Both South Africa’s and Argentina’s regime transitions towards democracy were accompanied by pro-
found changes in political ideology, legal systems, institutions and political leaders. The discontinuity left 
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by a moment of political transition allows for the potential of sudden and far reaching changes, the kind 
that are often precluded in more mature political systems. While a democratisation process is a critical 
juncture for the future trajectory of a country, this, however, does not mean that all potential paths are 
open at this crossroad. The historical trajectory of the country, as well as the temporal positioning of this 
juncture, at the same time both suggest and preclude certain future paths. 
In the previous chapter, we reviewed how the causal condition of the theoretical mechanism played out 
in South African and Argentine reality. This chapter will look at the first part of the mechanism that argues 
the state/church ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule to lead to the emergence of a constitu-
tional identity that, in contrast to the identity construction of the preceding authoritarian regime, does 
not use religion as a tool for legitimation and identification but rather focuses on secularly interpreted 
human rights instead. To this end, this chapter traces the empirical manifestations of this theoretical con-
nection in the context of South Africa’s and Argentina’s respective democratic transitions. 
As we will see, the pattern of continuities and discontinuities of the democratisation processes causally 
connect the state/church ideological symbiosis under authoritarianism to a secular constitutional identity 
focused on human rights after democratisation. The delegitimation of the old regimes and their ideologies 
led to regime change and with that a shift in political power away from the military in Argentina and away 
from the Afrikaners in South Africa; and towards the former regime opposition previously banned from 
political activity, in exile or imprisoned under the authoritarian regimes. The democratic political elite 
that came to power after the regime changes, exemplified by South Africa’s first democratic president 
Mandela and Argentina’s first president after its latest democratisation Alfonín, had personally experi-
enced the religiously legitimated repression of the authoritarian regimes. Pivotal players in the construc-
tion of South Africa’s and Argentina’s post-democratic constitutional identities were among the former 
regime opposition that was morally failed by religious institutions and indebted to human rights and civil 
society as compatriots in the struggle for democracy. 
While the political transitions included a change in regime ideology and representatives, the staff and 
ideology of the respective churches were characterised by continuity. Upon democratisation, a changed 
state then met a static church. The DRCs as well as the Catholic Church’s alliances still laid with the 
representatives of the old regime. 
During their political transitions, successful democratisation and consolidation in Argentina and South 
Africa was by no means certain. While earlier attempts at democracy existed throughout Argentine his-
tory, all were short lived before democratisation in 1983. Between 1930 and 1971, Argentina witnessed 
26 successful military coups (Brysk, 1994, p. 27). South Africa did not have previous experiences of non-
racial democracy prior to 1994 and thus democracy had yet to be invented in the local sense. This proved 
 
- 78 - 
to not be an easy endeavour considering more than 40 years of apartheid rule, an upsurge of political 
violence in the early 1990s and the extraordinary cultural and ethnic diversity even within the racial cate-
gories of black, white and coloured in the population. To secure the support needed for their democratic 
projects to blossom, political leaders in South Africa and Argentina had to design new political systems 
that would be legitimately accepted by the population and the international community of states, while 
contemporaneously fighting off internal challengers against the nascent democratic order; namely those 
from the military in Argentina and the pro-apartheid forces in South Africa. The continued ideological 
alliance between the church and the representatives of the old regime turned this authoritarian entente 
into a threat to democracy. In other words, democratic survival depended on fighting off right-wing and 
church influence. 
The highpoint of the democratisation processes was the passage of newly written constitutions. The con-
testation and reformulation of both countries’ formerly religious constitutional identities is mirrored in 
the constitutional debates that became a battleground for competing versions of constitutional identity 
along a religious/secular axis. The tension between religion and human rights in the specific context of 
South Africa and Argentina becomes visible in the way in which human rights arguments were used to 
limit the symbolic role of religion in the new constitutions and vice versa. Which side of the ideological 
battle won can be read in the final texts of these new constitutions. The greatly reduced symbolic im-
portance of religion, combined with an extraordinary emphasis on human rights protection, unparalleled 
in constitutional texts worldwide, in South Africa’s and Argentina’s new constitutions illustrate how reli-
gious institutions being morally compromised at a pivotal time in the political trajectory of both countries 
precluded their ability to shape and inform the founding values of the new democracies. Those values and 
their enshrinement in institutions and constitutions of the new regimes then form the opportunity struc-
tures for social movement action that will be the focus of the second part of the mechanism analysed in 
the next chapter.  
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5.1 Never Again: Argentina’s Quest for Democracy 
During the dictatorship in Argentina, mothers and grandmothers of the disappeared gathered weekly on 
Buenos Aires’s central plaza, holding pictures of their missing family members while wearing a white 
headscarf, representing diapers as a symbol for motherhood. These women demanded to know the fate of 
their disappeared children. Even more chilling was that the children of their disappeared children were 
born in detention centres and given to military families and regime supporters for adoption (Brysk, 1994, 
pp. 48–49). That the protesters were women and that they used the regime’s own ideological weapons, 
i.e. a focus on family and motherhood, challenged the military’s own legitimacy construction of protecting 
conservative Christian values, including the family, and contributed to delegitimising the regime. 
The so called Madres de Plaza de Mayo [Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, henceforth Madres] and the Abuelas de 
Plaza de Mayo [Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, henceforth Abuelas] are two of several significant hu-
man rights groups formed during the dictatorship, and today are part of the strong, vibrant and highly 
respected human rights movement of Argentina. As underlined by Brysk (1994, p. 45), “[t]he failure of 
the Argentine Church is particularly important in explaining the emergence of the human rights move-
ment.” Several human rights groups and key activists began movement activity only after unsuccessfully 
seeking support for their cause from the church. “The human rights movement then assumed the Church’s 
traditional role in elaborating symbols, rituals, and metaphors to explain and resolve death and injustice” 
(ibid.), acting as a substitute resource for moral claims. 
It is important to note that although some religious actors were also among the diversely composed human 
rights movement, this was not the case for the Catholic hierarchy. Argentine Methodist bishop and human 
rights advocate Federico Pagura explains: 
[A]t a given moment, the representatives of churches linked to the World Council of Churches 
proposed to the highest authorities of the Catholic church the establishment of a Vicaría de la 
Solidaridad in the style of the Chilean church. We were ready to renounce our own identity as 
evangelical churches and fully support such an initiative if the Catholic church so decided. We 
were informed that the Argentine church was not ready to follow the Chilean experience and that 
all the work in relation to human rights was going to be handled by Caritas … For us that meant 
the death of all initiatives. It was precisely in that response that the Movimiento Ecuménico por 
los Derechos Humanos [Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights – MEDH] originated. (as cited 
in Jelin, 1994, p. 41) 
The MEDH and the Movimiento Judió por los Derechos Humanos [Jewish Movement for Human Rights – 
MJDH] were two religiously-based human rights organisations whose existence shows that religion was 
not absent in human rights activism in Argentina, but whose founding history is related to the Catholic 
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church as the main religious institution failing to support the victims of oppression and collaborating with 
the state in legitimising and executing political violence. As a result, a heterogeneously composed human 
rights movement became the only public voice in support of those affected by the atrocities of the dicta-
torship. In this differentiation between regime resistance and Catholic Church we find one of the roots of 
human rights in the framework of Argentine democracy being interpreted through a secular lens today. 
The work of human rights organisations brought the regime’s gross human rights violations to interna-
tional awareness and contributed to Argentina’s increasingly pariah status internationally. In 1977, the US 
cut its general aid and military aid, as well as initiating multilateral sanctions a few years later. In 1976, 
the United Nations condemned the country’s violation of international norms in form of a resolution and, 
in 1978, the UN recognised and condemned the practice of disappearances, eventually leading to the 
establishment of a UN Working group on Forced Disappearance in 1980. The United Nations also sup-
ported the Argentine domestic human rights groups, even representing the claims of the Abuelas on several 
occasions to the Argentine government (Brysk, 1994, 31; 53-54). 
Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Civil Union won the first democratic elections after the demise of the military 
regime with 52% of the votes on 30 October, 1983, marking the return to democracy. The Radical Civil 
Union competed against the Peronists in the elections and unexpectedly won because of their clear com-
mitment to human rights and democracy (Viola & Mainwarning, 1984, p. 38). Following his election, 
Alfonsín commissioned the National Commission of the Disappearances of Persons (CONADEP) to shed 
light on the human rights abuses committed by the military. In 1985, trials against high ranking military 
officials began which resulted in General Videla to be sentenced to life in prison for crimes against human-
ity. However, Alfonsín’s successor, Carlos Menem, issued a pardon to the military in 1990, which was 
reversed yet again later under the Kirchner administration. In a narrow sense, Argentina’s democratic 
transition occurred in 1982/1983, but democratic consolidation was arguably only completed with the 
passage of the new constitution in 1993. 
 
State/church dissent under democracy  
“The Argentine Catholic Church criticises the secular attitude of the Raúl Alfonsín government for the 
first time”. (El País, 1984, my translation) This quote is the headline of an article published by Argentine 
newspaper El País in 1984, a few months after the first democratic elections. As the headline suggests, the 
article reports on the newly transformed ideological relationship between the new democratic regime and 
the Catholic Church, stating that: 
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The Argentine Catholic Church begins to measure the distance that has separated her from the 
centres of government decision, after a few months of silence. Although Raúl Alfonsín is a Cath-
olic, but it is said that on the day he took office as president, he substituted the traditional Tedéum 
[Christian Hymn of Faith that gives thanks God, traditionally recited on occasions such as the 
crowning of kings] in the metropolitan cathedral for a gala function in the Teatro de Colón, and 
that there are agnostics including confessed atheists in his circle, whose current wives are only 
theirs before Paraguayan or Uruguayan judges. (El País, 1984, my translation) 
This quote is revealing in various respects. First, it illustrates how influential the Catholic Church and its 
conservative values have traditionally been in support of Argentine governments, so much so that a more 
secular attitude of the new government was now remarkable and newsworthy. Events of highly symbolic 
political value, such as the presidential inauguration, were formerly accompanied by religious rites such 
as the Tedéum, that was attended by Argentine presidents in the metropolitan Cathedral since 1810 (Rubin, 
2013). Catholic morality was traditionally expected to be upheld by religious leaders in Argentina, such 
that only the fact that Alfonsín’s political advisors allegedly included agnostics and persons who were 
divorced and remarried was already ruffling feathers in the Argentine Catholic Church. Second, this ex-
tract demonstrates that the new government deliberately showcased a transmuted ideological relationship 
with the church by breaking with highly symbolic religious and political traditions which have accompanied 
Argentine politics throughout both authoritarian and democratic regimes in the course of its history. 
Unsurprisingly, Alfonsín administration’s relationship with the church proved to be nothing short of con-
frontational. The message conveyed by the government was clear: The Catholic Church’s influence on 
government action has ended. Another example appeared in the abolishment of cinematographic censor-
ship after democratisation, which especially awoke the “apocalyptic episcopal criticism” when Carlos 
Gorostiza, Secretary of State for Culture, declared “his intention to finance the Argentine cinema with the 
taxes collected by the exhibition of porn movies” (El País, 1984, my translation). 
The end of media censorship was doubly unfavourable for the Catholic Church, as the content of Argen-
tina’s cultural productions was no longer confined to Catholic moral principles. More importantly, in-
creasing public awareness of the magnitude of state terror committed during the dictatorship and the 
church’s complicity in the exertion of that terror was coming to light. Writer Ernesto Sábato, who chaired 
the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), denounced the church’s stance 
in relation to the former regime. No doubt it was not lost on him that this new uncensored voice was now 
made freely available to the public by the Argentine news media during democratisation. Sábato declared 
the church to be especially guilty due to the powerful influence of the Catholic hierarchy in the country: 
“A word of the Church would have stopped slaughter and torture. Not even the Argentine Army, whose 
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officers must profess by law the Catholic faith, would have dared to confront the Episcopal Conference.” (El 
País, 1984, my translation) 
A controversy that arose in conjunction with CONAPED was based on a list assembled by the commission 
staff containing the names of around 1500 persons involved in the repression carried out by the former 
regime. Victim testimonies were the main sources collected during the commission’s work. While the list 
was not made public at first, the information was leaked to the media and Pio Laghi, the papal nuncio’s18 
name, appeared on the list. Once in the public domain, families of victims were encouraged to testify 
against Laghi, who to this day “remains one of the most enigmatic figures of the repression.” (Feitlowitz, 
1998) The story was broadly disseminated via Argentine newspapers during the Easter week of 1995. 
Emilio Massera, one of the leading military figures during the last years of the regime, wrote a letter in 
Laghi’s defence to Argentina’s most influential news agency.  
Massera, who played tennis every other week with the ex-Papal Nuncio, defended Laghi with stating that 
“all the Church’s authorities, and in particular Pio Laghi, (…) were always concerned about the so-called 
detainees-desaparecidos” (ibid.). As observed by Feitlowitz (1998, 193ff.), this was a curious defence 
considering that Massera had denied any knowledge about kidnappings, detention centres or torture dur-
ing his trial. Laghi himself denied having ever known of the regime’s repression, which fits uneasily with 
his alleged concern for the victims thereof during the dictatorship. 
This illustrates how the immoral entente between military and church staff maintained its hold even after 
the transition to democracy, including mutual cover ups of human rights abuses and their involvement in 
them. While the system of government changed, staff in military and church largely remained the same, 
and with it their informal web of symbiotic connections that fostered the sense of moral righteousness 
necessary to execute state terror and that produced a lack of accountability to truth and the public in the 
name of defending conservative ideology. 
The signs of conflict between the newly democratic government and the Catholic Church accumulated 
during Alfonsín’s time in office. In his book “The House is in Order” [La casa está en orden], Alfonsín’s ex 
minister of defence, Horacio Jaunarena (2011) remembers a strange episode that occurred during a reli-
gious service he attended with Alfonsín in 1987. The military trials were running concurrently and con-
sternation in the armed forces about the democratic government was widespread. To commemorate those 
fallen in the Malvinas/Falklands War, the president and his defence minister attended mass on the 2nd of 
April held by military vicar Monsignor Medina. In the homily [commentary by priest after reading of 
scripture in mass], the vicar denounced the new democratic government as corrupt. Surprised by this 
                                                     
18 Papal Nuncio is an ecclesiastical diplomat representing the Holy See to a state or institution. 
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attack, Alfonsín spontaneously decided to launch a rebuttal attack at the pulpit. Jaunarena, who was sitting 
in the first row between the president and high ranking military official Teodoro Waldner, remembers 
the exchange vividly: 
The climate was very tense. When the homily ended and the religious service continued, Alfonsín 
asked in a low voice: ‘Man, can you talk here?’ ‘Look Raul,’ I said, ‘I do not understand any of 
this, I cannot answer because I do not know’. Noticing the restlessness, Jose Ignacio López said 
yes, that after the Mass you can ask the word, like any parishioner, to address the crowd. Alfonsín 
then said, ‘I'll talk.’ 
- Where? ‘There.’ He pointed to the pulpit with his finger. -When? -Now. What do you think? ‘I 
think it's going to be unforgettable.’ 
Quietly, I immediately told Waldner [the military official] who was at my side: - Prepare yourself 
because what you are going to see now you will never see again in your life. -What's up? He asked 
with a surprised gesture. ‘The president is going to speak.’ -Where? ‘There,’ I said, pointing to 
the pulpit with my eyebrows. -When? -Now. 
‘Fuck that!’ [A la mierda!] Said the military chief in a low voice and without a muscle moving in his 
face. (Jaunarena, 2011, my translation) 
Visibly angered, Alfonsín took to addressing Medina and the rest of the audience, defending the integrity 
of his government. For the first time in Argentine history, a president disrupted a religious homily. During 
his speech, Alfonsín challenged anyone who had proof of government corruption to step forward at once. 
As Jaunarena observes, this “was a gesture of presidential authority at a most delicate moment” especially 
because it happened in a church full of priests and militaries, not in a political context. “Monsignor Medina 
never spoke again before the president.” (Jaunarena, 2011, my translation; see also El Clarín, 2011) 
The diminished moral authority of the Catholic Church over political matters would soon be felt in policy 
as well. Against the wishes of bishops, the new government passed unprecedented laws equating the rights 
of legitimate and illegitimate children, and granting parental rights to women even if they are divorced 
and remarried. Furthermore, prominent feminists such as writer Maria Elena Walsh achieved the govern-
ment’s concession for a hour slot daily on a state television channel with a show called Cicada that dissem-
inated a feminist points of view on the political situation in the country, much to the irritation of the 
bishops (El País, 1984). However, the most contentious policy decision was the legalisation of divorce in 
1987. By now, the Catholic Church in Argentina was enraged by the Alfonsín administration because new 
laws directly curbed the church’s normative authority (Burdick, 1995, p. 221). 
 
- 84 - 
A Supreme Court decision19 that preceded the legalisation of divorce demonstrates the tensions between 
Argentina’s new found human rights focus and the traditional moral hegemony of the Catholic Church in the 
Argentine context. The universalism of the former seemed at odds with the particularism of the latter. The 
Court declared the indissolubility of marriage to be a Catholic teaching and its imposition on the whole of 
society a violation of the religious freedom of those not professing that religion (Padilla, 2015, p. 73). 
Regarding the divorce law, the Episcopal Conference published the following communiqué:  
As we have done other times, and as we will do again, we must illuminate with the light of the 
Gospel the moral questions that affect the life of the individual and of society when what is at stake 
are `the fundamental rights of the person or the salvation of souls` (G. et S., 76). That is why today 
we express the deep sorrow and sadness that we experience before a law that we believe will seri-
ously compromise the future of the family in the Argentine Republic (…). (Conferencia Episcopal 
Argentina, 1987, my translation) 
To protest the divorce law, the church also organised a demonstration on the Plaza de Mayo, where Arch-
bishop Aramburu preached in defence of the family. His sermon was attended by prominent military figures 
and former ministers of the dictatorship (El País, 1986). As joint protests as the one against divorce demon-
strates, the conservative ideological outlook of both military and church ensured their ideological symbiosis 
continued long after initial democratisation and further prevented the church to meaningfully contribute to 
the ethical considerations in policymaking under democracy. 
Thus, there was a continuity of alliances between military and church that was transmitted from authoritarianism 
into democracy. Same applies to a human rights focus and a dose of scepticism regarding doctrinal arguments in 
political matters that democratic politicians acquired during authoritarianism and carried over into democracy. 
How that shaped the political discourse in newly democratic Argentina is the focus for the upcoming section. 
 
Symbolic political communication 
The 10th of December marks a significant date in the national context of Argentina’s democratic transition. 
Worldwide, it is celebrated as the International Day of Human Rights in commemoration of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in Paris on the 10th of December 1948. Forty-five years later, on 
10th of December 1983, Alfonsín, the newly elected democratic president of Argentina, gave his inaugural 
speech, promising: 
                                                     
19 C.S.J.N., Sejean v. Zacks de Sejean (1986), Fallos 308:2268 
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On this occasion [of International Human Rights Day] we solemnly reaffirm our faith in the rights 
of man and the intention of our government to act both internally and internationally so that these 
rights can be effectively enforced. (…). We will seek the full force of human rights and stand out, 
for all men who inhabit the Earth, the same rights that we claim for our compatriots. (Alfonsín, 
1983, my translation) 
As Brysk (1994, p. 61) notes, “the transition elections of October 1983 marked not only a change of 
regime, but a fundamental change in the character of political life.” The victory of the Radical party in the 
democratic elections was greatly influenced by Alfonsín’s human rights rhetoric. Alfonsín himself was the 
former vice-president of the human rights organisation La Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos 
[Permanent Assembly for Human Rights - APDH], which was formed in response to the dictatorship’s 
practices in 1975 (Mercosur, 2014). Alfonsín was among the founding members, together with Emilio 
Mignone, an important figure in the Argentine human rights movement whose daughter was disappeared 
by the dictatorship in 1976. Mignone (1986) would later write a book about the complicity of the church 
in executing regime terror. As Argentine sociologist Jelin observes, Alfonsín’s victory, 
indicated the acceptance by the new regime of the demands and values expressed by the [human 
rights] movement or even their incorporation as the ethical foundation of the new state. Much 
more than in other cases of transitions in Latin America, human rights were an essential element 
of the new democracy. (Jelin, 1994, p. 46) 
Moreover, Alfonsín’s victory demonstrates one of the micro-transmissions of causal force that connect 
the state/church entente of the dictatorship with the way in which the new democracy unfolded and the 
values for which it stood. The political elite of the new democracy was heavily sympathetic to human 
rights groups due to their ideological alignment in the struggle against the dictatorship at the least, or even 
directly involved in their work before becoming the architects of a democratic Argentina. 
After the repressive dictatorship, democratisation in Argentina meant the country had to transition into a 
new democratic identity, or in Alfonsín’s words, had to “discover its culture, rediscover and reformulating 
its national identity” (Alfonsín, 1983, my translation). The choice of date and content of Alfonsín’s inaugural 
speech gives a first indication of the prominence of human rights in the construction of this new identity. 
The introduction of human rights symbolism into politics was all but unintended. Considering the profound 
delegitimation of the dictatorship, the new civil government’s internal and external legitimacy depended on 
proving its commitment to values that were opposed to those of the military regime. Accordingly, this was 
incompatible with the church’s previous complicity, and so human rights became the new foundational layer 
of legitimacy. As noted by Levit (1999, p. 317), human rights gained immense importance “because they 
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were a symbolic break from the past and thus enhanced Argentina’s reputation and standing vis-á-vis Mer-
cosur and other economic integration efforts.” 
In his inaugural speech, Alfonsín declared that “there are many problems that can’t be solved immediately, 
but public immorality has ended today. We are going to govern with decency” (Alfonsín, 1983). His words 
make plain the contrast between the past and then-present. Interestingly, this is one of the most prominent 
stylistic devices in Alfonsín’s speech, marking it as the symbolic moment of passage from authoritarianism 
to democracy. The discursive construction of a radical rupture between the previous and then-incumbent 
regime not only pertains to the contrast between authoritarianism and democracy, but equally importantly 
to the higher value system that lends legitimacy to government action. Alfonsín construed ethics, rather 
than religion, as the moral guiding principles for democracy: 
Yesterday could exist a hopeless, dismal and disbelieving country: today we call on the Argenti-
neans, not only in the name of legitimacy derived from democratic government, but also from 
the ethical sentiment which sustains this legitimacy. This ethical sentiment constitutes one of the 
noblest movement of the soul. Even the aim of building national unity must be fully interpreted 
through ethics. (Alfonsín, 1983) 
These ethics, Alfonsín elaborated, are “more than an ideology” and necessary because “you cannot preserve 
popular protagonism without upholding a policy of principles, ethics that ensure its continuance” (ibid., 
my translation). 
Ethics and religion both constitute a normative system of what is right and wrong but, conceptually, they 
are distinct. Religion can be a source of ethics but does not have to be. An examination of the content and 
sources of Alfonsín’s ethics gives insight into the role of religion in the discursive construction of consti-
tutional identity during democratisation in Argentina. On the occasion of the first opening session of the 
second national assembly in democracy, Alfonsín stated:  
This act [of opening parliament] is for me a new, strong and signifying symbol for the consolidation 
of democracy in Argentina. Like I said, you legitimately represent the varied and multiple face of 
our country which (…) now seeks to assert itself irrevocably in diversity and freedom. (Alfonsín, 
1986, my translation) 
Notions of diversity, pluralism and tolerance were frequently invoked by Alfonsín when speaking about 
Argentina’s political trajectory. Another example of this is when he stated that, “without the component 
of tolerance, democracy is impoverish and endangered (…). Tolerance and pluralism are the preserve of 
democracy (…).” (Alfonsín, 1986, my translation). What is remarkable about these values is that, while 
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not necessarily in outright contrast to religion, these new values represent an uneasy fit with the ideolog-
ical hegemony of the Catholic Church as it played out in Argentina’s history. Moreover, this tension be-
tween the Catholic moral dominance of the past and the new political value system also became visible in 
the education reform, which was one of the first projects the democratic government put on its agenda. 
Regarding that reform, Alfonsín expressed his vision that: 
Freedom, tolerance, pluralism, reciprocal knowledge and respect, and federative construction of 
social values and goals are the goals that should govern the work in each classroom, in each insti-
tution of the Argentine educational system, regardless of the educational agents that support the 
classroom or institution. (Alfonsín, 1983, my translation) 
Worth noting is Alfonsín’s reference to the various educational agents. State-run schools have historically 
coexisted with religious schools in Argentina. Insisting on pluralism and tolerance as the common guiding 
principles for all educational agents was an assertion of the supremacy of the new democracy’s founding 
values, subjecting religion to constitutional values rather than being informed by it. Such subtle hints of a 
newly defined role of religion in informing the country’s value system are characteristic of Alfonsín’s style 
of political communication during and shorty after democratisation. With that, Alfonsín discursively dis-
empowered the church’s normative influence over political matters. 
Another nuanced indication of Catholicism’s shifted role in the country’s political identity construction 
was Alfonsín’s frequent invocation of classic Enlightenment principles. As is well known, the intellectual 
movement originating in 17th century Europe nowadays subsumed under the term Enlightenment, wit-
nessed the development of back then radical notions of political legitimacy divorced from divine right. 
Feeding the first secular theories of ethics, ideas that were central to Enlightenment thought are a focus 
on reason as the tool for human progress on the path towards human dignity, liberty, tolerance and equal-
ity. Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke departed from religion as a source of government legiti-
macy and developed social contract theory, i.e. government legitimacy to be based on a contract between 
rational individuals. Locke’s ideas regarding a separation of state and church and a peaceful shift of political 
power through citizen participation, as well as Thomas Hobbes’ reflections on natural law as the source 
of natural rights of individuals later materialised in modern constitutionalism and founding documents such as 
the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. 
Many of the principles invoked in Alfonsín’s symbolic political communication follow the example of key en-
lightenment concepts. In an historic address to the General Assembly of the UN, Alfonsín, having “come before 
the Assembly with an open heart at a very special time in the life of [his] country”, describes the current situation 
of humanity:  
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Man, in his historic quest for perfection, has come to stake his ultimate claim: absolute respect for his 
dignity. (…) It does not define an ideology, because it is guided by ethics. It does not implement a 
strategy, because it is supported by the development of natural law. It is simply a vital impulse, or, 
better still, life itself. In brief, it is the immutable fact of his constant progress. (…) In fact, the indus-
trialized world, without exception, is moving towards a new frontier of progress, which will not be 
stopped by the logical and, at times, tragic vicissitudes of life. (Alfonsín, 1988) 
Aside from human dignity and progress, other Enlightenment principles such as rationality feature prominently 
in Alfonsín’s rhetoric. An example of this is when he introduced rational citizen participation as a tool for 
democratic consolidation: “To consolidate democratic power, among other things, it is necessary to strengthen 
civil society, through incentives that encourage the rational participation of citizens in popular organisations.” 
(Alfonsín, 1983, my translation) Just as it did in Enlightenment thought, science and technology have a firm 
place in the discursive construction of Argentina’s present:  
Our time, on the other hand, demands that governments consider the development of pure scientific 
knowledge and its technological applications as a matter of primary importance. In order to channel 
this urgent action, we have created the Secretariat of State Science and Technology, which will coor-
dinate these activities in the State and in other sectors, in order to optimally use and increase the na-
tional heritage constituted by the intelligence and knowledge of thousands of specialists, many of 
whom are currently residing abroad for lack of intellectual opportunities in the country or to avoid 
absurd discrimination. (Alfonsín, 1983, my translation) 
The striking parallels between the themes of enlightenment and those present in Argentina’s discourse of de-
mocratisation is informative regarding the role of religion in the new democratic identity, as it discursively 
shifts the government’s source of legitimacy away from religious principles towards the secular. All things 
considered, it presents a normative challenge of the church’s political influence. Enlightenment concepts in 
Alfonsín’s political speeches metaphorically connect the emergence of modern constitutionalism from the 
“dark” middle ages and the emergence of democratic Argentina from authoritarianism. 
To sum up thus far, it is not just that religion was absent from high profile political speeches, interesting is also 
what religion has been replaced with in political discourse. Alfonsín constructs ethics as the boundaries for legiti-
mate government action. In an effort to create as much distance as possible from the previous dictatorship’s ide-
ology, democratic Argentina is portrayed as committed to human rights, tolerance, pluralism and diversity. While 
in other contexts not necessarily incommensurable with religion, in Argentina these values were secularly derived. 
This is directly related to the past and continued personal alliance structures between representatives of the old 
regime and the church. 
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Despite this democratic progress, many military and church leaders continued to defend the general righteousness 
of the “war against subversion” and, if at all, admitted to transgressions by individuals rather than acknowledging 
the systematic human rights abuses committed by the regime. This stands in stark contrast to Alfonsín’s enlight-
enment-influenced democratic renaissance discourse and the focus on human rights he inscribed into political 
discourse and as we will see, also materialised in democratic Argentina becoming an active participant in furthering 
the development and jurisprudence of international human rights law. 
 
Human rights matters 
Democratic Argentina’s newly found human rights commitments were not confined to the discursive sphere. 
Upon taking office in 1983, the government swiftly annulled the military’s self-amnesty, reformed the military 
code of justice, brought to trial the human rights abuses committed under the military regime, abolished the death 
penalty, made torture by public officials a crime punishable by murder, strengthened habeas corpus and created 
the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Brysk, 1994, pp. 67–68). During the nine months of 
work by CONADEP, the commission identified 340 clandestine detention centres20 and documented thousands 
of unresolved disappearances. The release of CONADEPs final report Nunca más [Never Again] was accompanied 
by demonstrations of 70 000 human rights showing their support (Ibid. pp.70-71). Table 14 provides an overview 
on Argentina’s various ratifications of human rights treaties. 
  
                                                     
20Today, the human rights organisation estimate that up to 600 clandestine detention centres were operating during the dicta-
torship. 
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Table 14. Human Rights Treaty Ratification in Argentina 
Treaty Signature Date Ratification Date, 
Accession(a) 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or   De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (CAT 1984) 
04 Feb 1985 24 Sep 1986 
Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture (CAT-OP 
2002) 
30 Apr 2003 15 Nov 2004 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR 
1966) 
19 Feb 1968 08 Aug 1986 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights aiming to the abolition of the death 
penalty (CCPR OP2 DP 1989) 
20 Dec 2006 02 Sep 2008 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (CCPR OP1 1966) 
  08 Aug 1986 (a) 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (CED 2007) 
06 Feb 2007 14 Dec 2007 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW 1979) 
17 Jul 1980 15 Jul 1985 
Optional Protocol - CEDAW (CEDAW-OP 1999) 28 Feb 2000 20 Mar 2007 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (CERD 1965) 
13 Jul 1967 02 Oct 1968 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR 1966) 
19 Feb 1968 08 Aug 1986 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW 1990) 
10 Aug 2004 23 Feb 2007 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1990) 29 Jun 1990 04 Dec 1990 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the involvement of children in armed Conflict (CRC-OP-
AC 2000) 
15 Jun 2000 10 Sep 2002 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on child prostitution and the sale of child pornography (CRC-
OP-SC 2000) 
01 Apr 2002 25 Sep 2003 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 
2007) 
30 Mar 2007 02 Sep 2008 
Source: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (n.d.b)  
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As a sign of serious commitment from the government to human rights, Argentina ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights (14.08.1984). In doing so, it recognised the jurisdiction of the American 
Court of Human Rights (5.9.1984). Further, it ratified the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (15.7.1985); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (including the optional protocol, all 
8.8.1986); and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (24.9.1986).  
With the accumulation of human rights treaty ratifications shortly after democratisation, Argentina as-
serted its human rights commitment before both a domestic and international audience. Argentina also 
immediately became an active member within the UN human rights framework, participating in a joint 
declaration with Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania on nuclear disarmament in 1984, or 
through denouncing human rights violations in other countries. Alfonsín also renounced apartheid in South 
Africa in his address to the UN General Assembly: “The unjust system of apartheid must be eliminated forever. 
Those who suffer under it can continue to count on the support of the civilised world.” (Alfonsín, 1984) 
Congruent with its new secularly-based democratic identity, Argentina also became an outspoken propo-
nent of the inclusion of LGBT rights into the international human rights regime. At an event for the pro-
motion of the Yogyakarta Principles21, jointly sponsored by the permanent mission to the UN of Argen-
tina, Uruguay and Brazil, Federico Villegas Beltrán, the Director of Human Rights at Argentina’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Worship emphasised the importance of LGBT human rights within a demo-
cratic society. Furthermore, he encouraged the UN Human Rights Council to consider every violation of 
human rights, including those of LGBT people. At the end of his remarks, he gave the audience a lesson 
on political correctness, pointing out that the words “tolerance” and “intolerance” should not be used when 
it comes to LGBT rights because they imply “suffering with patience”. As an alternative, he suggested 
using the phrase “respect for diversity” instead (Human Rights Watch, 2014).  
Argentina’s support for a comprehensive definition of human rights also applicable to LGBT issues can only 
be understood in light of the moral delegitimation of the Catholic Church. The Yogyakarta principles were 
rejected on religious grounds in many other countries. In Poland, for instance, the church’s powerful moral 
authority after democratisation limited the boundaries for an acceptable interpretation of human rights. 
When the Yogyakarta principles were discussed at the parliamentary assembly of the Organisation for 
                                                     
21 The Yogyakarta principles articulate the application of existing international human rights law to LGBT people. Developed 
by an international group of human rights experts, the principles clarify state obligations to protect LGBT people from human 
rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity (Human Rights Watch, 2014). 
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Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE), the Polish representative “made a surprisingly forceful in-
tervention, saying the principles contradicted Poland’s constitution, and no international body has ever 
defined the terms ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’.” (Gennarini, 2013) 
In 2008, the first UN declaration of its kind against homophobia and discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation and gender identity obtained the signatures of 66 UN member states (being strongly rejected by 
the Vatican). The declaration was introduced by Argentina along with six other countries, and was pre-
sented to the General Assembly of the UN by Argentine ambassador Jorge Argüello, urging “all states to 
take all necessary measures, especially legislative or administrative, to guarantee that sexual orientation 
and gender identity do not serve, under no circumstances, as the basis for penal sanctions – especially 
executions -, arrest or detention (Servicio de Noticias de las Naciones Unidas, 2008, my translation). 
César Cigliutti, president of the Comunidad Homosexual Argentina (CHA), a national LGBT rights organisa-
tion, describes Argentina’s leading role in this historic declaration as “a gesture that makes us proud and 
that shows the change that this government is making in foreign policy, expressing an attitude against the 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity". (Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, 
2008) Conversely, the Vatican lobbied against the declaration. Celestino Migliore, permanent observer 
of the Vatican to the UN, argued that the declaration would pressure states to legalise gay marriage: “The 
states that do not recognise the union between two persons of the same sex will be submitted to pressure”. 
Furthermore, he brought forward that: "In particular, the categories sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity used in the text do not find recognition in the international legal order. Such a political declaration 
would create new and implacable discriminations." (El País, 2008, my translation) His statement under-
lines the existence of two competing interpretations of international human rights texts - some actors, 
including the Argentine government, defining issues related to sex and gender in its framework, and others 
who do not. 
Another example of Argentina’s comprehensive interpretation of human rights extending across sexuality 
and gender identity is that ambassador Alberto Dumont, on behalf of the Argentine government, sup-
ported the incorporation of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association 
(ILGA) to consultative status in the United Nations. On their website, ILGA expresses special thanks to 
Belgium, the United States and Argentina for their crucial role in lobbying for a favourable consensus for 
ILGA to obtain the consultative status (ILGA, 2011). 
It is noteworthy that while being an outspoken proponent of LGBT rights as part of human rights interna-
tionally, as well as for women’s rights in general, Argentina’s international positioning vis-à-vis abortion 
is less supportive. Argentina has been part of the opposition against reproductive rights at the Cairo and 
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Beijing population conferences (Morgan, 2015). As we shall see later, this is less related to religious in-
fluence but rather a focus on family in Latin America in general and a glorification of motherhood and an 
interpretation of human rights as applying to the embryo, not the pregnant mother, in Argentina specifically. 
Argentina’s rapid domestic incorporation of international human rights standards found its high point in 
1994, when a new constitution was passed. The constitutional project set out to enhance democracy and 
incorporate all ratified international human rights treaties as part of a new constitution. Chapter IV, Sec-
tion 75 of the current constitution contains a list of all human rights treaties signed by Argentina and grants 
them “in the full force of their provisions (…) constitutional hierarchy.” (1994) Section 75/23 further 
introduces affirmative action when it pledges, “[t]o legislate and promote positive measures guaranteeing 
true equal opportunities and treatment, the full benefit and exercise of the rights recognised by this con-
stitution and by the international treaties on human rights in force, particularly referring to children, 
women, the aged, and disabled persons.” 
The 1994 constitution “dramatically altered the Argentine Constitution’s substantive treatment of human 
rights, as well as the legal status of international human rights treaties” and made Argentina the only coun-
try in Latin America to grant human rights treaties constitutional rank (Levit, 1999, pp. 291–292). Copies 
of the Argentine Constitution sold at newsstands on the streets of Buenos Aires at the time also included 
the following as a type of super appendix: the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man; the 
American Convention on Human Rights; the Universal Declaration; the International Covenant; the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Sanction of the Crime of Genocide; the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women; the Convention against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, and 
Degrading Punishment; and lastly the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see Levit, 1999, p. 342). 
Overall, what we see is an extraordinary focus on human rights in post authoritarian Argentina and the 
embracement of a secular interpretation of human rights that includes the protection of sexual rights. In 
Poland, the church influenced government’s positioning regarding sexual rights as human rights. In Ar-
gentina, support for the application of human rights to sexual and gender identity was enabled by a dem-
ocratic constitutional identity that fed on secular principles rather than religious doctrine. In the following 
section we will trace this secularisation of constitutional identity in the making of Argentina’s new consti-
tution of 1994. 
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The passage of a new constitution 
Since the return to democracy in 1983, there was an interparty consensus about the need to reform the 
constitution. After assuming office, Alfonsín convened “the Advisory Commission for the Consolidation 
of Democracy” [El Consejo para la Consolidación de la Democracia] that was charged, inter alia, with exploring 
the options for a major constitutional reform. While the Advisory Commission recommended the con-
vention of a Constitutional Assembly, the reform project only gathered momentum in 1993 when the two 
main political parties, the Peronists and the Radical Party, agreed to proceed in an agreement known as 
the Pacto de Olivos (Levit, 1999, pp. 289–290). This pact included the Radical Party’s concession for the 
inclusion of an amendment that was aimed to allow Alfonsín’s successor, the new Peronist President Car-
los Menem, to run for a second term in office, while the Peronist party in turn agreed to a broader scope 
of reform than it had previously favoured (ibid., p. 315). As a result of the agreement, a convention for 
constitutional reform consisting of 305 delegates was established to work for three months to draft the 
new constitution, eventually adapted in August 1994. 
The minutes of the constitutional assembly debates reveal a fierce battle to determine the role of religion 
in the constitution. Perhaps understandably in light of the historical importance of the specific religious 
adherence of rulers throughout world history, a revision of Article 76 of the old constitution that estab-
lished that the president and vice-president need to profess the Catholic Roman Apostolic faith became a 
highly contentious and seminal debate in the constitutional assembly. During day-long discussions filled with 
impassioned speeches and pathos, delegates debated the essence of Argentina’s constitutional identity. 
The contributions of those favouring a change in the text regarding the religious background of specific 
individuals in office mirrored the historical tension between a secular definition of democracy and Catholic 
particularism in Argentina. In one instance, during a debate on Basic Matters [Debate de Coincidencias Basi-
cas] a delegate summed up his party’s position as “the desirability of eliminating a clause that could be 
considered to restrict the access to the exercise of the first magistracy, especially when this constitution 
aims to advance and provide a framework for greater democracy, participation and representation.” (Constitu-
tional Assembly Argentina, 1994b, emphasis added, my translation) 
Proponents of changing the religious requirement utilised Argentina’s human rights commitments to ar-
gue against the preferential treatment of the Catholic faith in the constitution. “With that [modification of 
the religious requirement] I believe we will effectively make a step towards politics of human rights” 
(Constitutional Assembly Argentina, 1994b, my translation), stated one of the delegates. 
Another delegate in favour of eliminating the religious requirement summed up the developments of the 
time regarding non-discrimination. Within the UN framework, it seeks to delineate the discriminatory 
character of the religious requirement for office: 
 
- 95 - 
I believe that this is the meaning of the human rights discourse, to pursue the elimination of all 
forms of discrimination (…). The current doctrine of the United Nations no longer considers the 
issue of majorities and minorities solely by a numerical function of criterion, but rather by virtue 
of the privilege or use of the right of the majority or by marginalisation and discrimination against 
minorities. (…) It is enough for me to invoke the idea of women and children; minorities, but 
who are majorities numerically. (…) It is the idea of belonging, in equality and freedom to the 
concept of universality (...). We believe that favouring the elimination of the religious require-
ment is, precisely, the idea of the universal (…). (Constitutional Assembly Argentina, 1994b, my 
translation) 
Apart from illustrating how human rights was used to strip the Catholic church of its previously privileged 
position in the new Argentine constitution, the quote above also reveals another salient aspect of the spe-
cific interpretation of human rights, prevalent now as it was then in Argentine human rights discourse: the 
emphasis on the rights of the child. As the analysis continues, the significance of this will become clear. 
Those opposing the reform argued that the deletion of the religious requirement for the presidential office 
would mean erasing national essence and tradition. A delegate brought forward that, 
this modification would hurt the national essence of the republic, its tradition, its history and the 
conditions under which the Argentine Nation is formed, developed and lives. (…) we must not 
forget, Mr. President, that the peoples who deny their history or who try to forget it can begin a 
sad course of national disintegration. The most important thing to introduce into a fundamental 
statute are the essences of the nation, is to consecrate the essential attributes of man, notwith-
standing the broadest freedom that is guaranteed through its maximum status. (Constitutional 
Assembly Argentina, 1994b, my translation) 
Emphasising the historical prevalence of Catholic privilege throughout state and federal constitutions of 
the Argentine Republic, another delegate remarked: “These historical antecedents make up an identity, 
which is called the national identity. (…) [R]eceiving the sacrament of baptism - is a requirement that 
makes the historical entity of the Nation.” (Constitutional Assembly Argentina, 1994b, my translation) 
Although not a coincidence, the line between opponents and proponents of reforming the religious re-
quirement for the presidential office also separated those in favour from those against giving constitutional 
status to international human rights treaties. Another delegate argued that through both the reform of the 
religious requirement and giving international human rights constitutional rank, Argentina goes on a “slide 
of national disintegration” (Constitutional Assembly Argentina, 1994b, my translation). This can be ex-
plained with the tension between religion and human rights in the Argentine context, in which both no-
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tions were constructed as alternative and incongruent sources of identification and legitimation. The in-
commensurability of both of these led the supporters of a religious political identity of Argentina to also 
reject human rights, as the latter constituted a threat to the former, functionally replacing it in the consti-
tutional identity construction of post-authoritarian Argentina. 
The Catholic Church itself advocated for a religious interpretation of constitutional identity. In a docu-
ment published by the episcopate to elucidate its official stance to the delegates on constitutional reform 
matters, it says:  
We believe it necessary to judge at least the cultural identity of the Argentine Nation to be from 
a historical tradition of unquestionable Catholic respect. The president and vice president must 
swear before God and the Homeland [Patria], regardless of their religion, respect, defend and 
safeguard the constitution and the cultural reality that it expresses, that is theistic, Christian and 
Catholic. (Constitutional Assembly Argentina, 1994b, my translation) 
The intense focus on identity in the constitutional assembly’s debate on the role of religion in the new 
constitution underlines the permeability of a constitutional identity in times of regime transition. Ulti-
mately, it signified the newly diminished role of religion’s traditional supporting function in Argentina’s 
national political makeup. The analysis of debates of the constitutional assembly revealed the presence of 
two competing discourses on the nascent Argentine constitutional identity. The one stressed the historical 
importance of Catholicism for the nation and the other sought to limit the role of the church using argu-
ments based on human rights. Which of the competing visions for Argentina’s constitutional identity 
would prevail can be inferred from the final text of the Constitution of 1994. Remarkably, it includes a 
significantly reduced role of religion, including the elimination of the confessional requirement for office. The 
final decision regarding this highly contentious passage was justified by the institutional assembly as follows: 
With general consensus it is recognized that Article 76 of the National Constitution, insofar as it 
demands religious confessionality as a condition for access to the presidency and vice-presidency 
of the Nation, is anachronistic at the present time, in addition to establishing discrimination in-
compatible with the equality of rights of all citizens. Therefore, it is necessary to delete the clause 
that established this requirement. (Constitutional Assembly Argentina, 1994a, my translation) 
This shows how the tension between religion and human rights, grown out of the experience of the 
last dictatorship, shaped the discourses on constitutional identity and was decisive in the Catholic 
Church loosing much of its political privilege. In addition to changes in confessional requirements for both 
presidential and vice-presidential office, the oath of office for these two posts was changed in Art. 93 in the 
new constitution (replacing Art. 80 of the old constitution), such that the mandatory oath for “God and the 
Holy Gospel” [por Dios y los Santos Evangelios] was replaced by one that respects the particular orientation of faith 
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of the office holder. Lastly, the old constitution contained the aim of “converting the indigenous population to 
Catholicism”, while the new constitution protects the freedom of religion and belief and the ethnic origin of 
the indigenous population (former art. 67 inc. 15 has been replaced by art. 75 inc. 17). 
While there were symbolic changes when it comes to the role of religion, there were still continuities regarding 
the role of Catholicism between the old and new constitutions. The preamble of the new constitution retains 
the phrase “invoking the protection of God, source of all reason and justice”. While establishing freedom of 
faith in art. 14, it also states in art. 2 that “the government sustains the Catholic faith” [Artículo 2. El Gobierno 
federal sostiene el culto católico, apostólico, romano], which binds the state to economically sustain the Catholic 
Church and therefore maintains a preferential treatment of the Catholic faith vis-á-vis other denominations. 
Despite these continuities, the transformed symbolic role of Catholicism in the constitution is as clear as it is 
significant. As Argentine supreme court minister Enrique Petracci commented on the constitutional reform in 
an article published in Argentine newspaper Pagina 12 in 1995, the changes in the constitution pertaining to 
religion evidence the intention to accentuate the non-confessional character of the state (Borello, 2013). 
Hand in hand with the diminished symbolic representation of religion in the new constitution came a sharp 
increase in the protection of human rights in Argentina’s basic law. The new constitution established the Public 
Defender, an institution to oversee the protection of human rights and all other rights and guarantees in the 
constitution. Furthermore, while the old constitution did not include equality measures, chapter 2 of the new 
constitution now enshrines the “Equality of Opportunity and treatment and the full exercise of rights recognised 
in this Constitution” as well as the “Real Equality of Opportunity between men and women in accessing elected 
and party office”. As mentioned above, art. 75(22) of the 1994 constitution lists nine international human rights 
treaties, and thus gives them substantial constitutional standing. All other international treaties are given supra-
statutory standing. This means that, 
[t]he Argentine Constitution is no longer a succinct document containing 110 constitutional provisions 
but rather a compendium of the constitutional text and the nine human rights treaties which, by virtue 
of their constitutional status, are effectively incorporated into the constitutional text. Therefore, every 
right, every privilege, every guarantee, that the anointed human rights treaties grant are part of Ar-
gentina’s Constitution (…), identical in scope, form, and substance. (..) In this sense, Argentina’s 
actions are unique in South America and, arguably, the world. (Levit, 1999, p. 312) 
While the specific mention of human rights in national constitutions per se is not unusual, the inclusion of 
a verbatim replica of international human rights treaties in Argentina is substantively more far reaching 
than in other countries. With the incorporation of the American Convention into the Argentine constitu-
tion, Argentina also constitutionalised the entire regional system consisting of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and an investigative/executive and 
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judicial prong (Levit, 1999, p. 329). The content and passage of the new constitution powerfully demon-
strates how the human rights-influenced political identity discourse materialised into the institutions and 
legal fabric of the new democracy. As we shall see in the next chapter, this was a critical step in forming 
the opportunity structures for social movement activity later on. 
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5.2 South Africa: The birth of the “Rainbow Nation” 
In February 1990, the South African president from the ruling National Party FW de Klerk announced the 
unbanning of the ANC and Nelson Mandela’s release after 27 years in prison. This unprecedented decision 
set in motion the long awaited democratic transition, resulting in the first non-racial elections on the 27th 
of April 1994, the subsequent formation of the first truly democratically elected government led by Man-
dela and the passage of a new constitution in December 1996. Mandela’s release from prison in 1990 and the 
passage of the final constitution in 1996 represent the timeframe for South Africa’s democratisation process. 
The National Party’s (NP) government policies managed to secure white supremacy for more than 40 
years during apartheid. Some of these included the banning of its political opponents, violent oppression 
of resistance and the deliberate exclusion of non-whites from positions of influence through policy and so-
called “Bantu education”, which was particularly aimed at leaving the non-white population uneducated 
and exploitable for labour. However, growing internal resistance, international isolation and steady eco-
nomic decline in the 1980s eventually pressured the apartheid government enough to embark on a change 
in approach. The unbanning of the ANC gave way for multiparty negotiations to take place, a critical 
component in the successful transition. Under the name of Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA), delegates from various political organisations, including from the ruling NP and the now 
unbanned ANC, started negotiations for the creation of a representative parliament and an interim gov-
ernment to oversee the process of democratic elections.  
Negotiations were hampered by diverging interests of the participating parties and escalating political vi-
olence in the early 1990s. Resuming negotiations in 1993, this time under the name “Multi-party Negoti-
ating Process” (MPNP), participants agreed on the 27th of April 1994 as the latest date to hold nationwide 
non-racial elections. In order to fairly oversee the preparations for democratic elections, the Transitional 
Executive Council (TEC) was set up as a multiracial executive organ sharing governing responsibilities 
with president de Klerk during the preparation time for elections. In December 1993, an interim consti-
tution was adopted and came into force with the first democratic elections. The interim constitution pre-
scribed the passage of a final constitution within the first two years of the new National Assembly being in 
power (Byrnes, 1997). 
It is important to note that South Africa has not had any experience in governing itself as a non-racial 
democracy on the national level prior to 1994. In fact, the very definitions of cultural identities and phys-
ical boundaries of what constituted South Africa as a nation were not clear when negotiations began in the 
1990s. Only in December 1991, during the first formal CODESA negotiations, it was decided that there 
would be a united South Africa (Klug, 2010). During apartheid, the South African government had “de-
cided unilaterally that its black population consists of a group of `nations`, each of which is entitled to a 
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homeland” (Butler, Rotberg, & Adams, 1978, p. 1). These designated rural areas (13 percent of the total 
area of the Republic for the 70 percent of the national population who were black) were supposed to gain 
independence at some point. Accordingly, both apartheid’s ideology and practices promoted physical and 
identitarian separation between South Africa’s subpopulations, deliberately preventing a common identity 
to develop prior to democratisation. 
 
State/church dissent under democracy 
"The Afrikaans churches' support for apartheid is now costing them a lot. Many people feel cheated and 
want to know, if the church lied to them about apartheid, what else it is lying about?" (Jean Oosthuizen, 
editor of the DRC church magazine Die Kerkbode, as cited in Leonard, 2012) 
During the early days of democratic transition, President de Klerk initiated a church conference which 
took place in November 1990 in the South African town of Rustenburg. The National Conference of 
Church Leaders in South Africa was attended by delegates from 85 South African churches, including the 
DRC, all together representing 90 percent of the Christian community. The aim of the conference was to 
determine the role of the churches in post-apartheid South Africa (Nel, 1991-1992, p. 11; Phiri, 2001, 
p. 124). Now referred to as “The Rustenburg Declaration”, it includes the admission of fault on the 
churches’ part regarding apartheid. Passage 2.5 of the declaration reads: 
We therefore confess that we have in different ways practised, supported, permitted or refused 
to resist apartheid: 2.5.1 Some of us actively misused the Bible to justify apartheid, leading many 
to believe that it had the sanction of God. Later, we insisted that its motives were good even 
though its effects were evil. Our slowness to denounce apartheid as sin encouraged the Govern-
ment to retain it. (Resolution of the Rustenburg Declaration of the National Conference of 
Church Leaders held in South Africa in November, 1990) 
Acutely aware of religious institutions’ shortcomings during apartheid, the document states later on that: 
In the past we have often forfeited our right to address the State by our own complicity in racism, 
economic and other injustice and the denial of human rights. We also recognise that in our country 
the State has often co-opted the Church. The Church has often attempted to seek protection for 
its own vested interests from the State. Our history compromises our credibility in addressing 
Church-State issues. (Resolution of the Rustenburg Declaration of the National Conference of 
Church Leaders held in South Africa in November, 1990) 
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Read closely, the Rustenberg Declaration reveals that even the church authorities themselves sensed that the 
ideological collusion of religion and the state during apartheid would compromise their legitimacy to influ-
ence politics under a subsequent regime (Phiri, 2001, p. 126). However, the full extent of religious power-
lessness under the new political dispensation would only gradually reveal itself as democratisation pro-
gressed. When the demise of white supremacist rule began to dawn as a political reality, the DRC, in a 
desperate attempt to secure ongoing influence on government, began to increasingly hold discussions with 
politicians across the spectrum to establish good relations with the future leaders of the country (Villiers, 
2001, p. 53). During those meetings, the DRC handed out official church documents to the political leaders 
in which they urged, among other things, that a new constitution should include, “the acknowledgement of 
the supreme authority of the Triune God without whom no government can govern and no nation can sur-
vive” (Agenda General Synod, 1990). Despite these efforts, none of the DRC’s wishes for South Africa’s 
new political dispensation would eventually materialise in the new constitution of 1996. 
The culmination of the democratic transition process came with the passage of the new constitution in 1996. 
Subsequently, the DRC reflected on the effects of democratisation on the church and published the results 
of this analysis in a General Synod Report in 1998. In the report, the DRC laments the considerable reduction 
in public influence that was, among other factors, caused by the negative public perception of the DRC as a 
result of it having delivered the theological justification of apartheid; and the fact that the new constitution 
prescribes a secular state that does not allow for religion to influence public policy (Agenda General Synod 
1998, p. 69-71, as quoted in Villiers, 2001, p. 57). 
Looking more specifically at how the DRC lost its political influence, it can be said that its two primary methods 
of political influence diminished during the democratic transition period. The first, or “silent diplomacy”, secret 
meetings between church and state officials to jointly discuss public policy, was no longer effective after the fall of 
apartheid due to the lack of mutual trust and absence of intimate relationships between the new political leaders 
and the church. The second important influencing mechanism was the representation of church leaders on gov-
ernment appointed statutory bodies and commissions, a privilege that was drastically curtailed as soon as apartheid 
ended. For instance, the DRC nominated seven candidates for the posts of commissioners in the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission (TRC), not one of which was appointment, much to the dismay of the church. The same 
held true for other statutory bodies, such as those charged with preparing welfare legislations, where DRC rep-
resentation radically declined (Villiers, 2001, p. 57). 
The loss of moral authority in political matters soon manifested in public policy as well. Aside from failing to exert 
influence on the new constitution, religious institutions attempted preventing the timely reform towards permis-
siveness of pornography and gambling, as well as failing to prevent the abolishment of the death penalty in the first 
years of democracy. 
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In one of the few meetings Nelson Mandela had with representatives of the DRC after the first democratic 
elections, he reminded the DRC that, “apartheid was fundamentally wrong and sinful.” Afterward, he artic-
ulated what kind of role the church should have after democratisation: “Having searched your own hearts 
[and thus having acknowledged your role in this evil system], you must now join hands with all the rest of us 
to ensure that the Reconstruction and Development Programme succeeds.” (Proceedings of the General 
Synod, 1994, p. 536 as cited in General Synodal Commission of the Dutch Reformed Church, 1996, 6.1.3) 
However, the DRC was not interested in supporting the new regime’s programmes. It refused to 
acknowledge its newly-limited influence on government and continued its attempts at influencing public 
policy in favour of its white membership. For its second and last meeting with then-President Mandela, 
the DRC prepared a memorandum containing its public policy concerns. In the memorandum, the DRC 
urged the government to uphold the death penalty (reflecting Afrikaner fears of violent crime in a nation 
shared with a vast majority of non-whites), not to implement policies of affirmative action (as, ironically, 
Afrikaners were angered by what they perceived to be discrimination against them) and to increase funds 
for the welfare services of the DRC (Agenda GSC Meeting Oct 1996, p. 26-47 as cited in Villiers, 2001, 
p. 59). As noted by Villiers (2001, p. 59), since at that stage, the government was primarily concerned 
with matters relating to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Reconstruction and Develop-
ment Programme, the DRC’s approach to influence policy was most likely perceived by Mandela as “con-
frontational and one-sided”. Supporting this view is the fact that this was the last meeting of its kind be-
tween DRC and government, and that Mandela subsequently publicly criticised the DRC’s stance on the 
death penalty (ibid.). 
To this day, the DRC has not recovered from its delegitimation. Shrinking membership numbers and the 
vanishing of any political significance the church possessed has led to what church minister Andre 
Achenbach, head of a DRC congregation in Durbanville, Cape Town, called “the slow and steady death of 
the DRC.” In a radio interview, Achenbach stated that, in light of the apartheid history of the church, this 
slow and steady demise does not come as a surprise and that he considers himself to be a sort of undertaker 
of the church (Deutschlandfunk, 2012). Ian Nell, scholar of religion at the University of Stellenbosch, 
explains that when the DRC finally recognised apartheid as a sin in 1992 and acknowledged its complicity, 
there was nothing to win. It triggered protests in rural conservative DRC congregations that still found 
apartheid to be morally justified. Other members became alienated when they realised the full extent of 
political opportunism by the church. According to Nell:  
It is so that there is a whole generation that says `We believed all of it at the time and then we 
were proven wrong, Apartheid cannot be delineated from the Bible. Why should we still believe 
anything the church leadership says?` (Ian Nell in Deutschlandfunk, 2012) 
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When the regime change opened up democracy to the non-white majority, the DRC went from the dom-
inant denomination of the politically powerful to just one of the denominations in South Africa’s religious 
landscape, characterised by high religious devoutness but a heterogeneous denominational composition. 
In other words, with the inclusion of the non-white population in political decision making, the DRC went 
from being a majority church to being just one among the larger churches within South African Protes-
tantism. While this power shift of critical mass certainly contributed to the decline in influence the DRC 
as an institution could exert on modern politics, the state/church symbiosis of the past reduced the role 
of religious principles in South Africa’s constitutional identity in general and thereby also restricted the 
influence other churches in South Africa.  
Issued by all major religious denominations of South Africa, the Rustenberg declaration shows that the 
history of state/church symbiosis “compromises our [all churches] credibility in addressing Church-State 
issues” (Resolution of the Rustenburg Declaration of the National Conference of Church Leaders held in 
South Africa in November 1990). No other single denomination or combination of denominations could 
replace the DRC as moral guardian of the state as the DRC’s relationship with the apartheid regime re-
sulted in a reduced religious influences on politics in general. The churches and their representatives who 
would gain some political significance after apartheid were the ones not morally compromised by direct 
association with apartheid. For instance, Nobel peace prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu of the An-
glican Church was an anti-apartheid activist and for his work for human rights, Mandela made him head 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Tutu is also known for supporting LGBT rights, and 
the Anglican Church in South Africa regularly weds gay couples. 
Yet, the role of religion in politics drastically declined in democratic South Africa compared with apart-
heid, as we will see in the following section which analyses the political discourse on constitutional identity 
in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
Symbolic political communication 
Only when taking into account the climate of political violence prevalent in South Africa in the early 1990s 
does the daunting task political leaders faced become clear while constructing the groundwork for a nas-
cent non-racial democracy. Pressures and influences varied greatly, and included the legacies of colonial-
ism, uncertainty of the nation’s geographical boundaries, grievances of apartheid and the extraordinary 
cultural and ethnic diversity even within the racial categories of blacks, whites and coloured in South 
Africa’s population. In the words of Mandela, South Africa’s democratic transition needed a “small mira-
cle” to successfully unfold (Mandela, 1994b). 
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South Africa’s miracle came true through years of negotiations between the most important political 
groupings of the country, most notably the National Party and the ANC. President de Klerk and Nelson 
Mandela, the latter of which would become the former’s successor and the first democratic South African 
president, were the symbolic faces of South Africa’s negotiated democratic transition. Jointly, Mandela 
and de Klerk were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on the 10th of December 1993 "for their work for the 
peaceful termination of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundations for a new democratic South 
Africa" (The Nobel Peace Prize, 1993). Critical to a peaceful transition and democratic consolidation was 
the need to gain legitimacy for the democratic government. Mandela’s focus on human rights can partly 
be attributed to the functional necessities of gaining domestic and international legitimacy. Human rights 
could offer a unifying political ideology for the in many ways divided country. 
The lack of a racially integrated national identity prior to democratisation proposed the challenge of cre-
ating the very nation the government was designated to govern. Thus, regime change represented the 
beginning of “a new era of hope, reconciliation and nation building” (Mandela, 1994a). Political leaders 
were acutely aware of the double task as Mandela’s many appeals to the population to “join hands and 
build a truly South African nation” shows (Mandela, 1995c). 
While a non-racial democratic identity was new to the country and represented a radical change from 
apartheid, its content, ironically, remained closely tied to the past, not through similarity but through 
maximum difference. In political speeches during democratisation, the new South Africa was presented 
as the diametric opposite to apartheid. Employing simple dichotomies of good vs evil, inhumane vs hu-
mane, immoral vs moral and the like, the apartheid era was reconstructed as illegitimate while the emerg-
ing political system was discursively positioned as its legitimate antidote. For instance, a speech by Man-
dela (1994b) claimed “the ideology and practice of apartheid” to represent “the worst in human beings”, 
but having “helped to bring out the best in its opponents”. With that, Mandela constructed apartheid’s 
main opponents, including himself, as the good force in battle against the evils of apartheid. During one 
of the CODESA multiparty negotiations, Mandela explained that its lack of legitimacy and morality are 
the reasons as to why the apartheid government should not stay in power during the democratic transition 
period until the first non-racial elections: 
The present government of our country has admitted to the fact that it is not sufficiently repre-
sentative of the people of our country. For the majority of our people, the matter however goes 
beyond this. These masses consider this regime to be illegitimate. They accuse it of having brought 
the country to the sorry state in which it is through the pursuit of the evil and immoral system of 
apartheid. They are therefore convinced that it has neither the legitimacy nor the moral authority 
to take the country through to its democratic transformation. (Mandela, 1992) 
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Considering this, the emerging political leaders of the new South Africa invoked the components of South 
Africa’s new constitutional identity as the direct opposite of what propounded to have been wrong with 
apartheid. In an address to the Constitutional Assembly on the occasion of the adoption of the new con-
stitution, Mandela proclaimed: 
[W]e stand today before our people and humanity to present this our new basic law of the land, 
whose founding principles of human dignity, non-racialism and non-sexism, and whose commit-
ment to universal adult suffrage, regular elections and multi-party democracy are immutable. This 
is our national soul (…). (Mandela, 1996c) 
The buzzwords “non-racial” and “non-sexist”, frequently employed in political speeches during South Af-
rica’s regime transition, are an interesting manifestation of the construction of South Africa’s new identity 
as a reversal of its past. Rather than speaking of gender and racial equality values in an affirmative manner, 
the negation in the word construction non-sexist and non-racist contains a label for the present as well as a 
reference to what was wrong with the past. The same holds true for Mandela’s description of South African 
people’s trajectory as “a remarkable transition to reclaim their humanity” (Mandela, 1995c). This human-
ity, denied to a large part of the population during apartheid, became the epicentre of South Africa’s newly 
emerging humanist value system. 
Humanism is a human-centred value system that explicitly excludes faith and religion as sources for moral 
principles. Occasionally, humanism was directly mentioned as a description of the values of the new South 
Africa. For instance, during an ANC national conference, Mandela (1994c) proclaimed: “As an expression 
of its glorious humanism, the new age will, at the same time as it liberates the oppressed, endow the 
oppressor with the gift of emancipation from ignorance, from fear, and freedom from hatred and bigotry.” 
Mostly, however, the humanist character of South Africa’s post-apartheid identity construction reveals 
itself in the numerous assertions of classic humanist principles, such as human dignity and freedom. In 
Mandela’s speeches, these more abstract concepts were intrinsically linked to the protection of human 
rights as the only means of restoring the dignity and freedoms denied to the non-white majority during 
apartheid. The following extract of the State of the Nation address, a yearly high profile speech delivered 
by the South African president to parliament, demonstrates this point: 
The purpose that will drive this government shall be the expansion of the frontiers of human 
fulfilment, the continuous extension of the frontiers of freedom. The acid test of the legitimacy 
of the programmes we elaborate, the government institutions we create, the legislation we adopt 
must be whether they serve these objectives. (…) We must construct that people-centred society 
of freedom in such a manner that it guarantees the political liberties and the human rights of all 
our citizens. (…) As an affirmation of the government's commitment to an entrenched human 
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rights culture, we shall immediately take steps to inform the Secretary General of the United 
Nations that we will subscribe to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
In addition, we shall take steps to ensure that we accede to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights and other human 
rights instruments of the United Nations. 
Our definition of the freedom of the individual must be instructed by the fundamental objective 
to restore the human dignity of each and every South African. (Mandela, 1994d)  
The fact that political discourse during democratisation focuses on humanism as a secular value system is 
no coincidence. In fact, its secularism is part of the overarching logic of the new South Africa’s political 
identity construction as the diametric opposite to its past. While the political rhetoric of the apartheid 
regime was characterised by the invocation of religion as the legitimising principle for its policies, post-
apartheid political rhetoric is characterised by a conspicuous absence of religion. The acceptance speeches 
of Mandela and de Klerk on the occasion of jointly receiving the Nobel Piece Price in 1993, in the midst 
of the transition process, present a rare opportunity for a direct comparison of the rhetoric of the repre-
sentatives of the old and new regime. The fact that both these speeches were delivered at the same cere-
mony is advantageous for our analysis. Without the potential confounding process of increasing seculari-
sation of time, we can observe the starkly contrasting role of religion in the speeches of the representatives 
of apartheid and democracy. 
In De Klerk’s acceptance speech, religion as the guiding value for politics features prominently: 
The greatest peace, I believe, is the peace which we derive from our faith in God Almighty; from 
certainty about our relationship with our Creator. Crises might beset us, battles might rage about 
us – but if we have faith and the certainty it brings, we will enjoy peace – the peace that surpasses 
all understanding. (…) 
One’s religious convictions obviously also translate into a specific approach towards peace in a 
secular sense (…). (Klerk, 1993) 
Mandela’s speech, in contrast, is characterised by a complete absence of reference to religion. To be sure, this 
is not due to a difference in privately-held beliefs between the two leaders. As Mandela’s autobiography “A 
Long Walk to Freedom” reveals, Mandela, like the majority of South Africans, was a devout Christian and held 
deep religious convictions privately (Mandela, 1995, c1994). Both leaders’ contrasting rhetoric must be re-
garded as an expression of the ideological orientation of the ideological frameworks they represent, as opposed 
to their personal value systems. Rather than religion, Mandela stressed democracy and human rights, mention-
ing the latter, four times in his short acceptance speech alone, as the only pathway to world peace: 
 
- 107 - 
We live with the hope that as she battles to remake herself, South Africa will be like a microcosm 
of the new world that is striving to be born. This must be a world of democracy and respect for 
human rights (…). (Mandela, 1993) 
In addition to high profile speeches, South Africa’s new identity found its metaphorical expression in the 
reshuffling and redefinition of public holidays. National holidays give an insight into what a polity values 
highly, commemorating events of the past of national importance to remember and celebrate aspects of 
culture considered to be fundamental characteristics of a country’s identity. While in pre-democracy 
South Africa public holidays were exclusively Christian and Afrikaner culture -oriented, this fundamen-
tally changed in the transition process. The Public Holiday Act of 1994 (Act No. 36, Act No. 36 of 1994 
To make provision for a new calendar of public holidays; to provide that the public holidays be paid holi-
days; and for matters incidental thereto, 1994) reshuffled the dates and meanings of public holidays, 
mostly eliminating religion as a point of reference. Easter Monday, for instance, was renamed “Family 
Day” to strip it of its Christian connotation. The 16th of December, formerly known as “Day of the Vow” 
was renamed “Day of Reconciliation”. The Vow referred to the Voortrekkers22 taking a Vow before God 
to build a church and annually celebrate that day if He was to help them win an upcoming battle against 
the Zulus23. 
Furthermore, secular holidays were added to the calendar. Among these are “Human Rights Day” on the 
21st of March; “Freedom Day” on April 27th to commemorate the first democratic elections held on that 
day in 1994; “Youth Day” on the 16th of June that was introduced to remember the protest of 20 000 
pupils in Soweto against Bantu education; “National Women’s Day” on the 9th of August commemorating 
that date in 1956 were thousands women marched to petition pass laws24; and “Heritage Day” on the 24th 
of September (South African Government, 2017). Regarding the latter, the South African Department of 
Arts, Culture, Science and Technology issued a statement that, “[w]ithin a broader social and political 
context, the day's events are a powerful agent for promulgating a South African identity, fostering recon-
ciliation and promoting the notion that variety is a national asset as opposed to igniting conflict.” (ibid.), 
which underlines the intention to reconstruct identity with the change of national holidays. 
                                                     
22 The Voortrekkers were descendants from Dutch immigrants that migrated eastwards from the original settlements at the 
Cape in the 19th century because of struggles with the British-colonial administration. This migratory movement is known as 
the Great Trek [Groot Trek] and holds great significance for Afrikaner identity. 
23 Zulus are an ethnic group from Southern Africa that makes up the largest ethnic group in South Africa today. 
24 Slaves in the Cape had to carry passes to facilitate the control of their movements by their owners and the state. Since the 
18th century pass laws have been subsequently used throughout South Africa`s history to restrict the movements of African, 
Coloured and Indian people to ensure the provision of cheap labour and to enforce racial segregation. Pass laws required persons 
of non-European origin to carry identity documents with them at all times containing stamps as official proof that the person 
in question had permission to enter an area reserved for white people, which was mostly granted to continue the exploitation 
of non-Europeans for cheap labour, e.g. as domestic servants (SAHO, 2011). 
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As the change in national holidays demonstrates, the shift in political discourse from religion to human 
rights based on secular humanist principles also manifested itself in a shift in the iconographic representa-
tion of South Africa’s constitutional identity and values during democratisation. Through various means, 
politicians engaged in a conscious construction of an identity that would unify the diverse racial groups 
into one nation. While a strong religious devoutness is one of the only common characteristics of the 
racially and culturally heterogeneous population of South Africa, this option was precluded by the inter-
minglement of religion and apartheid. To earn legitimacy, the new South African state’s identity was 
constructed as apartheid’s opposite and the emergence of a secular value system was inevitable in that 
logic. As a result, the new secular value system focussed on human rights was then enshrined into institu-
tions and constitution of democratic South Africa. 
 
Human rights matters 
A secular humanist interpretation of human rights also became the tool with which South Africa rebuilt its 
foreign relations. During a State of the Nation Address, Mandela (1994d) summed up South Africa’s chal-
lenge as follows: “We also face a major challenge in re-entering the global economy, while stable prices 
are vital to the restructuring of our industries and dealing with the critical issue of job-creation.” To gain 
international support for the transition process as well as regain access to international institutions and 
financial markets, Mandela seized every opportunity to ensure the world of its human rights commitments 
and its willingness to become a contributing member to the international human rights regime. In an 
address to the 49th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Mandela explained: 
The universal struggle against apartheid was therefore not an act of charity arising out of pity for 
our people, but an affirmation of our common humanity. (…) [T]he new South Africa which you 
helped to bring into being and which you have so warmly welcomed among the community of 
nations will, in its own and in the wider interest, make its own contribution, however small, to 
the realisation of those hopes. (…) Democratic South Africa rejoins the world community of 
nations determined to play its role in helping to strengthen the United Nations and to contribute 
what it can to the furtherance of its purposes. (Mandela, 1994e) 
The new South Africa’s clear positioning in terms of human rights was well received by the Western world. In 
a shared radio interview with Mandela, Bill Clinton affirmed that “now South Africa is a model for building the 
open, tolerant societies that share our values.” (Clinton, 1994) Mandela’s efforts to make South Africa re-enter 
world affairs as a legitimate member of the international community soon paid off financially as well. In a high 
profile speech, Mandela (1994d) rejoiced at the fact “that many of our friends abroad have already made com-
mitments to assist us to generate the reconstruction and development funds we need.” Not only did the UN 
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lift its embargo, but South Africa also received considerable funds from, inter alia, the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the Habitat housing initiative. Referencing these 
funds, Mandela declared at a speech for the Freedom Day celebration in 1996 that: 
Such benefit as we derive from this association has further strengthened our resolve to help build the 
United Nations into a powerful force for good, as we enter the new millennium (…) as a nation we 
have become an equal and proud participant in world affairs. (Mandela, 1996b)  
This quote reveals a somewhat opportunistic motive to embrace human rights in the UN framework in order 
to receive “benefits”, or financial assistance for stabilising the emerging democracy. Nevertheless, in the wake 
of the first democratic elections, South Africa indeed signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Shortly 
after the first democratic elections, South Africa signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(CCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). Table 15 provides an over-
view of Human Rights Treaties ratified by South Africa shortly after post-apartheid democratisation.  
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Table 15. Human Rights Treaty Ratification in South Africa 
Treaty Signature 
Date 
Ratification Date, 
Accession (a) 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (CAT 1984) 
29 Jan 1993 10 Dec 1998 
Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture (CAT-OP 
2002) 
20 Sep 2006  
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR 
1966) 
03 Oct 1994 10 Dec 1998 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights aiming to the abolition of the death penalty 
(CCPR-OP2-DP 1989) 
 28 Aug 2002 (a) 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (CCPR OP1 1966) 
 28 Aug 2002 (a) 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW 1979) 
29 Jan 1993 15 Dec 1995 
Optional Protocol - CEDAW (CEDAW-OP 1999)  18 Oct 2005 (a) 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (CERD 1965) 
03 Oct 1994 10 Dec 1998 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR 1966) 
03 Oct 1994 12 Jan 2015 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1990) 29 Jan 1993 16 Jun 1995 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRC-OP-AC 
2000) 
08 Feb 2002 24 Sep 2009 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the sale of children child prostitution and child Pornography 
(CRC-OP-SC 2000) 
 30 Jun 2003 (a) 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 
2007) 
30 Mar 2007 30 Nov 2007 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter 
1981) 
09 Jul 1996 09 Jul 1996 
Maputo Protocol (Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights of Women in Africa and the United Nations Con-
vention on all Forms of Discrimination against Women (2003) 
16 Mar 2004 17 Dec 2004 
Sources: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Equality Now, 2013; United Nations Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner, n.d.a. 
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Worth noting is the rapid accumulation of human rights treaty ratifications around the time of democra-
tisation. While before the regime change South Africa was party to the Charter of the United Nations 
only, this changed during the political transition when South Africa promptly ratified all major interna-
tional human rights treaties. Furthermore, South Africa did not stay a passive subscriber to these instru-
ments only, but also becoming an active participant in the development and shaping of the regional and 
global human rights regime. 
In terms of the regional human rights system, South Africa became an advocate of deepening human rights 
commitments on the African continent. Upon receiving the African Peace Award25, Mandela (1995b) 
appealed to the representatives of other African states that, “we face the urgent task of deepening the 
culture of human rights on the continent” and later he suggested that, “the continent could develop creative 
and effective peace and human rights instruments, characterised by co-operation between governments 
and civil society.” South Africa’s human rights advocacy explicitly rests on a secular interpretation of hu-
man rights, which is also applicable to matters pertaining to sex and gender. For instance, during the 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the South African delegation was mandated by the gov-
ernment “to fight tooth and nail for the cause of women’s emancipation” (Mandela, 1996a). In 2004, South 
Africa signed and ratified the Maputo protocol, which as an addition to CEDAW by the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) focuses on women’s human rights in Africa and exceeds the provisions of CEDAW 
in terms of explicitly urging governments to ensure reproductive rights, including the right to abortion 
under certain conditions. In March 2016, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) con-
vened a seminar for African countries to innovate practical solutions to end all forms of discrimination and 
violence on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation, resulting in the Ekurhuleni Declaration26 
(Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria, 2016). In 2011, South Africa presented a resolu-
tion on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity to the UN, an important precedent to the 
2013 resolution on the same issue in which Argentina also took a leading role (Nair, 2016). 
Democratisation presented a sudden and far-reaching shift in South Africa’s positioning vis-à-vis human 
rights. Apart from ratification of treaties and advocacy for human rights internationally (including sup-
porting the application of human rights to sexual orientation, gender identity and reproduction specifi-
cally), South Africa also put human rights at the heart of its political institutions and constitution.  
  
                                                     
25 The Africa Peace Award is issued by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and is 
awarded annually to communities, institutions or individuals who contribute to the protection of human rights, the peaceful 
settlement of disputes and good governance (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes [ACCORD] (n.d.)). 
26 Ekurhuleni Declaration on Practical Solutions on Ending Violence and Discrimination against Persons based on Sexual Ori-
entation and Gender Identity and Expression (2016). 
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The most symbolic and far-reaching result of democratisation in terms of human rights protection is South 
Africa’s new Constitution of 1996, widely acclaimed for its comprehensive Bill of Rights and containing 
one of the world’s strongest constitutional commitments to international law (Dugart, 1996). In terms of 
its content, the Bill of Rights closely mirrors international human rights provisions (Du Plessis, 2007, 
pp. 958–959). As the reports of the technical committees of the MPNP reveal, the formulations pertaining 
to equality, for example, are directly modelled on the ICERD and CEDAW (Technical Committee on 
Fundamental Rights During the Transition, 1993). Furthermore, the new constitution ensures the con-
sideration of international law in the interpretation of its text. The final section of the Bill of Rights (section 
39, commonly known as the interpretation clause) makes provisions on the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights stating that: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— (a) must promote the values 
that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) 
must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law. (as adopted on 8 May 1996 
and amended on 11 October 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly, 1996) 
This clause ensures the consideration of the evolving international human rights regime in domestic matters. 
The role of international law is further strengthened by schedule 233: “When interpreting any legislation, 
every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international 
law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.” In the same section 
(231.5) the constitution binds the Republic to international agreements South Africa was party to when the 
constitution took effect. Additionally, the constitution provides for customary international law to be “law in 
the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament,” (Section 232) which di-
rectly incorporates customary international law in South African common law (Du Plessis, 2007, p. 959). 
With the passage of the new constitution, other institutions were formed to safeguard the human rights 
protected in the basic law, among them the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender 
Equality, the public protector and the constitutional court. At the inauguration of the latter, Mandela 
(1995a) made the case for how institutions can protect values far longer than individuals: “People come 
and people go. Customs, fashions, and preferences change. Yet the web of fundamental rights and justice 
which a nation proclaims, must not be broken. It is the task of this court to ensure this.” As we will see in 
the following chapters, the enshrinement of a secular interpretation of human rights in national institutions 
and constitutions during democratisation set off a path dependency that would shape morality policymak-
ing in democratic South Africa for the decades to come. 
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South Africa’s newly found focus on human rights from its democratisation onwards can partly be at-
tributed to the functional necessities of gaining domestic and international legitimacy within the inter-
national normative context of third wave democratisations. Simply subscribing to international human 
rights instruments would have adequately fulfilled this function alone. However, South Africa’s trans-
formation into an active advocate championing the regional and international human rights regime and 
the thorough incorporation of international norms into domestic law can only be understood when 
considering that human rights based on humanist principles has replaced religion as a source of political 
identification and legitimation in the narratives of constitutional identity. In the logic of democratic 
South Africa’s identity construction in contrast to apartheid, the secularism of the emerging identity 
and value system was inevitable. As a result, embracing a secular interpretation of human rights as also 
applicable to reproductive and sexual rights was a logical application of the secular humanist value sys-
tem that displaced religion during the period of democratisation. 
 
The passage of a new constitution 
“The Constitution was the birth certificate of the South African nation. It is one of the most advanced 
in the world, establishing a constitutional democracy in which a finely-crafted Bill of Rights enjoys 
pride of place.” (Ebrahim, 2004, Chapter 3) 
During the apartheid-era, two different constitutions were in effect, passed in 196127 and 198328, 
respectively. Since both were a product of the apartheid regime and thereby reflected its racial and 
authoritarian ideologies, replacing the constitution was critical to the democratisation process were 
it to have any longevity beyond the first non-racial election. A two-stage process led to the passage 
of the final constitution in 1996. During the multiparty negotiations in the early 1990s, it was agreed 
that there should be an interim constitution29 that would be in effect from 1994 until the first demo-
cratic elections would produce a truly representative parliament, which would then act as a constitu-
tional assembly charged with the task of drafting a final constitution (Goldsworthy, 2007, p. 1). Thus, 
the final constitution of 1996 is the first that was adopted by a democratically constituted body.  
The first round of multiparty constitutional talks (CODESA) took place at the end of 1991 in Johan-
nesburg and was attended by 238 representatives of 19 political groupings and almost 1000 interna-
tional observers (Barnes & Klerk, 2002, p. 27). Much to delegate Helen Suzman’s consternation, 
                                                     
27 Act No. 31 of 1961 (The Republic of South Africa Constitutional Act No. 31 of 1961, 1961)) 
28 Act No. 110 of 1983 (Act No. 110 of 1983, 1983) 
29 Act No. 200 of 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993, 1993) 
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only about 5 percent of the delegates were women. Directly addressing the political leaders in the 
plenary, Suzman reminded them of their affirmations of creating a non-racial and non-sexist society: 
Here we are in this great hall at a momentous time, and I can’t believe my eyes and ears when I 
see the number of women in the room. As with racism, so with sexism – you can enact legislation, 
but despite this, racism and gender discrimination exists. When I look around, there are maybe 
ten out of 228 delegates who are women. Codesa, as a way forward must include more women. 
(Convention For A Democratic South Africa [CODESA], 1991, p. 232)  
Suzman’s remark was greeted with general agreement in the form of an ovation by the plenary. According 
to Ebrahim (1998), himself a participant in the negotiations, delegates from then onwards made greater 
efforts in gender representation in the constitutional process. 
The second CODESA plenary session (also known as CODESA II) in spring 1992 was marked by escalating 
tension and unresolvable differences among the negotiating parties which lead to the failure of the 
CODESA II plenary and a halt in negotiations. One year later, on the 1st of April 1993, negotiations 
resumed under a new name. The MPNP negotiations included representatives of 26 political groups. The 
heart of the MPNP structure was a Negotiation Council whose agreements would be ratified in the ple-
nary. Two delegates per party made up the Negotiation Council, at least one of which had to be a woman. 
Since religious institutions were excluded from the negotiation process qua definition (as the negotiations 
were comprised of political groupings only), religious influence on the constitution drafting process could 
be exerted in two ways; submissions and petitions that the public was invited to submit at various stages 
in the process, and through religiously affiliated political groupings party to the negotiation process.  
Individuals, civil society organisations and religious groups made ample use of the opportunity granted to 
the public to submit petitions about the content of the new constitution during the CODESA negotiations 
and the MPNP negotiations, as well as during the two years’ work of the constitutional assembly that led 
to the final constitution of 1996. The constitutional assembly published a working draft of the final con-
stitution on the 22nd of November 1995 of which over 5 million copies were printed in all 11 official 
languages, distributed by various means including the insertion of copies into newspapers all over the 
country (Constitutional Assembly South Africa, 1996a, 5CA-6CA). On this working draft alone, the con-
stitutional assembly received 1438 submissions and 245 523 petitions from the public (ibid., 6CA). The 
content of petitions offers a vivid perspective of the nature of the various contentious issues during the 
constitution drafting process. The relevant committee report reveals in section 7.2.3: “Petitions covered 
a wide range of subjects, including the death penalty, right to own firearms, equality clause and sexual 
orientation, Christianity and the state, property rights, animal rights, Rastafarian rights and abortion.” 
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(ibid., 6CA) Overall, matters pertaining to religion and morality were the most hotly debated issues 
among the public, with petitions on the former often causing jammed fax lines at the constitutional as-
sembly (Constitutional Assembly South Africa, 1995c). 
Many religious institutions, among them the DRC, tried to shape the outcome of the constitutional process 
to suit their own ends. In an objection to the ratification of the new constitution, the DRC requested the 
deletion of a reference to reproduction, plead for the protection of the life of the foetus, suggested the 
inclusion of the rights of the father in the case of abortions, and lamented an over-emphasis of individual 
rights at the expense of protection of home and family (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, 1996). 
The second point of access for religious influence in the constitution making process were religiously 
affiliated political entities, such as the apartheid government and the National Party, both partaking in the 
CODESA negotiations. After the first democratic elections, the ACDP was represented in parliament and 
thereby party to the constitutional assembly as well. The ACDP tried repeatedly to insert religious refer-
ences into the constitution. In a submission to the Constitutional Assembly on “the nature and application 
of a Bill of Rights”, the party pleaded for a religiously conservative interpretation of rights. Stipulating that 
these are inherently God-given and therefore a Bill of Rights ought to enforce “the heritage of divine 
authority”, the ACDP suggested: 
The right to life should make provision for the death penalty, while ruling out abortion and eu-
thanasia. The sanctity of the family must be protected and same-sex relationships should not be 
recognised (…). In the same vein, pornography and its partner, prostitution, must be specifically 
excluded from any protection afforded in the Bill, to ensure that the core family is allowed its 
continued and unthreatened existence. (African Christian Democratic Party [ACDP], 1996)  
The ACDP’s proposal was discussed in a constitutional committee meeting and contested by the Freedom Front, 
a party newly formed in 1994, which responded to the ACDP’s advances by reminding them “the meeting that 
Constitutional Principle II required that the Bill of Rights be founded on ‘universally accepted human rights’ ” (Con-
stitutional Assembly South Africa, 1995a, emphasis added). This demonstrates the separation of human rights 
from religion in South Africa’s constitutional process, with both standing in opposition to one another as apart-
heid’s religiously legitimised human rights abuses made them incommensurable in the new South African context. 
Possessing the greatest symbolic power and expressing the fundamental values of a polity, the Preamble was 
the most contentious section in the drafting of the constitution, in terms of religion. The minutes of the Con-
stitutional Committee meetings reveal an intense struggle around religion in the Preamble’s drafting. While 
the previous constitution’s preamble was an almost exclusive homage to God, the new one was to feature 
themes of human rights and democracy. 
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The old Preamble of the constitution of 1983 sets an overtly Christian tone and ties the history of South 
Africa’s colonisation to God by referencing His guidance and implying that He himself gave the land to 
the colonisers, thereby repudiating questions of legitimacy of a white minority regime in Africa within the 
first two sentences of the constitution. While the Preamble mentions the freedom of faith, it strongly 
emphasises the Christian variant of faith and even declares the upholding of Christian values as the first 
national goal: 
IN HUMBLE SUBMISSION to Almighty God, Who controls the destinies of peoples and nations, 
Who gathered our forebears together from many lands and gave them this their own, 
Who has guided them from generation to generation,  
Who has wondrously delivered them from the dangers that beset them,  
WE DECLARE that we  
ARE CONSCIOUS of our responsibility towards God and man; 
ARE CONVINCED of the necessity of standing united and of pursuing the following national 
goals:  
To uphold Christian values and civilized norms, with recognition and protection of freedom of 
faith and worship (…) (Act No. 110 of 1983, 1983) 
 
In light of that precedent, the ACDP, NP and other parties insisting on the inclusion of the sentence, “In 
this we humbly submit to God Almighty”, into the new constitution seemed almost modest. This partic-
ular proposal was countered by representatives of the ANC in the Constitutional Committee when saying 
that, 
the ANC believed in the separation of religion and the state. Even those supporters of religion in 
the ANC (…) did not agree with the changes proposed by the ACDP and other parties since they 
felt these proposals would amount to discriminating against non-believers.” (Constitutional As-
sembly South Africa, 1996b)  
This shows how a religious framing of fundamental values of the new democracy was competing with a 
secular interpretation of rights in the drafting process of the constitution. Another example of an at-
tempt by the ACDP to mould the constitution according to Christian values was when party leader 
Kenneth Meshoe requested an amendment to the constitutional principles because they contained a 
provision to outlaw discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Meshoe rejected that the consti-
tution should protect homosexuality because, "[t]he Bible tells us that God created Adam and Eve and 
not Adam and Steve." While his remark provoked amusement (and even some bemusement) in the 
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Constitutional Assembly, it did not impact upon the final text of the constitution, and neither did Me-
shoe’s further call for an inclusion of the rights of unborn children (Constitutional Assembly South Africa, 1995b). 
When it became apparent that the constitution would endorse a secular state, the ACDP led a protest campaign 
that included a march on parliament, attracting thousands of Christian supporters. Protesters at the march 
carried placards conveying messages about a Godless state and church leaders expressed, “that the government 
was prejudiced against Christianity because of the bias towards the religion during apartheid era“ (Constitutional 
Assembly South Africa, 1995d). This not only underscores the tidal shift in the role of religion in South African 
democracy but also the link between apartheid-era state/church symbiosis and the inability of religious institu-
tions in general to shape the constitutional direction of post-apartheid South Africa. 
The final constitution was adopted 8th of May 1996 and after being rejected by the constitutional court, it 
was amended on 11th October 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly. It was promulgated on the 28th of De-
cember 1996 and came into effect on the 4th of February 1997. The constitution consists of a Preamble laying 
out the founding values of the document and 14 chapters, the second of which contains the Bill of Rights. 
The Preamble proclaims the constitution as the supreme law of the Republic and lays out its raison d‘être to: 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights;  
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will 
of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;  
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and  
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the 
family of nations. (as adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 11 October 1996 by the Constitu-
tional Assembly, 1996) 
The Preamble text reflects a strong focus on democracy, equality and human rights. While the constitution 
establishes a generally secular state in the sense of separation between religion and state, the final passage 
reveals that the constitution is also not neutral when it comes to religion.  
The Preamble’s closing sentence states: 
May God protect our people.  
Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa heso.  
God seën Suid-Afrika. God bless South Africa.  
Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika. (as adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 
11 October 1996 by the Constitutional Assembly, 1996) 
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These references to God in various South African languages that conclude the Preamble might have been 
included to appease all negotiating parties, including those with theistic preferences; or reflect the deep 
religious devoutness of the population. However, compared with the Preamble of the old constitution of 
1983, the role of religion has decreased dramatically.  
While containing ample reference to the Christian religion overall, the 1983 constitution does not include any 
reference whatsoever to human rights and generally does not include a Bill of Rights. This stands in stark contrast 
to the comprehensive inclusion of human rights in the Bill of Rights (chapter 2) of the post-apartheid constitution. 
The Bill of Rights in the 1996 constitution is far reaching and even includes socio-economic and environmental 
rights, such as the right to housing (section 26), health care (section 27) and the right to an environment that is 
not harmful to health and well-being (section 24). Most astonishingly, however, is the way in which the Bill of 
Rights treats issues pertaining to equality and non-discrimination. As mentioned above, the provisions are directly 
modelled on international law and thereby “represent the highest aspirations of the global human rights move-
ment” (Klug, 2010, p. 1). The passage (section 9) pertaining to equality in the new Constitution reads as follows: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achieve-
ment of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories 
of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orienta-
tion, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimi-
nation.  
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established 
that the discrimination is fair. (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) 
Noteworthy is that section 9.2 and 9.5 explicitly allow for affirmative action to be taken to mitigate the 
enduring discriminatory effects of past injustices. Section 9.3 and 9.4 provide for a vertical (state to per-
son) as well as horizontal (person to person) application of the constitutional equality provision and 
thereby also binds religious institutions. The inclusion of religion in the enumeration on grounds on which 
the constitution seeks to protect from discrimination illustrates how religion has shifted from an overarch-
ing ideology informing South Africa’s legal system to one of the axes of difference that require protection. 
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Understandably, in light of South African history, race is listed as the first axes of difference to be protected 
from discrimination, under section 9.3 of the 1996 constitution. True to its commitment to create a non-
racist and non-sexist society outlined in the first chapter of the constitution, gender, sex, pregnancy and 
marital status are listed as grounds for unfair discrimination. These four grounds are specifically provi-
sioned for women. While this is obvious for the first three grounds, marital status requires a contextuali-
sation in South Africa’s legal system that acknowledges common law as well as indigenous law as equally 
valid sources of legal basis. Customary and religious marriages in South Africa include polygamy and some-
times an inferior status of the wife, e.g. prescribing a limited capacity for the wife to own property (Bron-
stein, 1996). As a result, including marital status was an effort of the constitution drafters to protect 
women from discrimination in traditional and religious marriages.  
The strong protection of women’s and LGBT rights in the constitution mirrors the development of the 
global human rights regime at the time. However South Africa, ventured much further than other third 
wave democratisation countries. Its truly revolutionary contribution was the incorporation of sexual ori-
entation as a ground for protection against discrimination in the constitution, as no country had ever done 
before. As religion before in its own era, human rights as a type of Ersatz-Religion became iconised and 
celebrated as the new national essence. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
Argentina and South Africa faced various similar challenges during democratisation. First, successful dem-
ocratic consolidation was by no means certain in either country. In Argentina, another military coup end-
ing civilian rule was an all too real possibility; and in South Africa, building a nation of equals on the back 
of centuries of racial domination and exploitation was an equally challenging task. Second, both countries 
were internationally isolated due to their human rights violations, which, thirdly, contributed to the trou-
bling economic crises both countries faced during their democratic transition periods. Suffice to say, the 
situation was precarious in both cases and the need to gain internal legitimacy to ensure a peaceful and 
successful transition was high as was the need to gain external legitimacy, so that both nations could access 
international financial markets to overcome economic crisis. 
In the early stages of democratisation, the future was uncertain but not completely open. Due to the 
delegitimation of the old regime, the succeeding regime had to be different from the past. Both new re-
gimes’ survival depended on gaining legitimacy, which in turn depended on portraying a new and vastly 
differentiated political identity from its predecessor. In the words of Mandela, South Africa had to “engage 
in an historic effort of redefinition of [itself] as a new nation” (Mandela, 1994a), and Argentina, in the words 
of Alfonsín, had to “discover its culture, rediscover and reformulating its national identity” (Alfonsín, 1983).  
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Democratisation in both countries had brought to power the former opposition of each of the authoritarian 
regimes, with some if not most of them among the very subjects of the religiously-based oppressive prac-
tices. In a political climate where religious institutions could not be counted on to defend the victims of 
oppression, regime opposition in Argentina and South Africa had turned to the force of argument and 
institutions of human rights to challenge the repressive regimes. The churches being on the wrong side of 
the ideological divide between the two former regimes and their respective successors produced a tension 
between religion and human rights that would carry over into democratic South Africa and Argentina. In 
Argentina, many of the important human rights groups established during the dictatorship were formed 
in a direct response to the failure of the church to support the victims of oppression. In South Africa, 
regime opposition framed their cause as a human rights matter, seeking support from international human 
rights organisations to strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis the religiously backed authoritarian 
government during the democratic transition process. 
Democratic politicians had experienced religiously legitimated oppression themselves and few of them were 
willing to defend religious interests in the critical times of democratisation in which the new constitutional 
identity crystallised and was enshrined into institutions and laws of the two countries. While new political 
leaders came to power during the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the churches remained 
largely the same, both ideologically as well as on the individual level. In South Africa, the DRC continued to 
lobby for political privileges of its white constituency and fell into an identity crisis itself, being torn by 
internal debates on their role in the legacy of apartheid. In Argentina, church and military officials continued 
to justify the necessity of the dirty war against subversion and covered up for each other’s involvement in 
the dictatorship when the full extent of state terror exerted began to be known in the early years of Argentine 
democracy. These continued alliances probably forfeited the already small chances of both churches finding 
powerful allies under democracy because during the transition period, the churches were allied with the 
opponents of the new political decision makers, and as a result, a threat to both young democracies. 
In Argentina, the military was potentially the greatest destabilising factor to the new democracy and preventing 
another military coup was one of the prime challenges of the new government. Consequently, the ongoing 
religious conservative entente between the military and the Catholic Church was an element that needed to be 
politically disempowered during the transition period for the democratic project to succeed. In a similar vein, 
in South Africa, the ongoing support of the DRC for the NP, the main antagonist of the ANC during the nego-
tiations that brought about democracy and the new constitution, created a need to reduce religious normative 
power on politics because it worked in the challengers’ favour. These dynamics resulted in the emergence of 
constitutional identities focused on a secular interpretation of human rights, rather than the continued use of 
religion as a tool for political legitimation and identification.  
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Poland and Croatia stand as illustrations of how this constellation fundamentally differed from countries that 
did not have an ideological symbiosis but opposition between state and church during authoritarian rule. As 
Grzymala-Busse (2015) analyses for Poland and Croatia, 
Unlike the communist regimes, the new governments were not ideologically hostile to the 
church, nor did they have to prove their commitment to atheism and anti-clericalism to a foreign 
sponsor. If anything, they were beholden to a church that had sheltered them during their years 
as the anti-communist opposition, by reassuring the communist regime and covertly supporting 
the dissidents. (p. 147) 
While South Africa and Argentina underwent a political secularisation from authoritarian to democracy, 
Poland and Chile’s democratic system where much more open to church influence. 
[G]governments could include clergy in formulating policy, give discretion in naming and vetoing 
secular officials, and seek out church representatives to secular institutions. (…) Churches could 
thus gain considerable access during times of potential instability- precisely when institutional and 
policy frameworks could be transformed. (Grzymala-Busse, 2015, p. 147)  
In South Africa and Argentina, churches were mostly excluded from democratic politics and were blocked 
from access to secular institutions. Being morally compromised and without strong allies in the party 
systems of both post-authoritarian states, lead to churches’ inability to shape the pillars of the new democ-
racies at a pivotal time of great transformative potential. This resulted in new constitutional identities and 
the exclusion of religion in the construction of democratic government legitimacy, the empirical traces of 
which are summarised and compared in the following. 
The presence of dissent between state and church represents smoking gun type evidence for a transformed 
constitutional identity. After democratisation, reacting to their loss of influence under the new political 
dispensations, both churches publicly expressed their discontent. In South Africa, the DRC, in a General 
Synod Report of 1998, laments the considerable reduction in public influence that was, among other fac-
tors, caused by the negative public perception of the DRC as a result of it having delivered the theological 
justification of apartheid (Agenda General Synod 1998, p. 69-71 as quoted in Villiers, 2001, p. 57). In 
Argentina, newspapers reported on bishops criticising the secular attitude of the Alfonsín administration 
(El País, 1984).  
Against the opposition of the respective clergies, both newly democratic governments passed policies run-
ning counter to religious morality in the first years after regime change. In Argentina, the government 
passed a law equating the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children, granting parental rights to women 
even if they are divorced and remarried, abolished the death penalty and legalised divorce. In South Africa, 
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against fierce resistance from various religious institutions, among them the DRC, the government recog-
nised rights for homosexuals, abolished the death penalty and included a clause on the protection of sexual 
identity in its constitution. 
The analysis revealed that both religious institutions tried to shape constitutional identity and policies of 
the new regimes according to their teachings and both repeatedly voiced their disappointment when it 
became clear that their privileged role in politics had ended; clear evidence for the presence of dissent 
between state and church, indicating a changed role of religious institutions under democracy compared 
to the preceding authoritarian times. 
These smoking gun-type findings are further strengthened by the way in which the democratic identities 
of both countries were constructed in highly symbolic political acts and communication. The analysis re-
veals that there is a marked and notable change between the religious rhetoric of the past authoritarian 
regimes and the rhetoric of the democratic governments. Where religion was omnipresent under author-
itarianism, it was virtually absent in political speeches of the new democratic leaders. This suspicious ab-
sence of religion is telling in its own right. In an attempt to make absence visible, further evidence was 
brought forward to sustain the secular constitutional identity hypothesis.  
First, not only is the absence of religion informative, but also the presence of value systems that challenge 
a transcendentally derived legitimation of government action. With Mandela invoking classic humanist 
principles, such as human dignity and freedom, and Alfonsín borrowing heavily from central Enlighten-
ment concepts, such as human progress through reason, both newly democratic governments constructed 
a human-centred value system. At its core, it staked that legitimate governing means protecting the human 
for its own sake, not for the sake of being God’s creation. This indicates an utterly diminished role of 
religion in the discursive legitimation of rule. While religiously derived moral principles have a precarious 
relationship with human-centred value systems, human rights proved a fitting symbol to credibly showcase 
a transformed value framework. As symbolic political acts illustrate, such as the changing of public holidays 
from Christian to secular ones, including adding Human Rights Day to the South African calendar, as well 
as Alfonsín’s inaugural speech in Argentina given on the International Day of Human Rights, human rights 
became the guiding light for both the Argentine and South African democracy. 
Second, there is an overarching theme of marked difference between the old and new regime in high 
profile political speeches during democratisation in both countries. The presence of religion as an essential 
element in the identity construction of the old regime precluded its involvement in the new emerging 
constitutional identities. In both countries, political leaders portrayed the old regimes and its values as 
immoral and their new government as its diametric opposite. In that sense, religious conservative apart-
heid produced non-sexist, non-racist democratic South Africa; and the forced ideological and political 
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unity of the Argentine dictatorship produced tolerance, diversity and pluralism to be the hallmarks of 
Argentine democracy. The fact that in both countries the new constitutional identity construction rests 
on being as different as possible from the identity portrayed by the authoritarian regime, illustrates that 
how, despite being fundamentally new, the democratic identities of both countries were tied to the past. 
The notable absence of religion in the political communication of democratic leaders, combined with the 
presence of value systems that contradict religiously derived government legitimacy permit the passage of 
this hoop test, and additionally increase confidence in the presence of the mechanism.  
Further empirical evidence for the theoretical mechanism is that post-authoritarian South Africa and Ar-
gentina immediately ratified most international human rights treaties and began to be strong advocates for 
human rights both regionally and internationally. This represents a stark contrast to the countries’ pasts 
where both were only party to very few selected international human rights instruments and occupied a 
pariah status in the international community. 
Using human rights to regain international legitimacy is a strategy shaped by the international normative 
context of third wave democratisation countries. That it also took over the function previously held by 
religion in the governments domestic legitimacy construction is because religious institutions were mor-
ally compromised and human rights could provide a new unifying ideological framework for democratic 
politics that also ensured government support by the strong civil society.  
The human rights focus materialised in the far reaching inscription of human rights norms into domestic 
legal systems. Reforms of the military code of justice, the prohibition of the death penalty, the creation of 
CONADEP to redress the abuses of the past regime and the inclusion of some of the world’s strongest 
commitment to international law in Argentina’s constitution of 1994 were all among the measures taken 
by the civil Argentine government to strengthen domestic human rights protection under democracy. 
In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the creation of the Human Rights Commis-
sion, the Commission for Gender Equality, the public defender and the constitutional court, as well as the 
close mirroring of human rights norms in South Africa’s Bill of Rights had the same function.  
The delegitimation of religious influence on politics also limited religious institutions’ ability to shape 
which of the currently prevalent interpretations of human rights took hold during democratisation. South 
Africa and Argentina both presented initiatives in the UN framework to further the incorporation of mat-
ters pertaining to sex and gender in international human rights instruments, evidence that the secular 
interpretation of human rights spread in both countries. 
While finding the swift ratification of human rights treaties after regime change only represents the suc-
cessful passage of a hoop test for a transformed constitutional identity, as ratifications can probably be 
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found in most third-wave democratisation countries. The exceptionally thorough incorporation of human 
rights norms into the domestic legal systems and moreover, both countries advocating for a secular inter-
pretation of human rights internationally, however, suggest a transformed constitutional identity in a dou-
bly decisive manner. 
The final piece of evidence for this part of the mechanism is the passage of new constitutions with a relative 
shift of emphasis from religion towards human rights. A constitution represents a country’s guiding values 
and how it wants to be perceived by its own citizens and the world. Accordingly, constitutions are of 
paramount importance for political identity. South Africa passed an interim constitution that came into 
force with the first democratic elections in 1994, which was replaced with the final constitution of 1996. 
In Argentina, the project for a new constitution was on the table from the early stages of democratisation, 
but its final passage only materialised in 1993, ten years after the first democratic elections. This timely 
difference can be explained with the fact that South Africa never had a non-racial democratic system in 
place prior to democratisation, and the old apartheid constitution reflected the racist ideology of that 
regime. Therefore, it was not suitable to stay in force for even the shortest time under a democratic 
dispensation. Argentina, on the other hand, could reinstall a democratic constitutional order that was 
temporarily abandoned by the military dictatorship, drawing on earlier democratic periods in the country. 
What unites both countries is that their new constitutions are a source of pride in the population and hold 
an extraordinarily high importance for the countries’ political identities. 
Besides a slight variance in timing, both democratic regimes passed new constitutions that reflect a pro-
found change in the role of religion and human rights in their constitutional identities. Particularly note-
worthy changes implemented with the constitutional reforms of both countries were the elevation of in-
ternational human rights treaties to constitutional rank in Argentina and the inclusion of a world-leading 
Bill of Rights in the South African constitution, that, mirroring “the highest aspirations of the global human 
rights movement” (Klug, 2010, p. 1), includes a non-discrimination passage protecting, inter alia, from 
discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, sex and sexual orientation.  
Among the modifications pertaining to religion, the new Argentine constitution omitted the religious 
requirement for the post of president and her vice (Art. 76 of the old constitution, Art. 89 in the new 
one) and changed the mandatory oath of office for these posts from including the words “God and the 
Holy Gospel” towards a religiously neutral formula (Art. 93 in the new constitution, replacing Art. 80 of 
the old one). In South Africa, the Preamble of the constitution was changed from an almost exclusive 
homage to a Christian God towards emphasising democracy, equality and human rights. 
The constitution drafting process in both countries was a strongly contested debate for the soul of the 
constitutional identity along religious/secular lines. Among them were the new symbolic role of religion 
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in South Africa’s constitution’s preamble and the confessional requirement for office in the Argentine 
constitution, taking place in the relevant commission sessions as well as in the general public and civil 
society. The tension between human rights and religion that grew out of the historical antecedent condi-
tion of state/church ideological symbiosis in South Africa and Argentina manifested in the constitutional 
debates, such that a secular interpretation of human rights was used in the arguments in favour of limiting 
the role of religion. In other words, both concepts were played out against each other. For instance, in 
South Africa’s constitutional process, attempts by religious institutions and religiously affiliated parties to 
maintain a greater emphasis on religion in the constitution were shut down by referencing the incompat-
ibility of a traditionally preferential treatment of religion with the universality of human rights.  
The empirical tests conducted have highlighted the various empirical manifestations of a transformed con-
stitutional identity in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina. While the mechanism played out 
differently in both country’s specific contexts, on an abstract level the dynamics provoked by the ideolog-
ical state/church symbiosis during authoritarianism were remarkably similar in both new democracies. 
The ideological shift from religion towards human rights and its materialisation into the legal fabric and 
institutions of South African and Argentine democracy constitute the opportunity structures in which 
LGBT and women’s rights activism would take place later on. Thus, this is focus for the second part of 
the causal mechanism, which will be investigated in the upcoming chapter. 
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6 Mechanism Part 2. Discursive and Legal Opportunity Structures 
 
“[T]here is no doubt that the religious feelings of some may not be a guide to limit the constitu-
tional rights of others. State powers cannot be called to interpret religious texts or to take sides 
with their assessment of homosexuality (…).” 
(Poder Judicial de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, 2009, my translation) 
“[T]he acknowledgement by the state of the right of same-sex couples to enjoy the same status, 
entitlements and responsibilities as marriage law accords to heterosexual couples is in no way 
inconsistent with the rights of religious organisations to continue to refuse to celebrate same-sex 
marriages. (…) The religious beliefs of some cannot be used to determine the constitutional 
rights of others.” 
 (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005b)  
 
Very few South African and Argentine political leaders foresaw the potential repercussions of constitutional conces-
sions granted to women’s and LGBT rights groups that would manifest in the realm of reproductive and LGBT rights 
policy later on. The precariousness of democratic stability in the early days of both the Argentine and South African 
regime transitions had political leaders focus on the most pressing issues of transitional justice, reconciliation and 
economic stability, overshadowing issues not directly related to democratic consolidation. The turbulence of regime 
transition also led to a degree of ideological permeability of the state for interest group demands as long as these 
groups were committed to the democratic project. When debating new constitutions and incorporating interna-
tional law in the domestic legal systems, politicians welcomed any form of support for a democratic political system.  
In contrast, the women’s and LGBT rights movements in both countries were acutely aware of the unique opportu-
nities for measureable progress during the transition period. In the early days of democracy, social movements did 
little more than raise awareness that they too belonged to the formerly oppressed victims of the past political repres-
sion. This tactic created a common ground with the new political elite and human rights organisations, and facilitated 
the acceptance of their oppression as a human rights issue. Only when this link between human rights and discrimi-
nation on the grounds of gender and sexuality was firmly established in political discourse, movements began to 
present more concrete policy demands. 
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At first glance, the chances seemed slim for the women’s and LGBT rights movements to gain policy 
concessions in South Africa and Argentina. Facing religious institutions that had traditionally dominated 
discourse in matters pertaining to sexuality and gender, as well as a highly religious and overwhelmingly 
conservative population, might have proved an insurmountable barrier for framing the cause in any other 
than religious terms elsewhere; but not so in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina. Through a 
deliberate framing strategy that resonated with the dominant ideologies of both countries’ democratic 
governments and the latest developments of the international human rights discourse, social movements 
turned into reality what seemed impossible at first; their problem framing overriding traditionally reli-
gious narratives on sexuality and transforming their demands for recognition and legalisation from some-
thing previously regarded as immoral into an immovable pillar of democracy. 
The theoretical mechanism for this section posits that the constitutional identity constructed by the newly 
democratic governments created a specific set of legal and discursive opportunity structures for stakehold-
ers in abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR policy. The international human rights commitments then-
recently entered by the states, a thorough incorporation of human rights law and principles into the do-
mestic legal system (including the respective governments’ construction of legitimacy based on secularly 
interpreted human rights), are the context in which competing problem framings are brought forward by 
participants in the policy processes. On the one side, the main protagonists are women’s and LGBT rights 
movements, and on the other churches and organisations associated with institutionalised religion in the 
political spectrum as well as in civil society.  
The theoretical proposition, which is subject of this chapter, is that the specific set of opportunity struc-
tures stake holders face in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina is conducive for actors who can 
credibly frame their claims as a human rights issue. In South Africa’s and Argentina’s post-authoritarian 
context, this should have been easier for social movements than for religious institutions and associ-
ated organisations.  
Accordingly, to test this logic, we will explore the ways in which the normative and legal structures of the 
post-authoritarian context have shaped social movements’ problem framings and activism strategies in 
South Africa and Argentina. As we shall see, social movement framings in both countries rely on human 
rights and indeed closely mirror the ideological meta-narratives of the countries at the time. In contrast, 
religious doctrine was rejected as a legitimate source of moral principles in the political sphere. Judges in 
Argentina and South African courts explicitly ruled that the religious convictions of some cannot impede 
the constitutional rights of others and social movements were quick to reference the ideological symbiosis 
of the past to challenge churches’ moral authority to influence policy.  
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The dynamics present in the three different policy fields are remarkably similar within and across each 
country, as the similar framings and strategies of social movements demonstrate a high degree of respon-
siveness to the specific ideological context of the time. However, abortion activism in Argentina deviates 
from this general pattern. It is at this stage in the progression of the causal chain where the abortion policy 
process in Argentina takes a turn different from LGBT rights policy. A specificity of Argentina’s human 
rights discourse has prevented the Argentine women’s movement in succeeding to anchor an abortion 
reform onto the political agenda. Moreover, opportunity structures for the women’s movement were less 
favourable than for the Argentine LGBT rights movement and social movements in South Africa. Rooted 
in the dictatorial past that included the kidnapping of children of regime opponents, the Argentine human 
rights discourse features an emphasis on the rights of children that did not allow for a framing of abortion 
as a human right. Thus, this chapter intends to solve the puzzle of why abortion remains restrictively 
regulated in Argentina, and, we will see that it was not institutionalised religion that kept abortion from 
the political agenda but an idiosyncratic factor in Argentina’s history that created unfavourable opportunity 
structures for the Argentine women’s movement to push for abortion reform.  
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6.1 Without Equality there is No Democracy: Strategic Framing and Litigation by 
Social Movements in Argentina 
 
While there was little to no activism on abortion and LGBT issues during the Argentine dictatorship, the 
picture radically changed upon democratisation. Newly formed social movements played a crucial role in 
the problem framing and politicisation of issues related to sexuality and gender in democratic Argentina. 
These movements successfully employed framings that mirrored the specificities of Argentina’s post-au-
thoritarian human rights discourse. LGBT rights organisations framed their claims in human rights lan-
guage and could form alliances with the broader human rights movement. At the same time, proponents 
of policy change continuously used the ideological symbiosis of the dictatorship and church to challenge 
religious frames introduced into the debate by the Catholic Church. 
Activism for the introduction of same-sex marriage and LGR faced similarly conducive opportunity struc-
tures. When the same organisations that were successful with igniting the legalisation of gay marriage took 
on the task to lobby for a reform of LGR policy two years later, the momentum of gay marriage proved 
beneficial for gender recognition reform success. When battling for marriage equality, the movement had 
framed LGBT rights as human rights and the passage of the gay marriage bill in 2010 was welcomed as a 
success of their framing efforts, reaffirming a secular interpretation of human rights in Argentina. This 
further strengthened the discursive opportunity structures for the subsequent struggle for LGR policy, 
whose reform was then relatively uncontroversial in political terms, and also received less media attention 
and fewer church interventions than gay marriage. 
Other than the case for the LGBT rights movement, the women’s rights movement’s framing of abortion 
was ambiguous. It was characterised by a multitude of parallel frames and demands, none of became dom-
inant. Although a human rights frame of abortion was present in the social and political debate, it was 
mostly used by abortion opponents. A focus on the rights of the child in the Argentine human rights dis-
course, which emerged as a reaction to illegal adoptions during the dictatorship, allowed abortion oppo-
nents to capitalise on Argentina’s human rights focused constitutional identity. In other words, for the 
LGBT rights movement, Argentina’s post-authoritarian human rights focus had created favourable oppor-
tunity structures, allowing the movement to develop key alliances in the broader human rights spectrum 
and challenge interventions by the Catholic Church as the main opposition to policy change. However, 
for the women’s rights movement, opportunity structures proved to be different, resulting in ambigu-
ous problem frames and the women’s rights movement’s failure to set abortion reform as part of the 
political agenda.  
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Discursive opportunity structures in Argentina 
The LGBT rights movement. The Argentine LGBT rights movement almost completely disap-
peared during the last dictatorship, however, soon after democratisation, the first groups began to organ-
ise. In 1984, one of the first groups that emerged was the Comunidad Homosexual Argentina (CHA), whose 
inaugural motto was “The free exercise of sexuality is a human right” (Encarnación, 2011, p. 106). The 
CHA was the most influential LGBT rights group in Argentina during the first years of Argentine democ-
racy (Brown, 2002, p. 121). Its first newspaper advertisement in 1984 appeared under the headline, “With 
Discrimination and Repression There Is No Democracy” (El Clarin on 28 May 1984, as cited in Comunidad 
Homosexual Argentina, n.d.c). In the text, its authors argued that, “there will never be a true democracy 
in Argentina if society permits the existence of marginalized sectors and the methods of repression that 
are still in place” and it concluded by stating that 1.5 million Argentine gays are “preoccupied with the 
national situation” and had experienced “with the rest of the nation the hard years of dictatorial rule” 
(Encarnación, 2011, p. 107). Thus, from the early days of democracy, the LGBT movement framed its 
cause within the broader socio-political struggle for democratisation and human rights. Its members having 
suffered severe repression under the dictatorship, they positioned themselves among the victims of the 
military regime who are still being repressed and thereby presented their liberation as essential for Argen-
tina to become a true democracy.  
When the uprising of nationalist militia in 1987 provoked great concern amongst democratic politicians 
and human rights organisations alike, the CHA joined a march for democracy on the Plaza de Mayo, which 
resulted them to be included, for the first time, in the joint meetings of the human rights movement 
(Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, n.d.c). Argentina’s threatened democratic stability facilitated the 
acceptance of the LGBT rights movement among the ranks of human rights and democracy defenders. 
Forming alliances with the human rights movement was an important step in the LGBT movement’s over-
all advocacy strategy. When the Madres called for a conference under the slogan “Trial and Punishment of 
the Guilty” shortly after democratisation, the CHA participated with a table on LGBT issues “progressively 
incorporating the discourse on sexual diversity within the framework of human rights” (Comunidad Ho-
mosexual Argentina, n.d.a, my translation). The strategic alliances built with the human rights movement, 
first related issues unrelated to homosexuality, would later pay off when the LGBT movement pushed for 
marriage equality and the LGR law. After having deliberately built a presence in the human rights move-
ment, the acceptance of the human rights frame LGBT organisations used to legitimise their demands 
became widespread. 
The gay marriage bill would later be supported by no less than 73 human rights organisations, among them 
the Madres. The group that enjoyed great legitimacy for its fight against the dictatorship gave validity to 
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the call for LGBT rights by arguing that “[d]enying marriage on the grounds of sexual preference is a form 
of discrimination prohibited by the national constitution, and creating a separate institution is a flagrant 
violation of human rights” (Madres, as cited in Encarnación, 2011, p. 108). 
In 2002, the CHA started lobbying activity to reach legal recognition for same-sex couples on the basis of 
a civil partnership regime. When the FALGBT [Federación Argentina de Lesbianas, Gays, Bisexuales y Trans], 
an association of LGBT rights groups from all over the country, was founded in 2006 with the specific aim 
“to gain the same rights with the same name”, it replaced the CHA as the leading organisation of the LGBT 
rights movement and as the public face for the legal recognition of same-sex couples in Argentina (Fed-
eracion Argentina LGBT, 2014). Explicitly calling for marriage equality, and not a partnership regime, 
FALGBT lobbied for a change in the civil code to remove the reference to the sexes of the persons entering 
marriage. The movement motto to gain marriage rights was “same love, same rights“ [mismo amor, mismos 
derechos]. In the media, the movement focused on making diverse forms of families visible, which resonated 
with the historical family focus in Latin America in general, and of Peronism in Argentina in particular 
(Tabbush, Díaz, Trebisacce, & Keller, 2016, p. 39). 
The movement discursively exploited Argentina’s human rights commitment in the new constitution to 
claim their rights. Gustavo López, lawyer of the FALGBT, told newspaper Página/12: “The national Con-
stitution, both in its text and in that of the international human rights treaties incorporated in it, guarantees 
the right of people to marry and found a family.” (López, as cited in Bruno Bimbi, 2008, my translation) 
The movement’s human rights framing secured alliances with human rights bodies within the state that 
were created in the new democracy and that, in congruence with the constitutional identity, subscribed 
to a secular interpretation of human rights. For instance, the National Institute against Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Racism [Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación, la Xenofobia y el Racismo, INADI], a special-
ised institute under the newly created Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of Argentina [Ministerio de Justicia 
y Derechos Humanos de Argentina], supported the LGBT rights movement in its claim for marriage rights. 
The FALGBT, together with the FNLID (Frente Nacional por la Ley de Identidad de Genero), were not only 
advocating for same-sex marriage but also for a gender change law from 2007 onwards, this time calling 
for “a right to identity". The FNLID, a coalition of LGBT rights groups including the CHA, was formed 
in 2010 with the aim of concerted lobbying for the passage of a gender recognition law. To advocate for 
LGR policy, the LGBT rights movement used the slogan, “Without Delay, Identity NOW” [which is much 
more catchy in Spanish: ¡Sin demora, identidad AHORA!], thereby referencing the Argentine human rights 
discourse’s focus on identity (Frente Nacional por la Ley de Identidad de Género, 2012). 
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More specifically, the FALGBT argued:  
Transvestites and transsexuals are denied the right to identity in Argentina, a right enshrined in 
all international human rights treaties signed by our country and incorporated into the National 
Constitution in the 1994 reform. They have a name in their documents that differs from the one 
everyone knows them under, and they are assigned a gender – man or woman – that contradicts 
their identity. (…). They are the NN [Nomen nescio] of democracy, undocumented and deprived 
of their most essential rights. (Federacion Argentina LGBT, 2011, my translation) 
NN is the designation used in Argentina for the anonymous dead that disappeared at the hands of the 
regime. Unlike a death memorialised by friends and family, the practice of disappearance deprived victims 
of their identity. Similar to concentration camps, detainees were not called by their names but given a 
number instead. Their subsequent extrajudicial killing without documentation and the disposal of their 
bodies meant that there were no bodies to be buried, and no funerals. In that sense disappearance was not 
only political homicide but the extinction of the very identity of a person. In the decades following the 
military dictatorship, some bodies have been found but have remained unidentified, hence many graves 
are without names. Accordingly, the identity-deprived dead are designated NN [Nomen nescio] in Argen-
tina. By framing trans people to be the NN of democracy, the LGBT rights movement drew a parallels 
between the atrocities of the dictatorship and challenged Argentina’s new democratic values as being dif-
ferent from the former regime by portraying the lack of a gender identity law as a crime similar to that of 
the deprivation of identity under the dictatorship. 
Aside from discursively connecting the practice of disappearance under authoritarianism with the treatment 
of trans people under democracy, the movement’s framing of a right to identity resonated with the right to 
identity of children being one of the focal points of Argentine human rights activism from its inception. This 
focus originated in the Abuelas advocating for the right to identity of the children taken from their mothers 
in clandestine detention centres, and then illegally sold or given for adoption to regime loyal families. 
The Abuelas explain that these illegal adoption were done to: 
Annul, erase the identity and roots of these children with the objective that they would not feel and 
think like their parents but like their enemies. (…) In that way, they made them disappear through 
annulling their identity, negating them to live with their legitimate families, negating them all their 
rights and their freedom. There are hundreds of children who were deprived of their identity, family 
and personal history and raised in a lie. (Las Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, 2015, my translation) 
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The right to identity that the Abuelas define as, “the right of everyone to be oneself, to know who he is” 
(ibid., my translation), is widely recognised in Argentina and has even been “exported” into the interna-
tional human rights regime. The UN International Convention of the Rights of the Child of 1989 includes 
three article (also called “Argentine Articles”) that enshrine the right to identity in international law and 
that are based on the Abuelas’ work in Argentina (ibid.). 
Since the relevant paperwork for the adoption of Argentina’s kidnapped children was forged, these chil-
dren grew up not under the names given to them by their biological parents, but under a completely new 
identity given by their adopting families passing them off as their own. Thus far, through large scale gene 
testing, only some of these children have been reunited with the survivors of their biological families. 
Some have even decided to retake their original names, given to them by their biological parents upon 
birth. An emphasis on true identity and names in the discourse on abducted children was appropriated by 
the LGBT rights movement. On the occasion of “Children’s day” [Día de la Infancia] in Argentina, María 
Rachid, at that point president of the FALGBT, stressed that,  
at present, various rights of LGBT children and adolescences are being violated, not allowing a full 
development of their potential and abilities, without any type of restriction. This is a clear example 
of the systematic violation of the right to identity of transvestite, transsexual and transgender girls, 
boys, and adolescents. This violation of the right to identity is the beginning of a chain of exclusions 
that prevents their full development. (Federacion Argentina LGBT, 2008, my translation) 
 
The women’s rights movement. The LGBT movement’s framing strategy for same-sex mar-
riage, as well as the gender change law, was an impeccable fit with the broader human rights discourse 
in Argentina. However, the situation in the case of the women’s rights movement advocating for 
abortion rights was markedly different. Feminists began to focus on reproductive rights in the 1990s 
when Peronist president Carlos Menem, an outspoken opponent30 of abortion, tried to steer the con-
stitutional assembly towards including the protection of “life at conception” into the new constitution 
(Htun, 2003, 161ff.) This is also when abortion emerged as an issue on the political agenda, notably 
not politicised by movement demands but by attempts of abortion opponents to protect the status 
quo in the constitution. Pro-abortion activism in that period was therefore concentrated on prevent-
ing the protection of the embryo to gain constitutional esteem or in other words, defending the status 
quo rather than decriminalising abortion.  
                                                     
30 Menem`s credibility of a protector of unborn life was severely compromised when his wife made public that he had urged 
her to have an (illegal) abortion. 
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Eventually, the movement prevented the constitutional protection of the unborn child. Other successes 
of the women’s movement in the 1990s included gaining economic and political participation rights for 
women, including the passage of a law on political quotas in 1991 to increase the participation of women 
in the national legislature (Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 27). 
An explicit focus on abortion reform by the women’s rights movement only re-emerged in the 2000s, when 
women’s rights groups organised in a joined national campaign for legal abortion [Campaña Nacional por el 
Aborto Legal, Seguro y Gratuito, following “Campaña”]. Currently composed of 338 organisations from all over 
the country (Campaña, n.d.) The Campaña was launched on the 28th of May 2005, which is also the Inter-
national Day of Action for Women’s Health. The Campaña’s lobbying efforts are carried out under the slogan 
“Education in order to decide, anti-contraception in order to not abort, legal abortion in order not to die” 
[Educación sexual para decidir, anticonceptivos para no abortar, aborto legal para no morir]. (Campaña, 2011) 
The problem framing of the Campaña is ambiguous and characterised by the simultaneous employment of 
a public health, social justice, emancipation, and in recent years, also a human rights framing. Given the 
relative weight of arguments in the Campaña’s lobbying activity, the public health framing is the most 
prominently employed. On its website, for instance, the Campaña presents the issue as follows: 
In Argentina, an estimated 500,000 women resort to clandestine abortion each year, showing how the 
penalty does not impede their practice, but makes it dangerous because of the lack of economic re-
sources of many women. (…) According to official figures, complications due to unsafe abortions are 
the main preventable cause of maternal mortality in Argentina (…). Since the democratic recovery in 
December 1983, more than 3,000 women have died as a result of unsafe abortions, thus expressing 
this great debt of democracy, constituting a very serious public health problem. Most of these women 
are young and impoverished, showing the inequalities across the problem of access to abortion when 
a woman decides she cannot go ahead with an unwanted pregnancy. (Campaña, 2011, my translation) 
The ambiguous problem framing went hand in hand with the ambiguous naming of the women’s move-
ment’s demands. Ariza y Valdivia (2015, p. 191) identify competing claims within the women rights 
movement which has demanded “free abortion” [aborto libre], “depenalisation of abortion”, “the right to 
decide” and “abortion as legitimate form of contraception”. Tabbush et al. (2016, p. 44) support those 
findings and also discover a split in movement activity between activism for abortion legalisation, judicial 
activism to amplify the indications under which abortion is de-penalised, and organisations that focus on 
direct action to facilitate access to medical abortions. 
The abortion issue sparked substantial political and social debate since its initial politicisation in the 1990s, 
accompanied by high media coverage. Interestingly, opponents, rather than proponents, of decriminalisation 
used human rights norms and international legislation to argue that abortion impedes the rights of the most 
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vulnerable: the unborn child (ibid., p. 41). For instance, the Argentine National Academy of Medicine pub-
lished a nationwide newspaper ad, stating that, “[a]ny legislation that permits abortion violates basic human 
rights.” (Morgan, 2015) Another example is the Federal Network of Families [Red Federal de Familias] that, 
at the time of writing, is pushing to further restrict abortion with the law proposal “Law for the integral 
protection of the human rights of the pregnant woman and of the unborn children” ["Ley de protección integral 
de los derechos humanos de la mujer embarazada y de las niñas y los niños por nacer"] (Quintans, 2016).  
In addition, at pro-life demonstrations in Buenos Aires, the mass chanted: “Today and yesterday it’s the 
same/ If yesterday they stole babies/ Today they kill them in the womb/ What is the difference/ Tell us, 
President.” (Felitti, 2011; see also Morgan, 2015). As sociologist José Manuel Morán Faúndes points out, 
abortion opponents began to strategically “construct their conservative sexual politics on the basis of rhe-
torical discourses associated with the condemnation of human rights violations that occurred during the 
dictatorship.” (Morán Faúndes, 2013; see also Morgan, 2015) 
The ambiguous problem framing by the women’s rights movement, as well as the fact that Argentina’s 
human rights focused identity was exploited by reform opponents (rather than proponents) prevented a 
human rights framing for abortion rights to become dominant, which is also mirrored by the fact that only 
few human rights organisations endorsed the women’s rights movements claim for abortion rights. 
Overall, there are notable differences in the framing strategies of the LGBT rights movement to push for 
same-sex marriage and LGR, and the women’s movements’ framing of abortion. These diverging activist 
strategies grew out of entirely different discursive opportunity structures encountered by both move-
ments. Idiosyncratic factors of the Argentine case allowed human rights to be present in the societal and 
political abortion discourse, but for the most part these human rights are interpreted as applying to the 
embryo, not the mother.  
It seems that this is due to the traditionally high value attached to motherhood and family in the Argentine 
context, and a sensitivity to the right of children due to the repercussions of the practices of the dictatorship. 
Largely made up of Italian and Spanish immigrants, the mother is an immovable figure in Argentine society. 
The cultural glorification of motherhood in Argentina and in Latin America contributed to the success of the 
Madres and Abuelas in challenging the authoritarian regime. However, the articulation and maturation of the 
Argentine human rights discourse within the framework of missing children produced a human rights focus 
that, while secularly interpreted, nevertheless has a special commitment to the protection of family and children.  
Claiming marriage rights for homosexuals reinforces the cultural focus on family. Furthermore, the right 
to identity, which was the framing brought forward to advance LGR policy, resonated with the discourse 
on the right to identity of the robbed children that commenced with the most important human rights 
report Nunca Más during democratisation. In the report it states:  
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Deprived of their identity and taken away from their parents, the disappeared children constitute, 
and will continue to constitute, a deep blemish on our society. In their case, the blows were aimed 
at the defenceless, the vulnerable and the innocent, and a new type of torment was conceived. 
(Argentina, 1986) 
This prevented a human rights frame for abortion to become dominant. “The perception of women as 
mothers and wives who would protect their children and ‘be on the side of life’ was widely shared in 
Argentine society and formed the basis for the Madres’ human rights claims.” (Morgan, 2015) “This history 
complicates the demand for legal abortion in ways that are uniquely Argentine.” (ibid.) The discursive 
exclusion of abortion in the framework of human rights allowed the opponents to policy change to capi-
talise on Argentina’s new constitutional identity by framing their opposition in human rights language. 
The main obstacle to abortion legalisation in Argentina was thus not a dominance of a religious frame, but 
the configuration of discursive opportunity structures that allowed abortion opponents to appropriate the 
human rights focus of Argentina’s democratic constitutional identity. This point is further substantiated 
by the fact that the women’s rights movement was highly successful in gaining many other gender related 
rights31, but specifically failed to politicise abortion. 
Discursive barriers for religious influence. The state/church ideological symbiosis during the 
dictatorship not only produced a specific discursive opportunity structure permitting the LGBT rights 
movement to frame their claims as a human rights issue (while also preventing the women’s rights move-
ment from doing the same), but it also provided social movements with ample discursive resources to 
challenge religious influence on legislation.  
Acutely aware of its primary adversary, the LGBT movement used a double strategy to achieve their goals. 
First, the delegitimation of church influence on the issue specifically, as well as challenging religious moral 
authority in Argentine society in general. Second, framing their claims as human rights issues. “Since its 
creation, the CHA systematically and courageously denounces the complicity of the Vatican Church in all 
repressive actions and discriminatory discourses in relation to sexual diversity, and has demanded the 
separation of Church and State”. (Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, 2013, my translation) In 1986, 
                                                     
31 For example, in 2002, the national legislature passed a law on Sexual Health and Responsible Procreation [Salud Sexual y 
Procreación Responsable, Ley 25.673 de 2002], obliging public health providers and state agencies to provide free information 
and counselling about contraceptive methods and including contraceptives under the coverage of public health providers 
(Pecheny and Petracci (2006)).  
In 2006 a reform of public sex education was passed [Educación Sexual Integral, Ley 26.150, de 2006], followed by the inclusion 
of emergency contraception into national health protocols in 2007 (Morgan (2015)). In 2009, a law against violence against 
women was passed [Protección Integral para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar La Violencia contra las Mujeres, Ley 26.485, de 2009]. 2013 
witnessed the passage of a law on Assisted Fertilization [Fertilización Asistida, ley 26.862, de 2013] and around the same time, 
with a maternalist rhetoric strategy, economic and social rights of women and their children were strengthened (Tabbush et al. 
(2016, p. 28)). 
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shortly after the return to democracy, the first independently organised action by the CHA was a gathering 
of 100 persons in front of the Cathedral in Buenos Aires to protest the Vatican’s second document on 
homosexuality, garnering significant media attention (Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, n.d.c). 
Denouncing the Catholic church’s discriminatory stance on issues gained the movement credibility in light 
of the historical symbiosis between the dictatorship and church, and thus attacks on the church by the 
LGBT rights movement always included some type of reference to the past and characterisation of the 
church’s anti-democratic leanings. Two years after Argentine cardinal Bergolio became Pope Francis I, 
César Cigliutti, president of the CHA, responded to some appeasing gestures by the Vatican towards the 
LGBT population: 
The Vatican continues with its historical discriminatory positions: they define homosexuality as a 
deviation from nature, they oppose equal marriage (lobbying around the world so that laws are 
not passed), the bishops continue with complicity in child abuse, campaigns against abortion, 
against comprehensive sexual education and against the use of condoms. (Comunidad Homosex-
ual Argentina, n.d.d) 
In a press communiqué issued by the CHA one day after Pope Benedict XVI made public that he views gay 
marriage as “a offence against the truth of the human person and a grave injury to justice and peace”, 
Cigliutti remarked:  
The true offenses against the truth of the human person and ‘a serious wound to justice and peace’ 
are the minors who were victims of the sexual abuse that their priests performed with the system-
atic silence and cover-up of the bishops. The peace of peoples and democracy is equal rights for 
all citizens. The offense is discrimination against people. (Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, 
2010)  
And the secretary of the CHA, Pedro Paradiso Sottile, added:  
The offense for humanity is religious fundamentalism, exclusion and terrible discriminatory acts 
promoted by the hierarchy of the Vatican church, accomplices of shame and silence in the face of 
processes and dictatorships, to the hegemonic powers, as to the abuses that took peace and life of 
millions of people in history. We are building an inclusive world, respectful of the rights of all, 
and for this reason we will continue to work for secular, democratic and diverse states, with love 
and freedom. (Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, 2010) 
An illustrative incidence underscores the fundamentally contrasting discursive opportunity structures 
faced by the Catholic Church and the LGBT rights movement respectively. In 2010, a letter by Jorge 
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Bergolio, then-president of the Argentine episcopal conference, addressed to the Carmelita nuns of Bue-
nos Aires, became public. In dramatic terms he warned of the dangers of gay marriage. Bergolio called the 
project something “the devil would be envious of”, the initiative to be “provoked by the father of lies”, and 
concluding by calling for a “war of god” against the policy (NoticiaCristiana, 2010). 
Invoking such war of god, a similar rhetoric figure as used by the leaders of the dictatorship, provoked 
public outcry, turning public sentiments against the church and in favour of the LGBT movement. Then-
Argentine President Cristina Fernandez reacted to the letter by publicly asking the cardinal to stop acting 
“in medieval times and times of inquisition” and used the occasion to, for the first time, state her support 
for the law project. (NoticiaCristiana, 2010) 
In general, the numerous public interventions by the Catholic Church in the public discourse on gay mar-
riage largely backfired as senators reacted to church involvement by expressing their explicit disapproval 
of church influence on the matter (Hiller, 2011, p. 144). 
The women’s rights movement also advocated for a secular state. Advocating for a law proposal to de-
criminalise abortion, la Campaña argued:  
Debating and sanctioning this project helps to consolidate a State that is responsible for designing 
and effectively executing public policies that guarantee the full exercise of the right to integral 
health, to the autonomy of women, who make up fifty percent of society, to consolidate a secular 
and democratic state that promotes freedom and respect for the beliefs of all people and to expand 
the horizons of our democracy. (Campaña, 2016, my translation) 
On another occasion, the Campaña commented on a change in the civil code that established the Catholic 
Church as a legal entity under public law. This change in law had nothing to do with abortion, but rather the 
relationship between the church and state in general. The Campaña argued the Catholic privilege to be: 
A clear contradiction with the principles of equality before the law, freedom of worship and con-
science and secularism of the State embodied in our Constitution and in the Human Rights Trea-
ties incorporated into it. (…) At the National Campaign for the Right to Abortion, like other 
organisations that have already protested, we do not understand or accept this concession to a 
religious institution that has been complicit in dictatorships, with a morality rooted in the past and 
the main opponent of advances in the human rights of all people, but especially of women. We 
advocate a secular state as a fundamental premise for the furtherance of democracy. (…)This cannot 
be achieved by holding privileges for the Catholic Church. (Campaña, 2012, my translation) 
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While the women’s rights movement did employ the argument of the state/church symbiosis under the 
military regime to advocate for a secular state, the movement did not focus as aggressively on a delegiti-
mation of the church. This is probably the case because, other than for LGBT rights, the church is not the 
only or at least the main obstacle to abortion legalisation. Rather, opposition against decriminalisation is 
more dispersed and includes secular actors, including human rights organisations. 
 
Legal opportunity structures in Argentina 
The recently ratified international human rights treaties and the Argentine Constitution of 1994 formed 
the legal framework that facilitated social movements in Argentine anchoring their cause onto the national 
agenda. While also used as a rhetorical tool in the debates, the new constitution also proved useful for 
social movements to gain valid legal grounds for their human rights framing. 
In the Argentine constitution of 1994, a right for filing an Amparo32 was codified. An Amparo is a type of 
constitutional complaints procedure that carries implications for the individual case only, rather than being 
automatically applicable to similar cases. On the 14th of February 2008, María Rachid, president of the 
FALGBT, the umbrella organisation of the Argentine LGBT rights groups, and her girlfriend Claudia Cas-
tro went to obtain a marriage license from the civil registry in Buenos Aires. Upon their request being 
rejected, they filed an Amparo, in which they argued that their right to marriage is protected by the con-
stitutional guaranty of equality and in the human rights treaties included in the constitution (Federación 
Argentina LGBT, 2014). 
Due to the nature of this type of constitutional complaint procedure, if Rachid and her partner were 
successful, the two activists would have been able to get married, despite this going against the law and 
without such marriage automatically granting the same right to other same-sex couples. However, the 
Amparo was rejected in first instance, but with the help of the judicial team of the FALGBT, the case was 
taken to the Argentine Supreme Court. While insiders expected a favourable judgement by the court, i.e. 
it declaring the relevant articles of the civil code unconstitutional, in the end the court did not have to 
judge the case because congress contemporaneously legalised gay marriage by reforming the civil code 
shortly before the judgement would have been due. Thus, the issue had already been decided. 
A series of successful Amparos (following Rachid’s unsuccessful one) eventually led congress to pass the 
gay marriage bill before the constitutional court judgement. The next chapter features a detailed analysis 
                                                     
32 An Amparo can be filed by individual who believe their rights as protected in the constitution, other laws and international 
treaties to be violated.  
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of the legislative process. The LGBT rights movement initiated a coordinated Amparo strategy, with nu-
merous couples following the same blueprint (i.e. applying for a marriage license, getting rejected, filing 
an Amparo), leaving little choice for politicians but to take the issue seriously.  
After the first Amparo by Rachid and Castro, LGBT rights activists Alex Freyre y Jode Di Bello were the 
first to be successful with their Amparo filing. Judge Gabriela Seijas at the Administrative Court of Buenos 
Aires declared unconstitutional articles 172 and 188 of the Civil Code on the 10th of November 2009, 
and ordered the Civil Registry of Buenos Aires to wed Alex Freyre y Jode Di Bello. The judge’s reasoning 
stressed that the religious sentiments of some cannot delimit the constitutional rights of others: 
It is possible that a decision in this regard is considered by some as an affront to religious beliefs 
deeply rooted in one sector of our community. But in the current state of secularisation of civil 
institutions there is no doubt that the religious feelings of some may not be a guide to limit the 
constitutional rights of others. State powers cannot be called to interpret religious texts or to take 
sides with their assessment of homosexuality (…). 
 [T]he civil sphere is different and independent of the religious, and this distinction protects the 
autonomy of the conscience, of the individual liberty and of cults that are fundamental principles 
of the constitutional democracy (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires [Judiciary 
of Buenos Aires], 2009, my translation) 
The verdict demonstrates how the new constitutional identity produced favourable legal and discursive 
opportunity structures for the LGBT rights movement. Without the focus on human rights in the consti-
tution, activists would not have been able to make a case on the basis of them being denied their constitu-
tionally protected human rights. Without the contentious relationship between religion and human rights 
in the Argentine context, and a secular interpretation of international human rights standards during de-
mocratisation, the court would not have taken religious influence to be incompatible with Argentine dem-
ocratic identity and the rights enshrined in it basic law.  
After the judgement, the path towards marriage for Freyre and Di Bello seemed clear and with high media 
attention, the couple scheduled their wedding for the 1st of December 2009. However, hours before the 
wedding was about to take place, the Corporación de Abogados Católicos [Catholic Lawyers Association] filed 
a complaint on behalf of a heterosexual couple that claimed that their wedding on the same day would be 
disturbed by the homosexual one. In response, the City of Buenos Aires suspended the gay wedding and 
passed the case on to the Supreme Court. In response, the FALGBT pointed out that the Corporación de 
Abogados Católicos also defended the “repressors” of the former military dictatorship, challenging religious 
influence by arguing that their mentality and action are “incompatible with democratic life” (Federación 
Argentina LGBT, 2014, my translation). 
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In light of Buenos Aires’ decision to suspend the marriage, Governor Fabiana Rios (of the province Tierra 
del Fuego) offered for the wedding to be held in Ushuaia, a remote city in southern Argentina. Therefore, 
the first gay wedding in Latin America was held on 28th of December 2009 in Ushuaia. Argentine news 
agency DyN reported Bishop Juan Carlos of the city of Rio Gallegos saying: “The decision took me by 
surprise and I’m concerned”. Furthermore, he described the wedding as “an attack against the survival of 
the human species” (TheGuardian.com, 2009). However, Governor Fabiana Rios rejoiced that gay mar-
riage “is an important advance in human rights and social inclusion and we are very happy that this has 
happened in our state” (ibid.).  
After this first gay marriage, other Amparos by same-sex couples delivered similarly successful results, with 
judges continuing to reject religious influence on public policy in their verdicts. The decision for an Am-
paro filed by Matín Canevaro, for instance, was justified in the following terms:  
It is essential to remember that ‘according to the Argentine Constitution the state is secular, even 
if there is preference or privilege in favour of the Catholic cult’ (…). Hence, the Constitutional 
Court has long maintained that ‘establishing the freedom of all cults cannot be sustained (...) if 
the Catholic Church is a political power in our organisation, with the power to dictate laws of a 
civil nature such as those that rule the regime of marriage’ (Rulings: 53, 188). (…) In this way it 
would be a violation of art. 14 of the National Constitution to coercively impose just some of the 
principles of the various religions that coexist in our society. (...) This is so because the National 
Constitution protects the freedom of all the inhabitants of the Nation who do not profess the 
Catholic creed, to conceive their marital relations differently than those established by that par-
ticular religion. 
(Poder Judicial de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, 2010, subsec. 9.2.d, my translation) 
The fact that references to the Catholic church has such explicit mention in the verdicts demonstrates the 
shift in moral authority away from the church, to being subjugated to constitutionally protected human 
rights as the new super-value informing constitutional identity. 
The events surrounding the legal strategy of the LGBT rights movement were highly visible in the media. 
Coverage about the couples trying to get married portrayed their personal love stories such that the whole 
country followed their battle for justice, love and human rights. Accordingly, this was a suitable fit with 
the focus on family in Argentine culture, and that of human rights in Argentine politics. In the end, the 
Amparo strategy led to the curious situation of many gay couples already being married before parliament 
finally decided to legalise gay marriage. 
Inspired by the success of the judicial strategy to gain marriage rights, the LGBT rights movement applied the 
same tactic to push for LGR policy. A precedent was set by the case of trans actress Florence de la V. With the 
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support of FALGBT, she requested judicial authorisation to change her first name without having to have had 
performed genital reassignment surgery beforehand (Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 46). In light of the success of this 
case, lawyers of the FALGBT started to support, free of charge, other members of the trans community trying 
to reach authorisation for a gender change via the judiciary (Federación Argentina LGBT, 2011). 
Overall, the judicial team of the FALGBT presented more than 30 Amparos regarding gender recognition. 
Judge Guillermo Scheibler who judged the third successful Amparo case, in line with the cause of the LGBT 
movement, emphasised in his judgement that, 
it is highly desirable to sanction a rule of general scope that regulates the procedure to be followed 
in situations such as the one in the case in order to avoid leaving those possibly interested [to 
change their legal gender] to the more or less broad or restrictive interpretations that may be 
displayed on the subject by the various operators of the legal system. (Federación Argentina 
LGBT, 2011, my translation) 
With the judge’s recommendation that legislators pass a law that would regulate LGR, the movement’s 
strategy to politicise their claims via the judiciary realised its full efficacy. 
In contrast, the women’s rights movement did not use litigation as a strategy to advance abortion rights. The 
active judicialisation of cases related to abortion was principally used by abortion opponents who aimed to 
impede the performance of non-penalised abortions. The role of the women’s movement in those cases 
consisted of investigating and dismantling the arguments the abortion opponents used in their litigation and 
as a result, women’s rights activism in those cases took on a defensive posture (Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 46). 
While a 2012 Argentine supreme court ruling (case “FAL”) is considered a victory by the women’s rights 
movement because it clarified the indications under which abortion is unpunishable in existing Argentine 
law (Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 31), this case was also brought to the court by abortion opponents. 
Due to an unclear formulation of art. 86 of the Argentine penal code, it was historically contested whether 
abortion remains unpunishable in the case of a violation of a mentally handicapped woman only, or if that 
applies to all women who have been violated. The “FAL” case was about a 15 year old minor who had 
been raped and then aborted the resulting pregnancy. The superior tribunal of justice in Chubut had au-
thorised the abortion but a legal official of Chubut Province filed an extraordinary legal injunction on behalf 
of the foetus, which the Supreme Court rejected in its judgement, arguing that: 
[T]he Constitution and human rights treaties not only do not prohibit the realisation of these types 
of abortions but, on the contrary, prevent them from being punishable for any victim of rape in 
accordance with the principles of equality, dignity of persons and legality. (CIJ - Centro de Infor-
mación Judicial, 2012)  
 
- 143 - 
Aside from that judgement in the women’s movement’s favour, the judiciary did thus far not play a sig-
nificant role in the legalisation of abortion in Argentina. Congruent with the less favourable discursive 
opportunity structures faced by the women’s movement, legal opportunity structures for the women’s 
rights movement differed from the ones the post-authoritarian legal landscape offered to the LGBT rights 
movement. As we will see below, South Africa’s new constitution already contained reproductive rights, 
making it easier for the South African women’s movement to claim abortion rights. In Argentina, the 
interpretation of human rights to apply to the embryo led to an omission of reproductive rights in Argen-
tine human rights provisions. 
Furthermore, the lack of active judicialisation of abortion may also be related to the difficult match in 
timings of pregnancies being nine months long and court cases that pass various instances usually taking 
considerably longer to resolve. The matter may therefore be more difficult to adjudicate by proponents 
than by opponents. 
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6.2 Social Movements seek Refuge under South Africa’s Rainbow 
While democratisation and the passage of the new constitution were promising developments for social 
movements in South Africa, they did not represent an automatic advancement of abortion and LGBT rights 
within the country. Rather, social movements had to actively make use of the opportunities presented to 
them to anchor their claims on the political agenda. 
Regarding abortion policy, the 1994 and 1996 constitutions did make reference to reproductive rights, 
but few negotiators were aware of its potential repercussions. The handful of politicians who did foresee 
its consequences mostly feared (rather than hoped) that the constitutional provisions could lead to a change 
in abortion regulations. That reproductive rights were mentioned in the constitutional text in the first 
place was due to two factors that worked in the women’s movement’s favour. First, the timely synchro-
nicity of the passage of South Africa’s interim constitution of 1994 with the Cairo Population Conference, 
which took place in the same year and stressed the link between reproductive and human rights. Second, 
the blurred boundaries between the ANC and civil society. 
During most of its existence, the ANC was not a party but a liberation movement and with that “one of the 
quintessential social movements of the twentieth century” itself (Ballard, Habib, Valodia, & Zuern, 2005, 
p. 622). This led the post-apartheid state (led by the ANC majority) to develop and maintain cooperative 
relations with civil society in general. A case in point came in the form of the new government passing laws 
allowing the registration of NGOs and establishing public funding agencies to provide financial resources to 
civil society organisations. Moreover, this blurred the boundaries between the ANC as a political party and 
civil society organisations in democracy as the ANC was transforming into a governing party. 
The permeability of boundaries between ANC and civil society manifested in the absorption of feminist 
activists into the party. As a result, many women MPs were feminists and had an activist background, which 
subsequently facilitated alliances between reproductive rights groups and feminists in the ANC-led govern-
ment. As observed by Bompani (2006, p. 1141): “The dialectic relationship between state and organisations 
involved in the struggle had lost its own raison d'être at the moment when the political arena became popu-
lated by the same agents of the grassroots movements”. The identity of the ANC as an organisation remains 
not one of being exclusively a political party, but still a liberation movement (ibid.) Once a coalition of 
feminists from civil society and within the ANC had ensured the inclusion of reproductive rights in the con-
stitution, the issue of abortion could easily be inserted into the constitutional agenda.  
Despite the constitutional protection of sexual identity in the first years of South African democracy, sod-
omy laws still effectively outlawed male homosexual acts, a mismatch between the far reaching constitu-
tional protections of homosexuality while the act remained criminalised. Interestingly, it underlines an 
aspect of the genesis of South Africa’s permissive contemporary moral regulations: the provisions in the 
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constitution did not the equal general political will to allow far reaching policy concessions to women and 
LGBT people. Rather, feminists managed to slip in some formulation on gender into the constitution 
which then also enabled the LGBT movement, bandwagoning on the feminist success, to have sexual iden-
tity protected in the constitution. While only the specific mention of race was set in stone due to apartheid 
history, once the mentioning of gender was settled, this presented the opportunity to insert even more 
grounds for protection. However, in the euphoria of democratisation and negotiators focusing on the 
more pressing issues of democratic survival, the constitutional provisions on discrimination did not rep-
resent the will of most politicians, or of the population to legalise abortion, LGR or gay marriage.  
Another case in point are LGR regulations, which at first became even more restrictive under democracy 
than they had been before. Under apartheid, the Birth, Marriages and Death Registration Act of 1963, as 
amended in 1974, granted the option for transsexuals to change their legal gender after having completed 
a sex reassignment surgery. During democratisation in 1992, parliament passed a new Births and Death 
Registration Act (Act 51 of 1992) that was based on a 1976 court decision which argued sex to be a 
naturally determined category that, by definition, cannot be medically altered (Births and Deaths Regis-
tration Act 51 of 1992, 1992). Thus, from 1992 onwards, it was impossible for trans people to change 
their legal gender, thereby having democratic leaders further restrict trans people’s rights rather than 
advancing them.  
Other than in Argentina, where the national idiosyncrasy of the human rights discourse being tied up with 
the notion of motherhood and identity of children created different opportunity structures for LGBT rights 
and women’s rights activism, South Africa’s post-apartheid context provided more similar opportunity 
structures for both types of movements. While the Argentine women’s rights movement’s demands for 
abortion legalisation remained unfulfilled (standing in stark contrast to the highly successful activism of 
the Argentine LGBT rights movement), the South African women’s movement moulded abortion policy 
to their preferences before the South African LGBT rights movement even gained momentum. 
 
Discursive opportunity structures in South Africa 
While during the apartheid regime abortion rights activism was low33, women’s rights groups started to 
organise in the early 1990s around reproductive rights issues (Albertyn, 2015, pp. 433–434). In 1992, 
the Women’s National Coalition (WNC) formed with the aim of ensuring the inclusion of women’s de-
mands in the emerging political system (Feltham-King & Macleod, 2015, pp. 11–12). Its foundation was 
                                                     
33 An exception to this represents the Abortion Reform Action Group, a small grassroots organisation made up of middle- and 
upper class white women, who began fighting for a reform of the restrictive abortion law in the early 1970s (Guttmacher, 
Kapadia, and Jim Te Water Naude and Helen de Pinho (1998)). 
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based on the realisation that national liberation wouldn’t automatically lead to women’s liberation. This 
was proven starkly during the CODESA negotiations, where only 23 of over 400 delegates were women 
(Goetz, 1998, p. 246; Waylen, 2007, p. 529). 
The WNC illustrates the peculiarity of the South African post-apartheid context in the form of blurred lines 
between civil society and the state. It included women from the ANC as well as women from the NP, the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), civil society organisations and experienced feminist ac-
tivists and academics (Goetz: 1998: 246). Thus, the WNC allowed for a “triple alliance” of activists, academics, 
and politicians who strategically inserted gender issues into the political discourse “at a crucial point during the 
transition” (Waylen, 2007, p. 525). 
The coalition consisted of fourteen regional coalitions and 92 national women’s organisations (Feltham-
King & Macleod, 2015, pp. 11–12). The WNC was not only nationally unprecedented in size but, ac-
cording to Goetz (1998, p. 246), globally unprecedented in its scope. “The political, racial, linguistic, and 
class differences between these groups were tremendous”, making the coalition unsustainable in the long 
run after having fulfilled its primary goal of lobbying for the inclusion of women’s demands for gender 
equality in the negotiations for a new South Africa in the early 1990s (ibid.). 
Despite being short-lived, the WNC did fulfil its purpose, making political parties aware of an organised 
women’s constituency and achieving the inclusion of a women in every delegation for the MPNP process. 
It was also responsible for the successful insertion of non-sexism in the constitutional principles and, most 
importantly, the inclusion of gender equity into the draft constitution of 1994 (Goetz, 1998, p. 247; 
Waylen, 2007, p. 532). After the first democratic elections of 1994, the WNC, like most civil society 
organisations, became “literally decapitated, as their leaders have moved from civil society into politics” 
(Goetz, 1998, p. 247). However, the concessions the WNC gained in the interim constitution would be 
carried over into the final constitution of 1996, enabling a framework for reproductive rights activism in the 
years that followed. The specific inclusion of the protection against gender discrimination in the constitution 
would also facilitate the lobbying of the LGBT rights movement to include sexual orientation as well. 
While the WNC had pushed for reproductive rights, abortion proved to be too divisive an issue for such 
a broad coalition to endorse. In laying the groundwork for later activism, more specialised interest groups 
emerged as pivotal players in abortion activism. Other than the WNC, the Reproductive Rights Alliance 
(RRA) founded in 1995 and was explicitly based on a prochoice position (Waylen, 2007, pp. 537–538). 
The RRA was a sectoral alliance of women’s organisations that allied with women in the ANC and gov-
ernment (Albertyn, 2015, p. 434). The human rights frame for reproductive rights formulated by the 
RRA gained credibility through three factors. First, it mirrored the language of the Beijing Women’s 
Conference, as well as the Cairo Population Conference. The ICPD took place in 1994, the same year as 
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South Africa held its first democratic elections and passed the interim constitution, conveniently remind-
ing the government of the connection of reproductive and human rights at a pivotal time of the transition. 
Second, South Africa had recently ratified the bulk of its international human rights treaties, lending ad-
ditional weight to issues that could be framed as human rights matters. A submission to the Constitutional 
Assembly of the Women’s Legal Centre in behalf of the RRA demonstrates how it took advantage of South 
Africa’s newly-minted human rights commitments: 
The right to make decisions concerning reproduction has also been established as a basic human 
right in international law by the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW): a treaty which South Africa has recently ratified. (Women’s 
Legal Centre & Reproductive Rights Alliance, 1996) 
Third, human rights organisations not only validated the RRA’s frame through approval but some even 
became part of the RRA as was the case for Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC). 
The specificity of the post-apartheid government’s legitimation strategy in constructing South Africa’s nas-
cent political identity on the basis of secularly interpreted human rights helped the RRA defeat the pro-life 
lobby’s most powerful argument; that a majority of South Africans opposed abortion on demand. The RRA 
countered such arguments by contending “that democracy is not equivalent to majoritarianism and that a 
democracy committed to fundamental rights [as South Africa claims to be] must protect the interests of 
minorities and disadvantaged groups” and further stating that decisions “must be guided only by human rights 
principles and not majoritarian demands.” (Women’s Legal Centre & Reproductive Rights Alliance, 1996) 
The RRA combined the strategic human rights frame with the argument that free decision making in re-
productive matters is “essential to a democratic system of government”, presenting it as “the absolute 
prerequisite for the legitimacy, acceptability and efficacy of our system of self-government” (ibid.). This 
illustrates how the RRA threatened to challenge the government’s constitutional identity construction of 
being a human rights abiding democracy if delegates were not to include reproductive rights in the final 
constitution. In other words, the pro-choice lobby was successful because it argued that without fulfilling 
its demands, the South African political system was not what it claimed. The RRA reasoned that “democ-
racy is achieved when all citizens equally participate in the democratic process. The barriers to controlling 
reproduction faced by South African women, and the social consequences flowing from those barriers, 
result in women's democratic participation being severely diminished.” (ibid.) 
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The strategic framing by the women’s rights movement granted feminist demands access to the political 
system and facilitated the minister of health (herself an acclaimed feminist with pro-choice positions) es-
tablishing a parliamentary committee in 1996 to change the restrictive abortion law of 1975. The RAA 
was both formally and informally involved in that process, and made use of its contact with MPs within 
the framework of the WNC. With the establishment of a parliamentary committee, abortion reform 
within a rights framework was firmly anchored onto the political agenda. As noted by (Albertyn, 2015, 
p. 446), the fact that state support for abortion was remarkably consistent despite a growing pro-life 
movement and ANC intra party dispute over the matter suggests “gender equality and women’s human 
rights remained an important measure of democratic progress for the government”. 
In short, “the existence of a women’s coalition such as the WNC was not sufficient in itself to influence 
the transition process”, but its success was a function of the opportunity structures it faced (Rebouche, 
2011, p. 3). The significant influence women’s rights organisations could exert during the democratic 
transition was “due to the desire of those engineering the new democracy to break with the discriminatory 
policies of the past and to incorporate international human rights norms into the new Constitution” (ibid). 
In the absence of a legitimately-perceived religious counter discourse, the new government’s commitment 
to human rights and democracy subsequently allowed for the successful politicisation of abortion. 
The LGBT rights movement. LGBT rights activism was virtually absent during most of the apart-
heid regime, with the first groups starting to form only in the 1980s. Among the first that emerged were 
the organisation Lesbian and Gays Against Oppression (LAGO) and Gays and Lesbians of the Witwater-
strand (GLOW), founded in 1986 and 1988, respectively. Given the criminalisation of same-sex sexual 
activity under religiously conservative apartheid policies, the groups positioned themselves in opposition 
to the apartheid government (Vos, 2007, p. 435). This facilitated the LGBT rights movement’s post-
apartheid framing of their struggle as part of the greater socio-political struggle for democracy. As Vos 
(2007, p. 436) underlines, “[g]ay men and lesbians could refer to this struggle and show that their struggle 
fitted the same frame, was part, in fact, of the same larger struggle for human rights and the emancipation 
of the oppressed”. 
As was the case for the women’s rights movement, the LGBT rights movement’s framing strategy reflect the 
discursive opportunity structure of South Africa’s transition context. For instance, a representative of GLOW 
argued: 
In South Africa, gay liberation is charged with distracting from the struggle for a democratic non-racial 
future. The same charge used to be levelled at the women’s movement. Both have subsequently proved 
that our struggle against oppression can enhance, not divide the offensive. GLOW, like the women’s move-
ment, believes that ‘None Will Be Free Until All Are Free’. (as quoted in Vos, 2007, p. 436) 
 
- 149 - 
Similarly to the women’s rights movement, the LGBT rights movement set up a specialised organisation, 
the Equality Foundation, to lobby for the enumeration of sexual identity as grounds for the protection 
from discrimination in the interim constitution, which strategically downplayed the potential repercus-
sions this inclusion could have for family law later on (ibid., p. 438). The first success for the movement 
was the inclusion of sexual identity in the constitution of 1994. By now, a couple of years into the transi-
tion process, the government’s identity construction based on secularly interpreted human rights was in 
full swing, leading the LGBT movement to push for a human rights frame for their demands. 
At the First National Gay and Lesbian Legal and Human Rights Conference held in Johannesburg in 1994, 
around 70 organisations joined to form the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality34 (NCLGE). 
Strikingly similar to the RRA as the main protagonist of abortion reform, the NCLGE was made up of 
LGBT as well as human rights organisations. The NCLGE’s approach was to publicise the recognition of 
all forms of oppression, and campaigning for equality for all (Mtetwa, 2013). Using the emphasis the 
government put on the human right to equality, the Coalition’s framing took a page from the govern-
ment’s racial equality agenda that the women’s rights movement was already riding successfully. A prime 
example is the NCGLE’s submission to the Constitutional Assembly in which it outlines that discrimina-
tion of the basis of sexual orientation “displays the same basic features as discrimination on the grounds of 
race and gender” (National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1995, p. 8). 
It was the specific aim behind the foundation of the NCLGE to ensure that the non-discrimination clause 
would remain in the final constitution of 1996. Later on, it would also manage a strategic litigation 
process that would lead to the legalisation of gay marriage (Vos, 2007, p. 439). Other than abortion 
reform that was passed soon after democratisation, gay marriage entered the political agenda only years 
later. This is due to the fact that gay marriage was not yet a popular concept at the time, not just in 
South Africa but all over the world. Only a couple of years earlier in 1989 had Denmark, the first 
country worldwide, introduced a registered partnership regime that granted limited rights to same-sex 
couples; and when South Africa legalised abortion in 1996, it was still five years to go before the first 
same-sex marriage law in the world came into effect in the Netherlands in 2001. 
A specialised trans rights movement. While many groups within the South African LGBT 
movement claimed to represent LGBT interests, the focus was largely on the rights of gay men and lesbi-
ans, resulting in a relative marginalisation of trans rights, even within the movement. Nevertheless, in 
                                                     
34 The NCLGE changed its name in 1999 on and subsequently operated under the name Lesbian and Gay Equality Project 
(LGEP), only to change again into the LGBTI Joint Working Group later on. 
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some LGBT groups trans mobilisation did take place. The Triangle Project, Out in Pretoria, and the Dur-
ban Lesbian and Gay Community and Health Centre were among those formed. Other than in Argentina, 
where the same organisations pushed for gay marriage and LGR, the South African movement eventually 
differentiated into groups mostly concerned with LGB issues and more specialised trans and intersex or-
ganizations from the mid-2000s onwards. 
Among these specialised groups were the Intersex Society of South Africa (ISOSA), founded in 2000; the 
Cape Town Transsexual/Transgender Support Group, founded in 2002; and Gender DynamiX (GDX), 
founded in 2005. Building on the early gains of the broader movement, such as the popularisation of 
sexuality matters as human rights and the inclusion of the equality clause in the constitution, trans and 
intersex activists quickly managed to move “law and society in visible ways” (Thoreson, 2013, p. 650). 
Trans rights groups played on the pride and identity that had become attached to South Africa’s new consti-
tution. The Transgender/Transsexual Support group closed a submission to parliament with the words: 
South Africa’s Constitution is among the most progressive in the world. We believe that our 
country could also be among the leading in the world when it comes to the legal acknowledgment 
of the rights and needs of trans and intersexed people. (as cited in Thoreson, 2013, pp. 657–658) 
Following the path of the women’s and the broader LGBT rights movement, human rights and democracy fea-
tured prominently in trans groups’ arguments. A trans activist’s submission to parliament illustrates this point: 
I am Simone Heradien, a post operative transsexual having had the triadic procedures which is real life 
experience, hormone therapy complemented with all the necessary and desired surgery to reassigning 
myself to the gender that I was born, during 1994 when the political term reconstruction and devel-
opment was the buzz word. I decided to follow suit (as cited in Thoreson, 2013, pp. 657–658). 
A human rights framing is particularly visible in the work of GDX that aims to ensure “that transgender 
struggles do not fall off the LGBTI and broader human rights agenda.” (Gender DynamiX, 2015) GDX pre-
sents its vision “to be a key role-player toward the realisation of all human rights of transgender and gender 
nonconforming people within and beyond the borders of South Africa”, and its mission as follows: “Using a 
human rights framework, Gender DynamiX undertakes to advance, promote and defend the rights of trans 
and gender nonconforming persons in South Africa, Africa and globally. “ (Gender DynamiX, 2015) 
Convincing specialised human rights institutions within the South African state that were created during 
democratisation (such as the SAHRC) of the need for protecting the human rights of trans people was 
perhaps the most important strategy of trans advocacy. This is because those human rights organisations 
had become strong supporters of the trans movement, which was in accordance with the general trend of 
international human rights discourse to reframe sexuality and gender as human rights issues in the 1990s. 
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Accordingly, this helped to push sexual rights policy onto the political agenda and tightened the rhetorical 
trap for politicians to vote for the passage of LGR policy subsequently. For example, SAHRC argued that 
its support for a change in LGR regulations was based “on the founding values of our democracy enshrined 
in our constitution of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedom” (Thoreson, 2013, p. 663). 
Discursive barriers to religious influence. Thus far, it has been shown how both the women’s 
and LGBT movements’ framings were a product of the dominant political-ideological climate of South 
Africa’s post transition context. At this point, it has been established how the international normative 
context of the time and the government’s constitutional identity construction worked in tandem to render 
the movements’ framing credible and their demands legitimate. But how did the ideological context shape 
the fate of those opposing permissive regulations of abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR?  
During the early 1990s, as sections of the women’s movement started to focus on reproductive rights, a 
strong pro-life lobby formed. In an effort to impede the inclusion of reproductive rights in the constitu-
tion, more than 20 anti-abortion groups organised under the National Alliance for Life, lobbying and 
holding demonstrations (Guttmacher et al., 1998, p. 193). Up to the last minute, they tried to prevent 
the reference to reproductive rights in the constitution’s final text. Christians for Truth, the Dutch Re-
formed Church, United Christian Action, and African Christian action, to name but a few, were among 
the organisations who filed submissions to the Constitutional Court arguing not to certify the constitu-
tional text, in hindsight correctly, fearing that this would open the door to a reform of the abortion law 
(Women’s Legal Centre & Reproductive Rights Alliance, 1996). 
Most religious organisations in South Africa opposed abortion. The DRC had also promulgated during 
apartheid that the white population must increase in order to maintain its supremacy and secure South 
Africa’s existence as a Christian Western country (Guttmacher et al., 1998, p. 192; Rebouche, 2011, 
p. 8). Apart from a general delegitimation of religious influence on public policy after democratisation, 
religious framings of abortion subsequently arose particular suspicion. The DRC’s mixture of religious 
and racist population control arguments had irrevocably entangled the abortion issue with race, and a 
continued ban of abortion was associated with the religio-racist policies of the apartheid state (Guttmacher 
et al., 1998, p. 192). 
This context provided the pro-choice and pro-life lobby with very different opportunity structures, lead-
ing to rapid, overwhelming success for the pro-choice lobby and a resounding defeat for those defending 
pro-life arguments. Considering that South Africa was and is a deeply conservative, religious and patriar-
chal society, it would be safe to say that without the unique window of opportunity provided by the tran-
sition context, abortion reform would not have been possible. 
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These differential opportunity structures faced by those pushing religious frames, vis-à-vis those employ-
ing a human rights frames, also applied to LGBT rights activism. As observed by (Vos, 2007, p. 442), “the 
prevailing political climate prohibited mainstream constitutional players from opposing the granting of 
rights to historically marginalised groups.” As a result, claims for equality were hard to ignore for politi-
cians. Moreover, remedying racial oppression was the primary concern of most parties at the time and 
LGBT rights were thus, “not a make or break issue for any political party, bar ACDP, and the statements 
by this party were so over the top that it alienated other political actors who might have had doubts” (ibid). 
This strongly reminds of the fate of religious arguments inserted into the debate in Argentina that, in the 
ignorance of a transformed political climate, seemed anachronistic and alienated those politicians who 
were still unsure of their position. 
How religious arguments were disqualified in debates in South Africa can be seen in the verdicts of courts 
when deciding on matters brought forward by the LGBT movement. When declaring the prohibition of 
male sodomy unconstitutional in 1998 (NCGLA vs Justice), the constitutional court argued that while the 
constitution protects the right of individuals to disagree or condemn homosexuality based on their reli-
gious views, the state ought not to endorse a particular belief system (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
1998, para 137). 
In the landmark case that paved the way for gay marriage policy (Fourie vs Home Affairs), South Africa’s 
history of religiously based state interference in the intimate relations of the population served as a justi-
fication to reject the validity of religious interventions. In counterarguments brought forward by religious 
groups that the definitional characteristic of marriage is procreation, the court countered that “[a]lthough 
this view might have some traction in the context of a particular religious world view, from a legal and 
constitutional point of view, the Court found, it could not hold “ (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
2005a) Additionally, the Court repudiated the argument of marriage being by its very nature a religious 
institution, and thus changing its definition would violate the right to religious freedom. Here the Court 
reasoned that in a democratic society, this argument is invalid: 
[T]he acknowledgement by the state of the right of same-sex couples to enjoy the same status, 
entitlements and responsibilities as marriage law accords to heterosexual couples is in no way 
inconsistent with the rights of religious organisations to continue to refuse to celebrate same-sex 
marriages. The constitutional claims of same-sex couples can accordingly not be negated by in-
voking the rights of believers to have their religious freedom respected. The two sets of interests 
involved do not collide, they co-exist in a constitutional realm based on accommodation of diver-
sity. (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005a) 
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A particular passage in the reason for judgement sums up the constitutional court’s position regarding reli-
gious claims to impede equal marriage rights: “The religious beliefs of some cannot be used to determine the 
constitutional rights of others.” And thus, the court argued, the view of the religious majority shall not im-
pede the human rights of a marginalised minority. That the court’s attitude is a direct consequence of the 
state/church ideological symbiosis during apartheid is illustrated by the fact that it mentions that, 
any endorsement by the State today of Christianity as a privileged religion not only disturbs the 
general principle of impartiality in relation to matters of belief and opinion, but also serves to 
activate memories of painful past discrimination and disadvantage based on religious affiliation. 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005a) 
 
Legal opportunity structures 
The women’s and LGBT rights movement in South Africa benefitted from making use of discursive op-
portunity structures and complemented this strategy, to varying degrees, with the exploitation of legal 
opportunity structures. The importance of strategic litigation for policy reform varies between the three 
policies observed in the previous section. While pivotal to achieve the legalisation of gay marriage, legal 
channels played only a minor role for LGR policy reform. When it came to abortion reform, the role of 
the court did not feature for the passage of the 1996 abortion law but favourable legal opportunity struc-
tures prevented reform opponents from reversing its legalisation, as courts defended the right to abortion 
on several occasions against legal challenges from conservative sectors of society. 
To ensure abortion law reforms, the women’s rights movement did not have to make use of the legal 
opportunity structures presented by the new constitution and the state’s international human rights com-
mitments, as the usage of discursive opportunity structures were highly effective in pushing for abortion 
rights on their own. Within two years of the first democratic elections and in the same year the final 
constitution was passed, abortion was legalised. The details of the legislative process will be discussed in 
the next chapter.  
Seeing the opportunity to reform abortion through the legislative process, activists chose to abstain from 
using courts to advance abortion rights as this “would avoid court interpretation of what a right to abortion 
included”, enabling the women’s movement to shape the drafting of the law (Rebouche, 2011). 
While legal opportunity structures did not play a part in the passage of abortion reform, they prevented 
the pro-life lobby from successfully challenging the permissive legislation once it was passed in 1996. One 
year after the passage of the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act, the Christian Lawyers Association 
challenged the constitutionality of the act in a court of law by claiming that it violated the constitutional 
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right to life of the foetus (Christian Lawyers Association v. Minister of Health). The high court denied 
their motion, arguing that the foetus is not a person in the legal sense until birth and noting women’s 
constitutional rights to reproductive decision making, thereby precluding future legal challenges of the 
Choice model (Albertyn, 2015, p. 441). 
Two further court challenges to specificities of the Act also failed (Feltham-King & Macleod, 2015, p. 12). 
Among them was another case by the Christian Lawyers Association against the state, objecting to the 
right of women under the age of 18 to make a decision regarding the termination of pregnancy without 
parental consent (Mhlanga, 2003, p. 122). In light of the rule, parliament passed the Choice on Termina-
tion of Pregnancy Amendment Act 2008. Against the interest of the claimant (the Catholic Lawyers asso-
ciation), the law was aimed at extending the pool of abortion service providers and advancing the desig-
nation of facilities in which terminations of pregnancies can be carried out. 
Far more central for the actual policy passage was the use of legal opportunity structures for the LGBT 
rights movement. Strategic litigation undoubtedly paved the way to marriage equality in South Africa. The 
first constitutional challenge (NCGLE v Justice), issued by the NCGLE and the Human Rights Commis-
sion, was focused on the prohibition of male sodomy that was still in place as one of the last legal vestiges 
of apartheid. The case was won as the court found that the state may not impose a particular belief system 
such as religious views on the whole of society. The court argued that while the constitution protects the 
right of individuals to disagree or condemn homosexuality based on their religious beliefs, the state ought 
not to endorse a particular belief system (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1998, para 137). This 
judgement laid the foundation for the second constitutional challenge presented by the coalition that 
would deal with same-sex partnership rights. Subsequent successful challenges focused on adoption and 
pension rights of same-sex couples.  
The jurisprudence that successively developed in those less controversial cases left little room for the court 
when the NCGLE fought its greatest battle yet; the case of Fourie vs Home Affairs. In its judgement, the 
constitutional court declared the common law definition of marriage of a union between a man and a 
woman to be invalid and the Marriage Act referring to husband and wife as unconstitutional. The court 
explicitly referred to the DRC-inspired Immorality Act that outlawed sexual contact and marriage be-
tween black and white people, noting that the constitution must be read as a remedy to such discriminatory 
provision of the past. The history of religiously based state interference in the intimate relations of the 
population served as the justification for a secular interpretation of South Africa’s human rights commit-
ments (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2005a). 
The judgement required parliament to pass new legislation within a year to remedy the unconstitutionality 
of the marriage act that would grant same-sex couples the same rights and status enjoyed by heterosexual 
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couples. If parliament failed to do so, the existing marriage act would automatically be amended to include 
same-sex couples. This demonstrates how few options there were for legislators, other than proceeding 
along the path towards permissiveness. 
Without the backing of successive legal rulings, it is unlikely that parliament would have legalised gay 
marriage in light of the widespread opposing views in the population. As noted by Thoreson (2008): 
From the earliest days of the post-apartheid era, the movement recognised that coherent, principled 
rhetoric rather than the support of the masses was the key to success. The reliance on legal battles 
was not wholly a matter of choice; the movement’s lobbyists acknowledged from the outset that 
they could ‘not win by counting numbers in any straw poll’ and that their agenda was ‘one of prin-
ciple and [they needed] to constantly position it in that way’. Compared with other post-apartheid 
movements, the GLB movement has been especially effective at mobilising ideological and organi-
sational resources in the judicial and parliamentary arenas (…). (Thoreson, 2008, pp. 685–686) 
Strategic litigation also played a role for LGR policy passage. Indirectly, the litigation brought forward by 
the broader LGBT movement reinforced the human rights framing adopted by the latter forming more 
specialised trans interest groups. For instance, in the case National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v. Minister of Justice, the court clarified that the constitutional protection for sexual orientation includes 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and trans persons (Thoreson, 2013, p. 651). Secondly, litigation was important in 
bringing LGR onto the political agenda. However, in stark contrast to gay marriage, litigation became 
irrelevant in later stages of the policy process.  
While far less publicised, the LGR bill also entered the parliamentary arena in 2003 largely due to litigation 
against the Department of Home Affairs (Deyi et al., n.d., p. 12). The paradoxical legal situation for trans 
people not being allowed to change their legal gender anymore prompted legal conflicts between the 
Department of Home Affairs and individuals, who were at the time not yet acting collectively as a move-
ment. The Department had received a report of the South African Law Commission as early as 1995, 
suggesting to create a legal framework for gender recognition. However, the project languished with the 
Department for 7 years, only to be reintroduced in 2003 so that the Department would not have to deal 
with the increasing number of court cases against it (Vundla, 2003). The reintroduction of the bill cata-
lysed the formation and mobilisation of the trans rights movement. The emerging specialised trans rights 
groups then successfully intervened in the policy formulation by exploiting discursive opportunity struc-
tures, most notably by employing a human rights frame that enabled an alliance with human rights bodies 
within the state. 
 
 
- 156 - 
6.3 Discussion 
In this chapter we have focused on the interaction between various opportunity structures and the success 
of movement stakeholders in abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR policy to frame their issues as in need 
of a solution within the political system. The theoretical mechanism posited that the new constitutional 
identities of South Africa and Argentina create favourable opportunity structures for stakeholders to make 
use of the framing and language of human rights. In light of the secular interpretation of human rights by 
the post-authoritarian states as a response to the repressive state/church symbioses of the past, we have 
hypothesised this to have been a far more successful undertaking for social movements to advance their ob-
jectives for equality and non-discrimination than for institutionalised religion and associated organisations. 
As a first test for the existence of the mechanism, we have reviewed the framings of the social movements 
involved in the policy processes. In a remarkably similar fashion, the LGBT rights movements in South 
Africa and Argentina (as well as more specialised trans groups and the women’s movement in South Africa) 
have framed the legislative status quo as a violation of human rights and inclusive policy change as essential 
for both countries to portray the kind of democracy the government had espoused. In both South Africa 
and Argentina, social movements challenged the democratic identities of the government if their rights 
were not to be granted. Examples of these include the CHA in Argentina arguing that, “With Discrimina-
tion and Repression There Is No Democracy” and the South African women’s rights movement and the 
LGBT rights movement asserting that, “None Will Be Free Until All Are Free.” 
As an exception to the generally successful human rights framings by social movements in both countries 
stands the women’s rights movement in Argentina that, despite its use of human rights framing compara-
tively late employed various other frames, with public health being the most prominent. As Tarrow (1992) 
asserts, frames are flexible and groups adjust them according to the specific opportunities available to 
them. Frames contain specific metaphors and symbolic representations to cast issues in a specific light and 
serve the purpose of convincing others to support the group’s claims. Thus, the contrasting framing of 
Argentina’s abortion lobby must be regarded as a product of different opportunity structures faced by the 
women’s rights movement in Argentina compared to the other groups. This difference in opportunity 
structures was founded on the focus of motherhood and the rights of children in the Argentine human 
rights movement, and the failure to politicise abortion was thus not contributable to church success but 
the specificities of the Argentine human rights discourse that has its roots in the dictatorship.  
Apart from this exception, the frames employed by social movements to advance their claims regarding 
sexual rights policy were remarkably similar, despite the geographical distance of the two continents, 
different cultures and languages. Overall, similar strategies and framings by social movements in both 
countries suggest the presence of a common causal mechanism being at work, or more specifically, the 
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presence of similarly conducive discursive opportunity structures. However, as argued in chapter 3, glob-
alisation and transnationalisation of social movements could also affect framing strategies and therefore, 
having found human rights and democracy frames can only slightly increase our confidence in a common 
mechanism; or in process tracing language, these findings only constitute the passage of a hoop test. 
Another consideration for the certainty of the presence of a common causal mechanism (and what strongly 
suggests a causal link between the previous parts of the mechanism and the social movement activities and 
successes reviewed in this chapter) is the overwhelming support from human rights organisations and 
institutions received by social movements. In Argentina, highly respected human rights organisations ac-
tively supported the LGBT movement, such as by signing petitions for same-sex marriage. This support 
validated the movement’s claims and lent great credibility to the human rights framing, raising the discur-
sive leverage of a minority movement, which is in essence what the LGBT rights movement represents. 
In South Africa, human rights organisations even became part of the coalitions that cemented sexual rights 
onto the political agenda. 
Furthermore, independent state bodies created for the protection of human rights supported the social 
movements in both countries. This is true for INADI in Argentina and SAHRC in South Africa. As an exam-
ple, SAHRC made public statements about the lack of LGR policy in South Africa being akin to human rights 
violations and subsequently became a co-claimant in strategic litigation cases by the LGBT movement. INADI 
in Argentina intervened in the debate explaining that a partnership regime would amount to discrimination 
and only by legalising gay marriage would the human rights violations faced by gay couples be remedied. 
The support by human rights organisations in civil society and independent human rights bodies within 
the state presents smoking gun type evidence for the focus on secularly interpreted human rights in the 
constitutional identity forming conducive opportunity structures for movement action. In a context in 
which human rights and religion were not as separated as in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina, 
a human rights framing of sexual rights would not have been created and reinforced so willingly by state 
institutions and civil society. Rather, the overwhelming support can only be explained by the movements’ 
framing complementing the meta-narratives of democratisation and constitutionally protected human 
rights that prevailed in political discourses of South Africa and Argentina after the regime transition. 
Were it not for South Africa’s unbreakable commitment to human rights through the passage of the new 
constitution and the creation of independent monitoring bodies such as the Human Rights Commission, 
social movements would not have had the material to build successful discursive and legal traps set for 
politicians and parties. In hindsight, this led to the politicisation of issues that most politicians would not 
have otherwise dealt with. Likewise, in Argentina, without the split between human rights groups and the 
Catholic Church, with the former forming in response to the lack of church support for the victims of 
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oppression in Argentina’s dictatorship, the Argentine human rights movement would not have been able 
to demonstrate as much strength and resilience nor been as willing to embrace a secular interpretation of 
human rights that included LGBT rights. Rather, the alliance between the human rights movement and 
the LGBT movement was an easy fit in Argentina because both were united by a common history of 
religiously legitimated oppression. The constitutional identities provided fruitful discursive grounds for 
these alliances to plant the seeds for policy change. 
For the presence and successful exploitation of legal opportunity structures, court decisions in the move-
ments’ favour as products of strategic litigation provide smoking gun type evidence. Gay marriage is the 
prime example of legal means employed by social movements in both countries. Without the legal basis 
in the form of constitutions and international human rights commitments, engaging with courts would not 
have proven as advantageous for movement actors. Thus, their successful judicial battles count as evidence 
for conducive legal opportunity structures. 
Apart from the human rights framing by interest groups and the way this resonated with the broader civil 
society and independent human rights bodies within the state, the final piece of evidence is the way in 
which religious arguments were dismissed from the debates by challenging churches’ moral authority. In 
Argentina, the LGBT rights movement was almost as focused on exposing the church’s past and present 
immoral behaviour as it was in lobbying for its actual cause. There were many cases of abuse scandals of 
Bishops featured on their websites and alliances with civil society organisations who lobbied for separation 
of church and state, all the while continuously underlining the moral shortcomings of the church during 
the dictatorship. In verdicts for judgements given by Argentine and South African judges in relevant court 
cases, judges explicitly dismissed religious arguments as inappropriate for a democracy, and occasionally 
even referenced the immoral influence churches have exerted in the past. 
For example, a court in Buenos Aires rejected the influence of the Catholic Church on same-sex marriage, 
arguing that, “the civil sphere is different and independent of the religious, (…) [this belongs to the] funda-
mental principles of the constitutional democracy” (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, 
2009, my translation). On another occasion, an Argentine court ruled that “the National Constitution pro-
tects the freedom of all the inhabitants of the Nation who do not profess the Catholic creed, to conceive their 
marital relations differently than those established by that particular religion.“ (Poder Judicial de la Ciudad 
Autónoma de Buenos Aires, 2010). In South Africa, the constitutional court rejected religious influence on 
marriage by stating that, “[a]lthough this view might have some traction in the context of a particular religious 
world view, from a legal and constitutional point of view, the Court found, it could not hold “ (de Vos 
2007:456). As the quotes preceding the introduction of this chapter illustrate, courts in both countries found 
that in a democracy, religious sentiments of some never justify limiting the rights of others. 
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Perhaps the clearest empirical traces left behind by the causal mechanism reveal that the discursive and 
legal opportunity structures merged to impose barriers to religious influence and foster the causes of social 
movements, and not just despite but precisely because of the dominance of churches in national identity 
and moral matters of the recent past. 
In summary, there is sufficient evidence to conclude beyond reasonable doubt the constitutional identities 
that emerged in the post-authoritarian context provided a set of opportunity structures conducive for 
actors who could frame their claims as human rights issues, and that such human rights claims were gen-
erally easier to formulate for social movements than for institutionalised religion and associated organisa-
tions. We have observed a close mirroring of the symbols and language employed by social movements of 
the specific constitutional identity constructions of the democratic government. The case of abortion in 
Argentina underlines, rather than challenges this point. While generally social movements in both coun-
tries feature strikingly similar characteristics in terms of logic of argument and strategy, the way in which 
the framing battles played out also reflect specificities of each national context. While the focus on human 
rights and equality was particular prominent in South Africa due to the racial inequalities of the past, a 
unique feature of the Argentine human rights discourse prevented a human rights frame of abortion to 
become dominant in Argentina. On the other hand, the focus on children and identity in Argentina was 
an important opportunity for trans activism as their claims for the recognition of identity resonated with 
the broader human rights discourse. 
The association with the past regimes disqualified religious institutions and arguments based on religious 
dogma from shaping the political discourse on sexual rights policies in Argentina and South Africa. As we 
will see in the following chapter, viewed through the lens of secularly interpreted human rights, rather 
than from a religious standpoint, policy makers responded to demands for sexual rights with passing per-
missive bills directly drafted by the social movements themselves. 
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7 Mechanism Part 3. Parties and Politicians face  
Rhetorical Entrapment  
 
 “What an important evening for the history of human rights in Argentina and probably the 
region!”  
(MP Alonso in the final debate on the LGR bill, Chamber of Deputies Parliament of 
Argentina, 2011, my translation) 
“[E]very constitutional expert that we have met in the committee agrees with us that there is no 
getting away from the rights of these individuals because it’s entrenched in the Constitution. 
You cannot run away. It’s something that is given and it’s something that we have to live with. 
So obviously, you gave it; you were part of the constitution-making process (…). When we 
adopted that Constitution, all of us stood there – there is a nice picture outside, showing that 
you are there – confirming that we will respect and uphold the supreme law of the country 
which is the Constitution.”  
(MP Chauke in final debate on same-sex marriage bill, South African Hansard for 14 
November, 2006) 
 
The framing and strategy employed by social movements to push for their claims in post-authoritarian 
South Africa and Argentina resulted in a rhetorical and sometimes also legal, trap for policy makers. 
Framed as a human rights issue and often claimed in courts, it was almost impossible for political parties 
and politicians to oppose the passage of more permissive abortion, same-sex partnership and LGR policies 
without undermining the credibility of their commitment to each of their nascent democracy’s post-au-
thoritarian values. Transforming a necessity into a virtue, politicians even began using support for social 
movements’ policy demands as a means of affirming their own commitment to newly emerging constitu-
tional identities. 
The theoretical proposition of this final part of the mechanism is as follows: the demands of social move-
ments are increasingly supported by individual politicians and parties because the movements’ framings 
resonate with the constitutional identities which have formed as a response to the previous authoritarian 
regimes and their alliance structures. While in previous chapters we have explored the ways in which 
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these democratic identities were constructed by the political elite and with the strategies of social move-
ments making their case on the basis of the opportunities presented to them, this chapter examines the 
parliamentary arena as the final link that leads to policy output. 
As we shall see, despite large sections of South Africa’s and Argentina’s population and many politicians 
privately opposing policy reforms, political actors and organisations started to publicly ally with the social 
movements. Across the spectrum in both countries the collaboration with social movement actors led to 
the introduction of bills into parliament that were often drafted by organisations within the movements 
themselves. The framing, as well as constitutional court decisions on these issues, limited the space for 
appropriate policy design, leaving little choice for politicians but to conform to the far-reaching demands 
of social movements, rather than opting for less permissive regulations. 
In an attempt to reconcile the permissive sexual rights bills with their own religious beliefs (as well as 
those of a large portion of the population), politicians stressed that the secular character of the state is that 
which must be separate from the influence of privately held religious beliefs. Somewhat ironically, political 
support for the policies turned into an homage to the new democracy, despite the oppositional stance of 
certain demographics. As an example in Argentina, politicians argued the legalisation of gay marriage helps 
to deepen democracy because it protects the rights of a minority from a hostile majority. In South Africa, 
the minister of defence contended that gay marriage makes society more democratic and tolerant. In both 
contexts, politicians argued that granting the demands of the social movements was a logical step in the 
wake of new constitutions and international human rights commitments.  
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7.1 Sexual Rights as an Affirmation of Argentine Democracy 
On the 5th of May 2010, following months of debate, media coverage and an extended session in the 
National Congress watched by the whole country, same-sex marriage was legalised in Argentina. Shortly 
afterward, the gender identity law was passed on the 9th of May 2012. Less successful was a bill on the 
voluntary interruption of pregnancy that was presented to the Chamber of Deputies on four occasions 
(2007, 2010, 2012, 2014). Even though the bill was discussed in the parliament’s commission of penal 
legislation more than once, as well as gaining increasing support from legislators, it never reached suffi-
cient support to be passed on to the plenary (Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 29). 
The successful passage of the same-sex marriage and gender identity bills as well as several unsuccessful 
attempts to legalise abortion took place during the presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who 
was leading the governing party Frente para la Victoria (FpV). The FpV was formally a faction of the PJ, i.e. 
the Peronist Party). The FpV was first led by Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007), followed by his wife Cristina 
from 2007 to 2011 in her first term and from 2011 to 2015 in her second term as president. 
As mentioned in chapter two, Peronism cannot be classified on a left/right axis, but rather straddles a 
multitude of ideological positions, including leftist, right-wing and conservative stances united by a pop-
ulist leader cult. The Kirchners are considered to belong to the progressive wing of Peronism (Tabbush et 
al., 2016, p. 27). Argentina has a presidential political system which grants a high importance the policy 
position of the president. Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner supported the same-sex marriage and gender 
identity bills while publicly opposing abortion. 
The party system is an eroded two-party system and does not include any religious parties. The national 
legislature consists of a bicameral congress: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the latter represent-
ing the various states that make up the Federal Republic. Both same-sex marriage and LGR policies needed 
the approval of both chambers to become national law. 
Until 2009, the governing bloc FpV had a majority in both chambers. Gay marriage and LGR, however, 
were legalised after mid-term elections in June 2009, during which the FpV had lost its parliamentary ma-
jority. Five months later, the same-sex marriage law was the first to reach quorum in parliament, in a situa-
tion of legislative deadlock. According to Hiller (2011, p. 137), this resulted in an interest shared by all 
parties to demonstrate a functioning parliament through the successful passage of the bill. Both of the policies 
advocated by the LGBT movement were voted according to the individual conscience of the legislators, 
freeing the vote from party discipline and reducing the influence of party ideology on the policy processes. 
The strategic framing of the LGBT rights movement, which involved presenting their claims as human 
rights issues, gave the movement enormous discursive leverage as it elevated the lack of LGBT rights from 
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a problem affecting a small subsection of the population to a problem of Argentine democracy as a whole. 
As analysed in the preceding chapter, the women’s rights movement faced less favourable opportunity 
structures and subsequently introduced comparatively less clear problem frames into the debate. The dif-
ferentiated opportunity structures for the two movements resulted in wholly different reactions by legis-
lators. While the human rights frame of the LGBT rights movement was difficult to resist for politicians, 
the human rights frame of abortion opponents had the same effect, but rather to the disadvantage of the 
women’s rights movement’s claims. 
 
Same-sex marriage 
The LGBT movement’s strategic framing of their claims as human rights issues led to its acceptance in the 
mainstream political system. For instance, when celebrating the 58th anniversary of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights in 2008, the Argentine parliament invited various representatives from human 
rights organisations. On that occasion, the CHA was recognised, together with individual human rights 
activists such as Estrela Carlotta from the Abuelas for their “struggle for the full validity of human rights” 
(Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, n.d.b). 
This explicit recognition of LGBT rights as human rights by the political system created a rhetorical trap 
for politicians when the topic of gay marriage arrived on the scene , since opposing the bill would now 
equate to opposing human rights; a conundrum for elected officials considering the oppositional stance of 
a great portion of the electorate. The Amparo strategy of the LGBT rights movement successfully created 
a legal trap in addition to the rhetorical. On the 12th of November 2009, the first judicial case in favour of 
two men wanting to marry was decided. The court decision reinforced the movement’s human rights 
framing and presented the issue as a problem that needed to be resolved by the state.  
None of the political parties had included the legalisation of gay marriage in their party agendas or manifestos, and 
neither the LGBT rights movement nor the Catholic Church had a natural ally among the strong parties represented 
in parliament. As a result, the LGBT movement focused on convincing individual politicians rather than parties as a 
whole. The first step was to identify potential allies by sending out questionnaires to MPs. An activist recalls: 
When we started to call the offices of MPs about a questionnaire we had sent out on gay marriage and 
gender change, the majority told us: ‘But this topic is not on the agenda, this topic is not even treated in 
commissions. The delegate does not have a formed opinion.’ And then we thought, ‘well, apparently 
there is the concrete necessity to put this on the agenda because until this is not put on the agenda, no 
one defines their vote.’ (activist Esteban Paulón as cited in Hiller, 2011, p. 141, my translation) 
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Eventually, the issue did enter the parliamentary agenda through individual politicians across the political 
spectrum collaborating with the LGBT movement. The bill that would change the civil code was intro-
duced by delegate Vilma Ibarra, member of the political party Nuevo Encuentro, in 2009. Activists inter-
viewed by Tabbush et al. (2016, p. 33) asserted that Ibarra’s office transformed into a space of action for 
the FALGBT. The LGBT movement had strategically lobbied legislators so that the presidents of both 
relevant parliamentary commissions - Vilma Ibarra heading the Commission of General Legislation 
[Comision de Legislación General] and Claudia Rucci (Peronismo Federal) heading the Commission of Family, 
Childhood and Adolescence [Comision de Familia, Nines y Adolescencia] - followed a concerted approach to 
include the issue in the parliamentary arena (Hiller, 2011, p. 115; Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 33).  
While in 2009 the bill on same-sex marriage did not yet receive the necessary support in the relevant 
parliamentary commissions, an interparty alliance in support of the bill started to form in early 2010. 
During a February 2010 press conference, legislators from various parties made known their intention to 
vote in favour of the bill, some of them speaking as representatives of their party or coalition (Proyecto Sur; 
Solidaridad e Igualdad; Socialismo), while others spoke on their personal account, such as MP Adrian Perez 
of the Coalicion Civica (Hiller, 2011, p. 136). 
On the 4th of May 2010, the two relevant commissions then passed on the proposed bill to parliament, 
where it was discussed one day later in Congress. By the time the bill reached Congress, five homosexual 
couples were already legally married due to the Amparo strategy of the LGBT rights movement. Each of 
these weddings was covered by national media in great spectacle. 
INADI used its political clout to fight off propositions for a partnership regime in order for gay marriage 
to be legalised rather than a regime with fewer rights. During a press conference, INADI declared that a 
partnership regime, "proposes distinctions that are repugnant to the constitutional prohibition of discrim-
ination”, and therefore gay marriage constituted the only suitable measure to establish equality and end 
discrimination. Furthermore, the director of INADI claimed a partnership regime to be comparable to 
apartheid in South Africa creating separateness, which is never free from discrimination (Vallejos, 2010). 
Such involvement in the debate by a government institute reinforced the movement’s human rights framing. 
Overall, politicians were facing the accumulated pressures of: 
- state institutions (such as INADI) calling for the legalisation of gay marriage 
- the now highly respected human rights movement supporting the LGBT rights movement’s de-
mands (73 human rights organisations in total supported the gay marriage bill) 
- substantial media attention on cases of gay couples who already got married 
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- court rulings, such as the one by judge Gabriela Seijas in 2009, declaring the denial of marriage 
rights for homosexual couples in the Civil Code unconstitutional and stressing that the religious 
sentiments of some cannot delimit the constitutional rights of others. 
That means that additionally to the LGBT movement explicitly calling for marriage rights and rejecting a part-
nership regime, it became increasingly difficult for politicians to oppose the marriage bill while at the same time 
credibly upholding their commitment to constitutionally protected human rights and the interpretation of these 
by the judiciary. Especially since the political system had already acknowledged the contributions by the LGBT 
rights movement to the advancement of human rights in Argentina, they faced rhetorical entrapment as appo-
sition to granting marriage rights would have meant opposing human rights and constitutional values.  
Politicians were free to decide how to vote according to their conscience as parties did not call to vote en 
bloque. While parties were hesitant to carry the political costs of supporting gay marriage, the rhetorical 
entrapment faced by politicians led increasingly more MPs to embrace the human rights frame of the 
LGBT rights movement and openly favour the most permissive option of granting marriage rights to same-
sex couples. Relatively late down the line, also the president had begun to personally endorse the project, 
which, as indicated earlier in this chapter, lends considerable clout to a proposed bill in Argentina’s pres-
idential system (Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 34). Activist Maria Rachid explains the free vote with political 
parties attempting to shirk direct responsibility for the legalisation, fearing electoral consequences: 
In that moment liberty of conscience was given. Because there was a political decision that it was 
possible that the project would advance but they did not want to take responsibility as a political 
organisation. (…) Political organisations knew that giving liberty of conscience would advance the 
project. What they didn’t want were the costs. (as quoted in Hiller, 2011, p. 139, my translation) 
Other than parties as a whole, individual politicians started to collaborate closely with the LGBT rights 
movement, affirming their support for the LGBT movement’s demands publicly and being the guiding 
voices when the marriage bill was presented for vote in the Congress and Senate. The final debates on the 
bill that took place in both parliamentary chambers are revealing in two respects. First, they show a close 
cooperation between MPs and the LGBT rights movement. Second, they illuminate how MPs reconciled 
their own, as well as the population’s religious convictions, with legalising gay marriage. 
Regarding the former point, it is telling that most MPs used exactly the same framing that the LGBT rights move-
ment had carefully crafted in the years leading up to the debate. Thus, MPs posited that Argentina must protect 
the human rights of LGBT people because the constitution and international human rights commitments demand 
it. Like most of the delegates speaking after her, Vilma Ibarra explained in the opening statement of the debate in 
the chamber of deputies that: 
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There is an interdiction, a prohibition of our Constitution and international treaties, in the sense 
that you cannot discriminate, differentiate or distinguish based on sexual orientation. (Chamber 
of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2010, my translation) 
Regarding religion, Ibarra reminded the house that: 
[F]irst we want to state that what we are dealing with today is the modification of civil laws in a 
secular state. We are not addressing, nor could we do it, the marriage of the different religions. 
We do not address Catholic marriage, we do not address the marriage of the Jewish religion, we 
do not address the marriage of Muslims. I repeat: we are dealing with civil laws in a secular state. 
Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2010, my translation) 
This shows how religion was relegated to the private sphere by politicians. Embedded in a secular consti-
tutional identity, the framing of human rights was embraced by politicians and religious frames explicitly 
rejected. Another MP argued: 
The religious should not be part of our debate. But it is valid to remember that there exists in 
Argentina an explicit division between Church and State. Although article 2 of our National Con-
stitution recognises the apostolic Roman Catholic cult, it is not a state religion and not everyone 
should profess it. There is no kind of moral union between the constitutional state of law and the 
Catholic religion that allows the contents of said religion to be transferred to civil society in terms 
of the regulation of rights (…). 
(Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2010, my translation) 
These are examples of how the vote in favour of the bill was justified with a clear distinction between 
institutionalised religion and the state, the former pertaining to the private sphere and the latter to the 
public. This moral divorce of state and church also becomes clear in the many contributions by MPs, who 
did not let their privately held religious beliefs interfere with their commitment to secularly derived prin-
ciples while voting. As an example stands the following quote by an MP: 
I am a fanatic of the Virgin [Mary], but my religious convictions do not impede looking at this 
topic from the point of view of natural law, because I am also a man of law. In positive law I have 
not found a single argument that would tell me that we cannot grant rights to a minority that 
deserves it. (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2010, my translation) 
The framing of affording human rights to a minority legitimised the passage of gay marriage, despite op-
position in the population and relegating religion to the private sphere justified the granting of rights as 
demanded by the secular constitutional identity of the state. Resultantly, after a 12-hour marathon debate, 
the bill was approved in the National Congress on the 5th of May 2010 with 126 votes in favour, 110 
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opposing votes and few abstentions. Few parties with five or more seats in Congress (86% of the lower 
chamber) voted uniformly on the issue. Those who did were the Movimiento Proyecto Sur (5 seats, all in 
favour), the Partido Socialista (6 seats, all in favour) and a sub-party of Peronism, the Partido Peronista (6 
seats, all against). All the larger parties split the vote on the issue; the governing FpV with 54% of delegates 
supporting the bill and the UCR with 53% of delegates against (Hiller, 2011, p. 138). 
The following month, the bill was discussed in the Senate. The debate went on for many hours, starting 
on the 14th of July 2010 concluding with a vote at 4am the next morning. Most of the 66 senators present 
made use of their right to speak. The high level of engagement by legislators was due to the eyes of the 
country watching them during those hours. The debate was televised by various channels that cleared their 
schedule to accommodate the live event, some merely covering the proceedings while others broadcast 
the whole debate live. Outside of the Congress building, opponents of the reform demonstrated and the 
LGBT movement organised smaller events throughout the capital. The Senate ended up approving the bill 
with 33 votes in favour, 27 against and three abstentions. Again, support for and opposition to the bill cut 
across party lines. 
Two days after the approbation of the law in both chambers, MP Cynthia Hotton presented a call for a 
referendum on the issue. Considering the large part of the population, especially outside of Buenos Aires, 
against the bill, a referendum could have well stopped the passage of the same-sex marriage bill. This 
initiative, however, was only supported by around 20 members of both legislative chambers and was 
therefore discarded (Hiller, 2011, p. 162). Corrales and Pecheny (2010) find in the circumvention of the 
referendum one of the most important victories of the LGBT rights movement. 
That the issue was perceived as a human right of a minority is what led politicians to object to calling for 
a referendum. President Cristina Fernandez made known her support for the bill and her opposition to a 
referendum by publicly stating that she was concerned about the religious tone of the debate, and that 
those who call for a plebiscite do not take into account that it would be a plebiscite on a minority right. 
She further stated that: 
What the regulation targets is something that society already has. And I think it's fair. It is fair to recognise 
that right of minorities. And I think that a terrible distortion of democracy would be that the majority in 
the exercise of these majorities denied rights to minorities (...). We are talking about whether we are 
going to be a society that recognises minority rights. This is the issue (La Nacion, 2010, my translation) 
Regarded as the human right of a minority, this helped to democratically justify the legalisation of same-
sex marriage. One day after the passage of the bill, the president received LGBT rights organisations in 
the Casa Rosada for the first time in Argentine history (Hiller, 2011, p. 164). As a symbolic act, the state 
embraced LGBT rights as part of the country’s democratic identity. Since then, LGBT rights are a source 
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of pride for Argentine politicians and serve as a discursive reaffirmation of the constitutional identity as a 
modern human rights abiding democracy. When LGR policy was passed two years later on, MP Augustin 
Rossi referred back to the gay marriage decision: 
[F]or all of us this law on equal marriage has in itself a transcendental value. I believe that with it, 
we have clearly put Argentina in the midst of the most democratic, tolerant and inclusive societies. 
For us it has also a special symbolic value. (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2011) 
This transcendental meaning of permissive LGBT rights would ensure the passing of the most permissive 
LGR policy in the world just two years after the gay marriage bill was signed into law. 
 
Legal gender recognition 
While the LGBT rights movement experienced rather similar opportunity structures when pushing for gay mar-
riage and gender identity laws, advocating for the latter was a considerably smoother process due to the former 
having been passed shortly beforehand. Since the battle of frames was already decided during the policy process 
of same-sex marriage and the legislative decisions taken had officially affirmed state responsibility to redefine 
LGBT issues as belonging to human rights, the political discourse on LGR became far less polarised. The bill, 
according to activists and legislators, “passed like a rocket” [salió como por un tubo] (Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 35). 
The bill was first introduced to parliament by a multiparty coalition of delegates who worked closely with 
the LGBT rights movement. In 2009, this handful of early collaborators from across the political spectrum 
presented the gender identity bill to parliament by highlighting that the status quo continues to violate 
human rights. The text for the bill was drafted in collaboration with the Frente Nacional por la Ley de Iden-
tidad de Género (which included the CHA, the Asociación de Lucha por la Identidad Travesti y Transexual (ALITT) 
and other organisations and individuals). At this first introduction to parliament, the bill was described to: 
Promote the respect, the protection and the exercise of the human rights of the persons discrim-
inated against on the grounds of gender identity, transsexuals, transvestites, transgender. (Cham-
ber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2009, my translation) 
The close collaboration between politicians and the LGBT movement becomes visible in the fact that 
organisations from the LGBT movement virtually authored the LGR bill, and also in the numerous itera-
tions of politicians indicating the great importance of the LGBT movement in advancing the issue. The 
MPs who authored the original bill introduced to parliament observed: 
All the advances related to the human rights of trans persons, be it in public policy or legislation, 
were realised due to the active participation, activism and mobilisation of the social organisations 
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of these persons. (…) outstanding is the permanent work of the FALGBT that has already given 
impulse to legislative measures such as the law on marriage, which guarantees that families formed 
of same-sex couples have the absolute same conditions than heterosexual couples and the present 
bill on gender identity. (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2009, my translation) 
As gay marriage before it, the gender identity bill was supported by an alliance of individual MPs across 
party lines. Similarly to the policy process for the marriage reform, court decisions during the legislative 
process provided an added sense of legitimacy to the LGBT movement’s demands. On the 2nd of December 
of 2010, in the midst of the legislative process, the first trans person in Argentina (and Latin America) 
received her new national identity document (DNI) without undergoing sex reassignment surgery before-
hand. As a point of affirmation of the new mainstream political appropriation of LGBT rights, Tania Luna 
was given her new DNI at a salon in the Congress building. César Cigliutti, president of the CHA, cele-
brated handing over the document. Just 10 days later, trans actress Florencia de la V. was handed her new 
identity document by Florencio Randazzo, Argentina’s interior minister at the time. 
After reaching the necessary quorum in the two relevant commissions (the Commission of General Leg-
islation as during the passage of gay marriage, still led by Vilma Ibarra of the party Nuevo Encuentro; and 
the Commission of Justice [Comisión de Justicia], led by Juan Pedro Tunessi of the UCR) on the 8th of 
November 2011, the CHA approached the presidents of all political parties represented in Congress, lob-
bying for an affirmative vote in the upcoming session (Comunidad Homosexual Argentina, n.d.e). 
As in the case for gay marriage, parties did not demand delegates to vote en bloque. From the 30th of 
November and until 1st of December 2011, the debate that took place in Congress reveals high levels of 
support for the bill from across the bench. Vilma Ibarra opened the debate by thanking “the social organ-
isations of sexual diversity, especially activists from the trans community for all their years of work, to-
gether with deputies, to reach the recognition of their rights.” (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Ar-
gentina, 2011, my translation) 
She proceeded to outline both human rights in the constitution as well as Argentina’s international 
human rights commitments which demand the passage of the bill:  
I want to start defending this majority vote [in favour of the bill in the committee sessions] and 
affirm that we are asking the vote to pass a project of law that would permit trans persons to 
develop their own life plan according to their gender identity and that respects their dignity, as 
article 19 of our constitution establishes as well as the international human rights treaties that are 
part of our constitutional text. (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2011, my translation) 
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Considering the support for secular interpretations of human rights and international documents such as the 
Yogyakarta principles, Ibarra was given ample room to justify the permissiveness of the proposed legislation: 
The difference between sex and gender is not new. It was recognised in numerous cases and the 
Yogyakarta Principles of 2006 (…) which we, who work on these issues, use as a basis. (Chamber 
of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2011, my translation) 
Moreover, in underlining the legitimacy of her point, Ibarra mentioned that the Assembly of the Organi-
sation of American states [Asamblea de la Organization de los Estados Americanos] has recognised the right to 
gender identity and reminded the present politicians that Argentina “together with 65 nations, has signed 
and presented to the Assembly of the United Nations documents against discrimination, violence and vi-
olation of human rights, including the necessity to remove all types of obstacles in the issue of gender 
identity.“ (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2011, my translation) 
MP Juliana Di Tullio also began her speech by underlining the fundamental role played by the CHA, 
FALGBT and ALITT in drafting the bill. She also explained that these organisations, through their constant 
battles, have “convinced all of us of the necessity to advance in this direction.” The way in which Di Tullio’s 
speech proceeded illustrates how the LGBT rights movement’s framing produced a situation in which 
opposing the bill was akin to opposing Argentina’s constitutional identity, something which no democratic 
party could afford: 
My party, the Unión Cívica Radical, could not oppose a legislation of this kind because it defends 
the National Constitution. It is not a graceful concession because it suffices to read article 19 of 
the National Constitution to recognise the existence of the right that persons have to autonomy 
of their will, equality and non-discrimination. 
A political party like ours has always defended the spirit and the word of the National Constitu-
tion, and would never oppose to consecrate minority rights to equality, diversity, for their auto-
determination and the possibility to share a more just and equilibrated society (Chamber of Dep-
uties Parliament of Argentina, 2011, my translation) 
It is not only that the LGBT movement’s framing had created a rhetorical trap that motivated support by 
politicians, but that the framing also rapidly escalated the issue’s importance from a minor problem con-
cerning a fraction of the population to a matter touching upon the very foundations of the new Argentine 
democracy. A statement by MP Miguel Angel Barrios demonstrates this point:  
[T]oday we are not only reconstituting the right to identity to the collective of trans persons but we 
are also passing a law that deepens, strengthens and widens our young democracy by spelling out the 
rights of an excluded minority. (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2011, my translation) 
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Furthermore, MP Paula Cecilia Merchan began her speech by claiming that the political consensus regarding 
the law “speaks of the clear advances that Argentine society is making in all territories related to equality, liberty 
and auto-determination of persons.” (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 2011, my translation)  
As we have explored in the first section of the mechanism regarding Argentina’s constitutional identity, 
the post-authoritarian identity was constructed as a kind of antidote response to the religiously legitimated 
dictatorship of the past. Due to the LGBT movements framing of their claims, support for the gender 
identity law by politicians became a tool to thus demonstrate the allegiance of those politicians and parties 
who supported or reinforced this fledgling identity. Even though the end of the dictatorship and the debate 
on the gender identity bill in congress were nearly 30 years apart, that the past is pivotal for Argentina’s 
present sexual rights policies is very clear. The speech by MP Silvia Beatriz Vazquez illustrates how closely 
past and present were connected: 
In the case of our society, of the whole of Argentina, after having traversed so many dictatorships, 
I believe that democracy can be able to pay off these debts with everyone who has felt or is still 
feeling marginalisation as products of these dictatorships. (…) And these dictatorships have re-
pressed homosexuality. Being homosexual, heterosexual or bisexual is a distinction that does not 
concern anyone besides who takes this decision for their own lives. That is what the Constitution 
says but we have not respected it. It is not that we did not have laws to, from the liberalism that 
structures this Republic, value the rights to equality and free decision that all Argentine citizens 
have. But since we have not respected the constitution for so many years and have negated our-
selves the right to elect the ones who govern us, we also disrespect our constitution if we negate 
so many citizens to fully exercise their rights. (Chamber of Deputies Parliament of Argentina, 
2011, my translation) 
Eventually, the gender identity law was passed in the Chamber of Deputies with an overwhelming 
majority of 168 votes, with 17 votes against and 6 abstentions (ibid.) However, the law still had to 
be decided on by the senate. All speeches in the debate held in the senate on the 9th of May 2012 
repeated the human rights framing and passage of the law as a logical progression from making good 
on the promises in the constitution and international human rights treaties. Arguments brought for-
ward mirror the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, but delegates reiterated even more strongly the 
absolute necessity to finally protect the human rights of this marginalised group. One senator con-
cluded his contribution by stating, “We should have done this much earlier. We could not. Blessed 
be God that we are doing it today.” (Senate Parliament of Argentina, 2012, my translation) 
There are two factors that contributed towards the considerable consensus in the Senate. First, after the 
passage of the gay marriage law, the battle of framing was already settled and LGBT rights were irrevocably 
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accepted as human rights in Argentina. Second, the way in which the LGBT rights movement framed LGR 
as an issue of a human right to identity naturally invited the support of politicians eager to demonstrate 
their commitment to a secularised Argentine constitutional identity. How closely support for the bill by 
politicians was tied to the dictatorial past demonstrates the following closing statement of a senator in the 
debate: “[W]e wont permit ever again [nunca más] that an Argentine will die without his or her basic right 
to identity.” (Senate Parliament of Argentina, 2012, my translation) 
Another example is Senator López’ speech when he proposed that identity is the synthesis of all democratic 
rights in Argentina and then stated that, “without autonomy of conscience [to decide one’s gender] there is no 
personal identity, without the right to choose the profile of the own identity there is no human dignity; and 
there is no democracy without human dignity” (Senate Parliament of Argentina, 2012, my translation). 
In the end, the law was passed unanimously with 55 votes and one abstention in the Senate in April 2012. 
On the 9th of May 2009, Argentina passed the most permissive gender identity law in the world. 
The Law on Gender Identity of 2012 “establishes the rights to gender identity of persons”. Art. 1 of the 
law states that: 
Every person has the right to 
a. The recognition of their gender identity 
b. The free development of their person confirming to their gender identity 
c. Be treated according to their gender identity and, in particular, to be identified in that way in the 
instruments that accredit their identity in respect to the name, image and sex that is registered 
(Ley de Identidad de Genero, 2012, my translation) 
These far reaching recognitions of a rights to gender identity in Argentina stands in contrast to its restric-
tive abortion regulation. 
 
Abortion 
The Campaña presented a bill on the voluntary termination of pregnancy to Congress on four occasions 
(2007, 2010, 2012, 2014). Despite gaining increased support from legislators each successive time it was 
presented, it never reached sufficient support to be passed on to the plenary (Tabbush et al., 2016, p. 29). 
While former president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner supported both the same-sex marriage and the 
gender identity laws, she publicly opposed the passage of permissive abortion regulations. In 2003, while 
still a national senator and First Lady to then-president Nestor Kirchner, Cristina responded to a question 
on her position about abortion: 
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I am not progre [sic] (an Argentine political term referring to progressivism), I am Peronist (…). 
Societies have their times and I do not think that Argentina is ready for that. By a small margin we 
managed to pass a law on sexual education and responsible reproduction and we need to see what 
that has cost. Furthermore, I am against abortion. (Pisani, 2003) 
During her presidential campaign of 2007, Cristina Kirchner had expressed some of her views on sexual 
rights policies. In their wake she reiterated her stance against the depenalisation of abortion and marijuana 
(Hiller, 2011, pp. 163–164). Even while the LGBT movements’ human rights framing was difficult to 
resist for politicians, when it came to abortion, politicians did not face rhetorical entrapment and could 
easily oppose abortion rights without being seen to oppose commitment to Argentina’s democratic identity. 
However, the women’s rights movement in Argentina has increasingly started to frame abortion as a hu-
man right and is starting to form alliances with politicians but is nevertheless operating under less prom-
ising opportunity structures. At the time of writing (February 2018), current Argentine president Mauri-
cio Macri has granted liberty of conscience for MPs for actions pertaining to abortion regulations, and has 
allowed two of the delegates of the governing Cambiemos to look into the possibility of legalising abortion. 
Debate in parliament is planned to start on the 6th of March 2018. Macri himself is not supportive of 
legalisation, and according to news station teleSUR, many MPs have publicly announced their disinterest 
in the bill, mainly of whom claim that the country is currently facing more pressing issues (teleSUR, 
2018). While abortion reform is closer than ever in Argentina today, the outcome remains unsure. 
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7.2 Sexual Rights in the Name of South Africa’s Constitution 
Abortion entered the parliamentary arena in South Africa roughly a decade before the debates around LGR 
and same-sex marriage. The topic of abortion went through the legislative process in 1996, the same year 
the new constitution was passed. Eventually LGR policy and gay marriage were treated in parliament in 
2003 and 2006 respectively. The ANC has governed since South Africa‘s democratisation, which means 
all policies have been debated and passed under ANC majority rule. An essential component of the ANC’s 
openness to social movement demands was that prior to democratisation the ANC was part of civil society 
itself and thus personal contacts between politicians and sexual rights activists had already been established 
before democratisation and were easily converted into policy influence by social movements.   
Before entering the legislative arena, there were a few pre-existing factors worth considering. In the case 
of abortion, the final Constitution of 1996 included the “the right to make decisions concerning reproduc-
tion” in section 12(2), as well as the right to access to reproductive health care in section 27. Furthermore, 
the then-recent conversion of the ANC from a liberation movement to a political organisation with a 
mandate to govern the country made for soft boundaries between state and civil society. Prior to the first 
democratic elections, the women’s movement and the ANC were both part of civil society, united in their 
struggle against religiously backed apartheid and thus bound together by “links of comradeship” (Klugman 
& Varkey, 2001, p. 257). This ensured easy access of civil society to political decision makers.  
Furthermore, since the ANC was relatively new to party politics, it had no established research or support 
staff to help parliamentarians design policy, which is why they turned to their former comrades from civil 
society, giving “those in the `prochoice` establishment much greater access than any other groupings.” 
(ibid.) NGO staff that ended up as legal advisers for the ANC translated civil society demands into gov-
ernment. Leading figures of the women’s movement were also part of the ANC and ended up in important 
government positions. For example, Dr. Nkosozana Zuma, the Minister of Health in 1996 was an ac-
claimed feminist and would become an important player in the legalisation of abortion on demand.  
Regarding LGR policy, during democratisation there was a policy change towards restrictiveness when 
parliament passed the new Birth and Death Registration Act in 1992, which made it impossible to change 
one’s legal gender. A bill regulating LGR was lingering within the Department of Home Affairs since the 
early 1990s and was only passed on to parliament when litigation was brought against the Department, in 
addition to the SAHRC strongly advocating for it on the basis of human rights. When the bill finally en-
tered parliament, organisations from both the LGBT and trans rights movements started their lobbying 
activities. The very need for a more specialised trans movement splitting from the broader LGBT project 
became clear in the policy process, as the more mainstream gay rights organisations inserted relatively 
restrictive proposals into the debate that were not in line with the demands of trans activists.  
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The lack of concerted efforts and the disregard from the broader movement towards the needs of trans 
individuals led to a final policy that while permissive, is less permissive than its Argentine counterpart. 
Worth considering, however, is that the law in South Africa was passed almost a decade before Argentina 
passed the Gender Identity Law in 2012.  
The situation for the legislative process of same-sex marriage was particular as the South African constitu-
tional court decision had established firm boundaries for the timeframe and content of a law regulating the 
legal recognition of same-sex relationships. The case Fourie vs Minister of Home Affairs required parlia-
ment to remedy the unconstitutionality of the state’s denial of same-sex couples the same rights hetero-
sexual couples enjoy. The court had set a deadline of one year, until the 1st of December 2006, within 
which parliament had to pass appropriate legislation and if the parliament failed to do so in time, the 
existing marriage law would automatically be changed to gender neutral terms. A bill on the matter was 
introduced to parliament in September 2006 and originally provided for the creation of a registered part-
nership scheme only. However, to fulfil the requirements of the constitutional court the bill was amended 
by the Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs to include marriage rights. The final vote on the civil union 
bill was taken on the 14th of November 2006 in the National Assembly and affirmed by the National Coun-
cil of Provinces on the 28th of November. The next day it was signed by the Deputy President and came 
into law shortly after, just in time to meet the constitutional court deadline. 
 
Abortion 
Considering the conservative attitudes of much of the population and the immense role institutionalised 
religion had previously played in informing public policies, one might have expected repealing the South 
African abortion legislation of 1975 would be difficult. “However, the transition from apartheid to a rep-
resentative democracy produced a crucial moment for feminist advocates: the new government’s com-
mitment to human rights would prove pivotal in supporting historically marginalised issues like reproduc-
tive rights.” (Rebouche, 2011, p. 8) 
Much of public opinion as well as a majority of health workers opposed abortion legalisation, which was an 
important factor in speeding up the process leading to policy passage. Since the government and the RRA were 
well aware of the dangers of a consultative process or even a referendum, the bill was passed as quickly as 
possible so opposition forces would have no time to grow and organise (Klugman & Varkey, 2001, p. 262).  
With an absolute majority in parliament, the ANC’s position on abortion was key to the reform’s success. 
In the early 1990s, the ANC had no policy position on abortion and contained a variety of different views. 
However, key women activists within the ANC had a pro-choice position and managed, despite some 
fierce intra-party opposition, to ensure the inclusion of a pro-choice position in the ANC’s first election 
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platform. The culmination of this was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (Waylen, 2007, 
pp. 537–538). The endorsement of a pro-choice position committed the ANC to legal reform once they 
were elected, even though the fact that is was contested within the party made ongoing advocacy from the 
women’s movement necessary to keep the issue on the legislative agenda.  
When the public was consulted for submissions to parliament, the vast majority of submissions opposed 
abortion legalisation, mostly on religious grounds. The few submissions in favour of policy change towards 
permissiveness based their argument on human rights (Albertyn, 2015). The only other point of access for 
the public were the formal hearings conducted on the bill. 
Those who were against policy change, and indeed against any legal access to abortion, were com-
pletely outside of the process. They had no entry point except the formal hearings where they gave 
evidence. But the ideological environment was against them. (Klugman & Varkey, 2001, p. 259) 
Once the constitution was passed, a speedy parliamentary process under the leadership of acclaimed fem-
inist then-Minister of Health, Nkosozana Zuma, and the chair of the portfolio committee led to the debate 
on abortion taking place in the same year as the passage of the new constitution. The inclusion of repro-
ductive rights formulated as positive rights in the constitution also had implications for policy design as it 
demanded the delivery of state-funded abortion services (Rebouche, 2011, p. 13). 
A free conscience vote for the decision on the abortion bill became a contested issue within many parties. 
Some members of the ANC called for a free vote because they opposed abortion on religious grounds. 
“Clearly there were tensions within the ANC once the bill was ready to come to parliament on how to 
handle the balance between women’s rights and religious rights.” (Klugman & Varkey, 2001, p. 264) 
Eventually, the ANC settled for the compromise that members who opposed the bill abstained from at-
tending the voting session. Delegates from the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Democratic Alliance 
(DA) voted en bloque in favour of the bill. The NP and the IFP allowed their delegates to vote according 
to their conscience (Gender Links, n.d.). 
Since the bill was drafted and brought to vote by a coalition of feminists within and outside of parliament, the final 
parliamentary debate on the issue closely mirrored the women’s movements framing of abortion. Pregs Govender, 
who also chaired the parliamentary committee on the Improvement of the Quality of Life and the Status of Women, 
presented the matter in the debate as an important advancement of South African democracy towards equality: 
The right to control our bodies, the right to choose a safe legal termination of pregnancy, is in the 
context of political, social and economic choices for women, in the context of moving our society 
towards equality, respect and a healthy sharing of power and responsibility in the home and in 
society (South African Hansard for 29 October 1996, as cited in Albertyn, 2016, pp. 15–16). 
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In keeping with the ANC’s overall theme of nation building at the time and South Africa’s constitutional 
commitment to human rights, a majority of MPs decided to vote for human rights, even despite the varied 
voices of opposition. While, as the rest of the population, most MPs were religiously affiliated, they ar-
gued human wellbeing, rather than religious doctrine to be the new yardstick for policy making. In her 
opening speech, the Minister of Health said: 
We deeply respect the pro-life view of our fellow Christians. Their arguments have some theo-
logical support and we sense a genuine concern for the sacredness of life. Their theological expli-
cation, however, is idealistic to the point where human suffering is ignored. (South African Han-
sard for 29 October 1996, as cited in Klugman & Varkey, 2001, p. 277) 
Ultimately, the abortion issue cut across political lines and votes were spread out across the bench. The 
abortion bill was passed in November 1996 with 210 votes in favour, 87 against and 5 abstentions. The 
Preamble of the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act illustrates how the human rights framing em-
ployed by the women’s movement directly influenced the text of the new abortion law, reflecting South 
Africa’s post-authoritarian secular political identity: 
Recognising the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, security of the person, non-
racialism and non-sexism, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms which underlie a 
democratic South Africa;  
Recognising that the Constitution protects the right of persons to make decisions concerning re-
production and to security in and control over their bodies; 
Recognising that both women and men have the right to be informed of and to have access to safe, 
effective, affordable and acceptable methods of fertility regulation of their choice (…) 
This Act therefore repeals the restrictive and inaccessible provisions of the Abortion and Sterili-
zation Act, 1975 (Act No.2 of 1975), and promotes reproductive rights and extends freedom of 
choice by affording every woman the right to choose whether to have an early, safe and legal 
termination of pregnancy according to her individual beliefs. (Choice on Termination of Preg-
nancy Act (No 2 of 1996), 1996)) 
 
Legal gender recognition 
After democratisation, the LGBT rights movement tried to ensure ongoing government commitment to 
their cause by lobbying democratic leaders and making them aware that preaching equality logically means 
supporting LGBT rights as well. Phumi ­Mtetwa, an LGBT rights activist, recalls that he was part of a 
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delegation of the NCGLE that met with President Mandela in February 1995 at the party’s headquarters 
to remind him of the ANCs “commitment to equality, and to reiterate the importance of ensuring that it 
lives up to that commitment and presented the aspirations of many lesbian and gay people” (Mtetwa, 
2013). LGBT activists highlighted their oppositional stance towards the apartheid regime, morally obliging 
the ANC to support their cause by arguing the “ANC owed them those rights as comrades in the liberation 
movement” (Thoreson, 2008, p. 690). The experience of repression by the religiously legitimised apart-
heid regime now played out in the LGBT movement’s favour, as it could morally pressure the ANC to 
support their claims as fellow formerly oppressed. The human rights framing of the movement made it 
“especially effective at mobilising ideological and organisational resources in the judicial and parliamentary 
arenas” (ibid., p. 685). 
While certain sympathies of the new democratic elite for civil society benefitted the LGBT rights move-
ment as it did for the women’s rights movement, the former was not absorbed into the ANC as an organ-
isation, and thus did not enjoy the same kind of insider position within the political system as the women’s 
rights movement. As a result, LGBT rights activists made use of strategic litigation (for gay marriage) to 
promote their cause on the political agenda and recruited parliamentary allies for support when it came 
to policy design and passage (with respect to gay marriage and LGR policy). This strategy guaranteed that 
a well-crafted framing approach could override public opinion. LGBT movement’s key audience to con-
vince was the legislative and judicial elite, and not the public at large, something that could not have been 
achieved in the South African context. As noted by Thoreson (2008, p. 694), “the foremost criterion of a 
frame’s success is its resonance with its audience”. 
The legislative process for LGR policy largely took place without public involvement, with activists col-
laborating directly with government departments and committees. Activists made concrete policy and 
best practice recommendations, which were granted support by official advisory bodies of the state, such 
as the SAHRC (Thoreson, 2013, p. 653). The SAHRC stated its support for the bill arguing it was based 
“on the founding values of our democracy enshrined in our constitution of human dignity, the achievement 
of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedom” (ibid., p. 663). 
The original bill on the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status included restrictive requirements for 
the change of legal gender, most notably that individuals need to have undergone surgery beforehand. 
That the final law features far more permissive wording is due to the openness of politicians to listen to 
the demands of trans activists within the political debate (Klein, 2009, p. 30). 
During the public hearings on the bill, the Cape Town Transsexual/Transgender Support Group made an 
oral submission, arguing: “It is a human right to alter one’s gender – the role of psychologists and medical 
practitioners in this should be supportive” (Home Affairs Portfolio Committee, 2003). The group suggested 
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three possible amendments to the bill, the third of which included adding a reference to intersex people and 
replacing “sex organs” with “sex characteristics”, which changed the requirement to undergo surgery to mere 
hormone treatment. This suggestion was ultimately taken up by the committee and implemented. 
The minutes of the parliamentary hearings on the proposed legislation reveal how the human rights fram-
ing resonated with legislators. After the representative of the Transsexual/Transgender Support Group 
concluded their deliberations, the committee chair commented approvingly that, “South Africa is a free 
and fair society, with the best constitution and bill of rights. Pieces of legislation such as this Bill were 
beginning to enforce the rights and values in these” (Home Affairs Portfolio Committee, 2003). 
That the final bill was not even more permissive was due to the LGBT rights movement’s lack of unity 
and determination. One of the proposals of the Transsexual/Transgender Support Group was also to drop 
all requirements for a legal gender change whatsoever, but the simultaneous insertion of other less per-
missive proposals provided legislators the option to comply with movement demands without creating 
ground-breaking legislation. Moreover, the submission of the Gay and Lesbian Equality Project was not 
coordinated with the more specialised trans groups because the LGBT rights movement was, other than 
in Argentina, split. The Equality project even demanded in their oral submission that qualification for 
gender recognition should rather be restrictive, stating that requirements “need not be surgery, but should 
involve an act to define or alter one’s sex description. Living a particular gender lifestyle is not sufficient 
– gender is too fluid a concept.” The final bill being permissive (but again, not quite as permissive as its 
Argentine counterpart) can therefore be attributed to more modest demands of a less unified LGBT move-
ment. The modified bill was passed in the relevant committee meeting without objections by any party 
on the 1st of October 2003 (NCOP Social Services Committee, 2003). 
In the National Assembly, the bill was opposed only by the ACDP, based on its belief that sex was deter-
mined biologically rather than socially constructed. Steve Swart of the ACDP argued that "this is another 
example of the impact of secular humanism on our legislative process - secular humanism being under-
girded by concepts of atheism and evolution." Another delegate, in contrast, renounced religious influ-
ence, saying "It is a common occurrence to find that those that resist change cloak their selfish interests in 
a religious guise and appoint themselves as God's representatives here on earth." (IOL, 2003). 
Politicians faced the pressure of state human rights bodies such as the SAHRC arguing the bill to advance 
human rights and to base on constitutional principles (Thoreson, 2013, p. 653). Relying on policy pro-
posals of the LGBT rights movement to revise previously more restrictive drafts, an overwhelming ma-
jority of politicians ended up voting in favour of the permissive bill on the Alteration of Sex Description 
and Sex Status. 
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Same-sex marriage 
Like LGR policy, the LGBT movement’s oppositional stance to the apartheid government benefitted the 
cause of same-sex marriage as politicians and activists had formed tentative alliances before democratisa-
tion. A statement by Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota illustrates this point: 
[I]n the long and arduous struggle for democracy very many men and women of homosexual and 
lesbian orientation joined the ranks of the liberation and democratic forces. (…) They accepted 
long prison sentences. Some stood with us, ready to face death sentences. (…) How then can we 
live with the reality that we should enjoy rights that we fought together for, side-by-side, and 
deny them that? (South African Hansard for 14 November, 2006) 
For its dominant position in post-apartheid politics, the LGBT movement’s main target of lobbying for 
marriage rights was the ANC. The framing strategy of the LGBT rights movement created a rhetorical 
trap for the ANC as it resonated with the liberation movement’s foundational values and South Africa’s 
democratic identity that was largely modelled on the former. Opposing the claim for marriage rights by 
the LGBT movement after the Fourie judgement would have meant undermining the party’s credibility 
in standing for human rights and equality. Furthermore, democratic politicians had a deep seated respect 
for their constitution and the constitutional court, which influenced their willingness to accept even un-
popular rulings. While privately many ANC members were opposed to gay marriage, the party ultimately 
supported the movement’s claims publicly and even went to great length to enforce party discipline on 
the issue (Thoreson, 2008, p. 686). An ANC spokesperson stated that: 
ANC policy toward gays and lesbians, and toward other groups in South Africa which are discrimi-
nated against, has to be the same because it is an issue of principle enshrined in our Freedom Charter. 
The raison d'être of the ANC’s existence is to fight discrimination and deprivation of gays and lesbi-
ans cannot be excluded from that process. (as cited in Thoreson, 2008, pp. 689–690) 
While it was no option for the ANC to oppose an issue framed in the human rights language of equality 
and non-discrimination, offending the religious sentiments of a considerable portion of the population was 
less of an issue for politicians. In public hearings all over the country, it became clear that a majority of 
the population rejected the bill on religious grounds, especially opposing the usage of the word “marriage” 
in that context. But, “[t]he ANC is rife with politicians who routinely reject their constituents’ views on 
capital punishment, reproductive rights, and gay and lesbian issues”, as those involved in the anti-apartheid 
struggle are relatively safe from electoral punishment when defending values in line with the liberation 
struggle (ibid., p. 686). 
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Interestingly, support for gay marriage turned into symbolic support for democracy. In other words, a 
sort of proof of contrast of modern South Africa to its apartheid past. For instance, Defence Minister 
Mosiuoa Lekota stated that South Africa, “cannot afford to be a prison of timeworn prejudices which have 
no basis in modern society. Let us bequeath to future generations a society which is more democratic and 
tolerant than the one that was handed down to us” (as cited in Thoreson, 2008, p. 693). 
The newly founded ACDP steadfastly opposed the civil union bill. The party had also voted against the 
constitution in 1996, as they claimed that it deviated from Christian scripture. However, arguments based 
on scripture arose suspicion in democratic South Africa due to the ideological symbiosis of DRC and the 
apartheid state. One LGBT activist noted that conservative churches “used scripture to justify this apart-
heid split, to racially divide people on the basis of their colour and their culture ... [and] people are truly 
scared to go back to what the original scripture says” (as cited in Thoreson, 2008, p. 687). 
As a last resort to circumvent the constitutional court’s judgement, the ACDP fought for a constitutional 
amendment that would ban same-sex marriage. However, the other parties did not want to touch the 
constitution, now the most important pillar of the country’s new democratic identity. The Minister for 
Home Affairs argued that whilst understanding, “that the Constitution can be amended from time to time 
to deal with practical arrangements, we are cautious of an amendment to the Bill of Rights, as it is the 
bedrock on which our Constitution and our democracy is based.” (South African Hansard for 14 Novem-
ber, 2006) As observed by Thoreson (2008, p. 691), “[t]he proposal not only attacked the GLB [Gay, 
Lesbian, Trans] movement but symbolically threatened the entire post-apartheid framework.” 
While religious institutions had limited access to the legislative process, they could voice their opinion 
during the hearings in the parliamentary commission sessions. During hearings on the bill in the home 
affairs portfolio committee, religious groups argued e.g. “that homosexual behaviour was a violation of 
the anatomical design of humans and was sinful” (His People Christian Ministries in Home Affairs Portfolio 
Committee, 2006a), or that “Homosexual acts were disordered” (Southern African Catholic Bishop’s Con-
ference in Home Affairs Portfolio Committee, 2006a). However, other religious institutions were sup-
portive of LGBT rights, among them the Anglican Church, to which Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a popular 
figure in South Africa, belongs. Some of the more liberal churches had also opposed apartheid and politi-
cians were therefore more willing to give weight to their supportive stance. 
The original Civil Union bill that was discussed in parliamentary commissions proposed the creation of a 
civil partnership regime only. However, the SAHRC pointed out that this would “not give effect to what 
the Court intended” and argued that a “separate but equal” type of arrangement would amount to discrim-
ination (SAHRC in Home Affairs Portfolio Committee, 2006a). The LGBT rights movement further ar-
gued that a separate regime would amount to sexual apartheid and is discriminatory. Consequently, the 
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bill was amended last minute to also include same-sex marriage, in addition to the partnership regime. 
The final bill must be seen as an attempt to reconcile the incommensurable standpoints of each political 
actor. The minutes of the relevant committee sessions clearly illustrate that the confusing final legislation 
was due to delegates’ reluctance to change the definition of marriage, therefore retaining the existing 
marriage provisions and creating a separate bill. Since the constitutional court ruling required complete 
equality, the new bill eventually included marriage rights as well. Thus, the constitutional court judgement 
was a legal trap that virtually forced politicians to include marriage, maybe sometimes against their per-
sonal preferences. The confusing policy design can therefore be explained with politician’s intention “that 
the passing of the Bill would protect the traditional religious marriage provided for in the Marriage Act, 
due to the creation of a separate institution for same-sex couples” (Home Affairs Portfolio Committee, 
2006b). However, Democratic Alliance MP Kaylan fittingly described in the plenary debate: 
The Bill in front of us today is not purely a Civil Union Bill, but is in fact a second Marriage Act, 
merely couched in a different name in an effort to appease both sides and arrive at a middle-of-
the-road solution. (South African Hansard for 14 November, 2006) 
The final debate on the bill in parliament illustrates the extent to which the constitution and the constitu-
tional court judgement had created a discursive and legal trap for politicians. One MP explained: 
[E]very constitutional expert that we have met in the committee agrees with us that there is no 
getting away from the rights of these individuals because it’s entrenched in the Constitution. You 
cannot run away. It’s something that is given and it’s something that we have to live with. So 
obviously, you gave it; you were part of the constitution-making process (…). When we adopted 
that Constitution, all of us stood there – there is a nice picture outside, showing that you are there 
– confirming that we will respect and uphold the supreme law of the country which is the Con-
stitution. (South African Hansard for 14 November, 2006) 
Ironically, MPs were well aware of the bill going against public opinion, but still managed to celebrate its 
passage as a tribute to democracy. Another MP stated that: 
This is the tenth anniversary of our beloved Constitution. South Africans always mention with 
pride that ours is the most progressive constitution in the world. Unfortunately, however, the 
values of our society do not always match the progressive values of our Constitution. (South Af-
rican Hansard for 14 November, 2006) 
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Such as the case in Argentina, religion was prominently mentioned in the final debate on the marriage bill. 
For example, one MP argued that religion should not influence the state: 
Abanye bavika ngeBhayibheli. Ngifuna ukutjho ukuthi… [Others are using the Bible as a scape-
goat. I would like to say…] marriage is an institution recognised by the state in South Africa. 
Marriage, in terms of the Marriage Act, is a civil act. It is not a religious act. (South African Han-
sard for 14 November, 2006, original translation) 
The final vote on the civil union bill was taken on the 14th of November 2006 in the National Assembly 
and affirmed by the National Council of Provinces on the 28th of November, just in time to meet the 
constitutional court’s deadline. In the National Assembly, the bill was passed with a great majority of 229 
votes in favour, 41 votes against and 2 abstentions. Some opposition parties voted uniformly against it, 
the ANC in favour and the DA voting dividedly. During the vote in the National Council of Provinces, 
the bill was passed with 36 votes to 11, with only 1 abstention. 
 
7.3 Discussion  
During the course of this chapter, we have explored the final link connecting the state/church symbiosis 
during authoritarian rule with the extraordinary sexual rights policy output of both post-authoritarian 
South Africa and Argentina. We have traversed through each of the parliamentary processes that led to 
LGR and same-sex marriage policy output in Argentina and South Africa, and, in the case of the latter, 
abortion policy output. 
In the theoretical mechanism, I have hypothesised that the framing and strategy employed by the social 
movements creates a rhetorical trap for political actors, leading to sufficient support from parties and 
politicians that permissive policies are passed. 
An early indicator of the presence of this section of the mechanism is that politicians in South Africa and 
Argentina began to closely collaborate with social movements. These movements’ adroit lobbying efforts 
were successful in influencing policy makers in key positions. In Argentina, the LGBT rights movement 
allied with the heads of the relevant parliamentary commissions to advance their goals of submitting same-
sex marriage and LGR bills. This is especially remarkable considering that none of the two dominant 
parties in the Argentine parliament were explicitly leftist or religiously affiliated. Parties granted liberty 
of conscience for delegates to vote on the issues, which resulted in a coalition of politicians from across 
the party spectrum, rather than from a specific party, to collaborate with the LGBT rights activists. 
In South Africa, the ANC’s dominant position post-democratisation made it the most attractive ally for 
social movements. Due to its overwhelming parliamentary majority, convincing the ANC meant winning 
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the battle in South Africa. The South African women’s movement, working from inside and outside of the 
ANC, managed to have its pro-choice position included in the ANC’s first election platform, which com-
mitted the party to policy reform later on. The LGBT rights movement in South Africa morally obliged 
the ANC to support its cause by tirelessly reminding politicians that notions of non-discrimination and 
equality must also apply to LGBT people. Since women’s and LGBT rights groups had opposed religiously 
legitimised apartheid alongside the ANC, links of comradeship ensured privileged access to the political 
system. At the same time, the shadow of the church’s influence during apartheid presented considerable 
barriers to entry for political access for religious institutions, as they lacked the personal relationships and 
loyalties with democratic leaders, necessary for informal policy influence. 
This was very different in countries without ideological symbiosis during authoritarian rule. In Poland and 
Croatia the collapse of communism opened up great opportunities for church influence. “The new demo-
cratic governments were inexperienced, unstable, and often uncertain about their ability to establish du-
rable regimes. Historians, playwrights, and shipyard workers became national leaders overnight”. 
(Grzymala-Busse, 2015, p. 146) The precariousness of democratic stability in Poland and Croatia led dem-
ocratic governments to seek the support of the Catholic Churches and included clergy in policy formula-
tion and put church representatives in positions in secular institutions (ibid., p. 147). 
In South Africa and Argentina, the highly respected civil society benefitted from government inexperience. 
In both countries, the respective bills were mostly drafted by organisations from the social movements them-
selves, and inserted into the parliamentary arena by willing politicians. Policy reforms were often initiated 
by social movement action. The framing of the status-quo as violating the human rights of a marginalised 
subgroup of society, made permissive policy passage the adequate response to the posed problem. 
The key observation that a collaboration between social movements and political actors took place une-
quivocally illustrates the astonishing success of these social movements in their efforts to convince politi-
cians of their demands. Accordingly, this constitutes the passage of a doubly decisive test. 
Further certainty of the presence of this part of the mechanism (and that it is triggered by the strategy and 
framing of the social movements) can be derived from the way in which politicians defended their support 
for the social movement’s demands. Most notably, politicians in South Africa and Argentina used the exact 
same problem framing as the respective social movements when speaking about the policy reforms, indi-
cating doubly decisive evidence for the theoretical mechanism. In both countries, politicians argued the 
reform osexual rights policy (with the exception of abortion policy in Argentina) to be the logical appli-
cation of what has already been committed to in the new constitutions and international human rights 
treaties. The new constitutions and human rights documents have an extraordinarily symbolic meaning 
for the constitutional identities of South African and Argentine democracy, and supporting the passage of 
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more permissive policies was equivalent to supporting democracy and its founding values. Somewhat iron-
ically, the passage of LGR, same-sex marriage and abortion policy in South Africa and Argentina was 
celebrated as deepening democracy, despite not exactly reflecting the stances of the demos. 
While not necessarily privately endorsed or supported by politicians, the social movements’ framings cre-
ated a rhetorical trap for politicians and parties to comply with the movements’ demands. The ambitious 
legal frameworks created and rhetorically used by politicians as proof of the newly functioning democratic 
fibre suddenly demanded the passage of more permissive policies. Highly respected independent human 
rights bodies within the state, constitutional courts and civil society human rights organisations supporting 
the social movements’ claims left little room for politicians other than to simply embrace the social move-
ment’s framings. For better or worse, politicians opportunistically embraced policy reform to present 
themselves (as well as their party and country) as modern and human rights abiding. 
The fact that sexual rights policies (again, except abortion in Argentina) were considered to be human 
rights issues ensured the passage of very permissive bills. For instance, the inclusion of reproductive rights 
in the South African constitution demanded the formulation of abortion policy that included abortion as a 
right (rather than, for example, only a non-penalised act such as in German Law) and the coverage of the 
procedure by public health care. In Argentina, the way in which LGR policy was framed as a human right 
to identity made even cost coverage by public health care for sex reassignment surgery a logical step. In both 
countries, less permissive proposals for same-sex partnership regulation were prevented from becoming law 
because when framed as a human right, anything less than equal was tantamount to discrimination. 
Finally, we have encountered smoking gun type evidence in that human rights framing of sexual rights in 
the context of post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina had far better chances of convincing politi-
cians than that of religious arguments. Politicians in South Africa and Argentina explicitly rejected both 
the arguments and influence of certain religious institutions, arguing the issues to be a matter of rights and 
not religion. The split between human rights and religion that formed due to the ideological symbiosis 
during authoritarianism (later materialising in a secular interpretation of human rights in both countries) 
is mirrored in parliamentary debates containing claims that religion should not impede the human rights 
of others. The separation of democratic identities and institutionalised religion was also an overlapping 
theme in the parliamentary debates, when politicians repeatedly underlined the secular character of the 
state, demarcating religion within the private sphere. This disempowerment of institutionalised religion 
would have been unthinkable for the most part of South African and Argentine history – perhaps just as 
much as the passage of permissive abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR policies during the years of au-
thoritarian regimes. 
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8 Conclusion  
 
The roots of South Africa and Argentina’s surprising modern day legal regulations of abortion, same-sex 
marriage and LGR lie in the past. The main argument tested in the present study is that the permissive 
sexual rights policies of both countries can be traced back to ideological symbiosis between state and 
church during authoritarianism. It has been shown that the alliance structures between state and church 
during apartheid South Africa and during Argentina’s last military dictatorship created political oppor-
tunity structures favourable towards women’s and LGBT rights movements’ efforts to introduce their 
claims for sexual rights on the political agenda. When social movements successfully framed their claims 
as human rights issues, the influence of religious institutions on policy output was blocked, due to their 
dubious associations with the former human rights abusing regimes. 
Accordingly, Argentine and South African churches could not effectively shape sexual rights policy output 
to their doctrinal preferences, despite high levels of religiosity and corresponding conservative values in 
both populations, as well as in the face of institutionalised religion’s traditionally important role within 
the political realm. Ironically, the Catholic Church’s and DRC’s privileged position under authoritarian-
ism directly compromised their ability to shape public policy after regime change. 
The research interest that informed this dissertation pertains to the puzzling sexual rights policies in South 
Africa and Argentina. There are three peculiar aspects of their sexual rights provisions. First, the wide-
spread religious conservative values present within a majority of each population, and high rates of church 
attendance would lead us to expect Argentina and South Africa to regulate sexual rights issues equally, or 
even more restrictively than other countries with comparable structural measures of religion (such as 
Poland and Chile). Yet, South Africa and Argentina regulate overall permissively and consequently deviate 
from expectations derived from literature on religious influence on policy output. 
Second, Argentina’s restrictive abortion law stands in stark contrast to its global championing of LGBT 
rights policy. Especially in light of the standard pattern of rights progression that we observe in European 
countries, such as the legalisation of abortion preceding the passage of LGBT rights policies by decades, 
Argentina’s abortion policy presents itself as a remarkable exception. 
Third, when parliaments in democratic South Africa and Argentina have reformed sexual rights policies, 
we observe jumps towards permissiveness rather than incremental change. For instance, same-sex mar-
riage was legalised in both countries without having first establishing a type of partnership regime, as most 
other countries have done. 
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During the remainder of this conclusion, we will revisit the key findings of the empirical investigation. 
What follows is a reflection on the explanatory potential of the mechanism beyond South Africa and Ar-
gentina, and its limitations. Finally, this chapter ends with a discussion of the implications of the present 
study for scholarly research, as well as of the relevance of permissive policy output for the lived experience 
of women and LGBT people in South Africa and Argentina. 
 
8.1 Revisiting the Causal Mechanism 
The in-depth process tracing in South Africa and Argentina has revealed ample evidence that there is in-
deed a common causal process connecting each country’s state/church symbiosis during the countries’ 
last authoritarian regimes and sexual rights policy output under democracy. To answer the threefold re-
search question, we now turn to the key findings from the empirical investigation. 
The assessment of the causal condition has revealed that a decisive characteristic of the ideological 
state/church symbiosis during Argentina and South Africa’s last authoritarian regime was that it produced 
a configuration of personal and institutional bonds and oppositions which carried over into democracy, 
both institutionally and ideologically separating human rights from religion. 
On the one hand, the ideological symbiosis was facilitated by close personal relations between both state 
and church officials, often bound together by friendship, ideological alignment, mutual support and influ-
ence. Sometimes, key individuals from church and state even overlapped. On the other side of the dem-
ocratic/authoritarian cleavage, there was the regime opposition, which included democratic politicians 
banned or in exile as well as an emerging civil society including human rights groups and women’s and 
LGBT organisations. 
During this time, regime opposition formed not only outside of religious institutions but also as part of the 
forces that challenged and ultimately defeated the authoritarian regime and its source of legitimacy; the 
church. The failure of religious institutions to speak out against violence and oppression during authoritari-
anism, led to regime opposition using the institutional support and framing of human rights organisations. 
Par contrast, in Poland and Chile, churches provided the physical space for regime opposition against 
authoritarian governments to form and religious doctrine infused the emerging human rights and democ-
racy activism. In Chile, the Catholic Church called for a return to democracy right after Pinochet’s military 
coup in 1973 and collected records of human rights abuses reported by pastors and individuals, criticised the 
regime repeatedly for those abuses and offered material assistance to the families of political prisoners (Sig-
mund, 1986, pp. 32–33). With its human rights programmes and outspoken disapproval of the regime’s 
oppressive practices, the Catholic Church in Chile earned its moral authority through a close connection 
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to opposition forces. Later on, the church used this influence to shape morality policies according to reli-
gious doctrine under democracy (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Hennig, 2012; Htun, 2003). 
In Poland, a degree of general ideological tension between Soviet-style Marxism and Catholicism grew 
into full-blown antagonism between the Soviet satellite state and the Polish Catholic Church (Walaszek, 
1986, p. 120). The de facto eradication of Polish national sovereignty under Soviet influence contributed 
to the development of the church becoming “the guardian of the Polishness of Poland – that is, of its 
separate culture and political identity and its democratic heritage” (ibid., p. 131). Polish Cardinal Wyszyn-
ski’s sermons at the time focused on the threat the anti-religiousness of Communism posed to the survival 
of Christianity and with his repeated emphasis on the inseparability of the fate of the nation from the fate 
of its Catholic Church”, Wyszynski offered a distinctly Polish national identity as an alternative to Com-
munist internationalism (ibid., p. 130). 
As in Chile, the Polish Catholic Church responded to its regime’s repressive practices with calling for 
human rights and dignity and, likewise, the church’s institutional infrastructure played a key role for the 
organised resistance that contributed to the regime’s eventual collapse (ibid., p. 133). 
The pivotal difference between the two contrasting examples of Chile and Poland versus Argentina and 
South Africa is the positioning of institutionalised religion on either one of the ideological camps, between 
authoritarianism and pro-democratic/human rights forces. This had profound implications on various lev-
els, connecting the causal condition with the next component of the mechanism.  
First, other than in Poland and Chile, South Africa and Argentina’s human rights discourse was decidedly 
secular because it developed across the opposition’s use of the language of human rights as a normative 
(and, at the time, increasingly internationally accepted) force to denounce oppression and political vio-
lence without being supported by the church. 
Second, on the individual level, democratic politicians in both South Africa and Argentina had personally 
interacted with or were part of civil society during the authoritarian period, and were morally indebted 
to their comrades in the struggle for democracy. Conversely, the democratic elite in Poland and Chile 
was indebted to the church for providing normative force and physical shelter for oppositional activities 
during authoritarianism. These links, contacts and shared history between church representatives and 
democratic politicians in Chile and Poland vs that which existed between civil society and democratic 
politicians in South Africa and Argentina could later be activated as channels of access for political influence. 
This constellation impacted on the nascent democratic constitutional identities that developed during and 
after democratisation (and the investigation of how they formed) was the focus of chapter five, exploring 
the first component of the causal mechanism. Here, we have seen that in order to clearly differentiate the 
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democratic regime as a stable and legitimate alternative compared with its authoritarian predecessor, dem-
ocratic politicians placed the protection of human rights at the heart of new democratic institutions and 
constitutions in both South Africa and Argentina. Entrenched in the iconography of resistance, as well as 
being written firmly into the history of the birth of South African and Argentine democracy, human rights 
took on an indispensable role in the post-authoritarian constitutional identities. In a matter of years, the 
two countries underwent what could be called a process of extraordinary political secularisation. Without 
a significant decline of religious affiliation and church attendance in the population, or even in measures 
of formal state/church ties, the ability of churches to shape the political sphere drastically declined after 
democratisation. 
In chapter six, we looked at the way the post-authoritarian context shaped the political opportunity struc-
tures of two of the most important stakeholders in sexual rights policy making, namely social movements 
and religious institutions. The investigation revealed that South Africa and Argentina’s post-authoritarian 
constitutional identities created an advantageous environment for actors framing their claims as human rights 
issues, constituting an advantage for women’s and LGBT rights movements vis-à-vis religious institutions.  
The LGBT and women’s rights movements in South Africa and Argentina were able to successfully exploit 
political opportunities when they framed their claims for rights and recognition in human rights terms, as 
well as exposing the status quo as a violation of rights of an oppressed group or minority. In contrast, the 
efforts of religious institutions in both countries to frame abortion and LGBT policy in religious terms 
stood under the shadows of association with the former human rights abusing regime, thereby considerably 
limiting the moral authority of churches to speak on matters pertaining to public policy.  
A particular idiosyncratic factor of Argentina’s history of political oppression is the focus on motherhood 
and the right to the identity of children in the country’s human rights organisations and discourse. Due to 
the emergence of powerful human rights organisations as a response to the illegal abduction of children of 
victims of political murder, human rights in Argentina became to be considered to protect the embry, not 
the mother. As a result, abortion opponents (rather than abortion activists) could capitalise on the human 
rights focused constitutional identity.  
While the Catholic Church in Argentina favours restrictive abortion regulations, it was not the main factor 
in impeding abortion policy change. In fact, it was the lack of opportunity for the Argentine women’s move-
ment to exploit the potential of a human rights framing to increase its discursive leverage in courts and 
parliament. It is precisely at this stage of the causal chain that we solve one of the sub-plots of the research 
question; namely Argentina’s relatively restrictive abortion policy diverging from its very permissive LGBT 
rights policies. Key are the different opportunity structures faced by the Argentine women’s rights move-
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ment compared with the Argentine LGBT rights movement, preventing the former from successfully fram-
ing abortion rights in terms of human rights.  
In chapter seven, we explored the way in which the preceding components of the causal mechanism relate 
to the overall pattern of permissive sexual rights regulations in South Africa and Argentina, as well as their 
atypical far jumps from relatively restrictive status quos to regulatory permissiveness. The investigation 
revealed that the strategic human rights framing by social movements resonated with each country’s new 
constitutional identity, creating a rhetoric trap for political parties and their representatives. Thus, prob-
lem framings aligned with the constitutional identity meant politicians faced rhetoric entrapment as sup-
porting sexual rights policy meant rejecting or supporting the country’s core values. As a result, support 
for permissive bills turned into an affirmation of the democratic constitutional identity.  
Moreover, the framing of human rights limited the options for an appropriate state response to the prob-
lem of rights violations. Less permissive bills were rejected, often at the last minute, so that the final policy 
would comply with constitutional principles and the interpretations thereof by constitutional courts. The 
result was that highly permissive bills were passed despite staunch opposition by religious institutions. 
This answers why South Africa and Argentina made large jumps in permissiveness in the regulation of 
sexual rights– when framed as a human rights violation, a less far reaching reform would not have ad-
dressed the problem at its core, and would still constitute a violation of rights. 
Overall, the decisive difference between the two groups of cases discussed (South Africa and Argentina in 
the former and Poland and Chile in the latter) are the informal relations that existed between state and 
church during authoritarian rule. The post-authoritarian context in South Africa and Argentina fostered 
the success of political actors who could frame their claims (in front of courts and politicians) as human 
rights issues.  
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8.2 Potential and Limitation of the Causal Mechanism beyond South Africa 
 and Argentina 
 
South Africa and Argentina are extraordinary but previously under-researched cases. Both countries de-
viate from expectations regarding sexual rights policy permissiveness derived from structural arguments 
in comparative morality policy literature. Apart from solving the questions posed by the sexual rights 
regulations of these two countries, the analysis of two deviant cases can substantially contribute toward 
theory development (Levy, 2008, p. 3). While other scholars have focused on theorising the pathways of 
successful religious influence, this dissertation has focused on explaining why and how religious institu-
tions failed to shape policy decisions. 
The argument that informal relations between church and state matter is not new, as it has been argued 
in various case studies, such as the ones by Grzymala-Busse (2015) and Htun (2003). Also, the idea that 
the relationship of religious and political identities matter is well established (Grzymala-Busse, 2015). This 
dissertation has tested and refined those arguments about a causal connection between state/church rela-
tions and policy output by thoroughly exploring the causal chain between authoritarian involvement of 
churches and its effects on sexual rights policy output. 
The causal mechanism of religious blockade proposed in this thesis is not an inversion of the causal mech-
anism of religious influence on morality policy. Rather, it responds to the need to assess social movements 
as actors competing with churches to influence policy. Accordingly, this helps explain the causal chain’s 
efficacy when understanding permissive policy output, as opposed to restrictive. 
A limitation of the explanation for religious blockade offered in this dissertation, that perhaps applies to 
morality policy research in general, pertains to its validity across time. Morality regulations are subject to 
constant revision in many countries, as global patterns of regulations and rank orders of permissiveness 
transform at a rapid pace. Thus, scholars need to understand and account for new developments and phe-
nomena, rendering theories unavoidably incomplete as they account for a snapshot in time only. Just as 
developments in countries such as South Africa and Argentina have called into question earlier (and sim-
pler) causal propositions regarding the relationship between structural religious factors and morality pol-
icy output, future developments in other countries will create new regulatory patterns. This will no doubt 
invite new theorisation. 
For the time being, the causal explanation offered in this thesis can solve the threefold question that flows 
from South African and Argentine sexual rights regulation. Furthermore, the explanation has potential be-
yond these two cases. As previously mentioned, the theoretical proposition is set-theoretical, and what follows 
is a tentative exploration of the explanatory potential of the state-church relationship for Spain and Portugal. 
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Spain and Portugal are dominantly Catholic third wave democratisation countries, which also passed some 
highly permissive sexual rights policies. Both legalised gay marriage (Spain in 2005 and Portugal in 2010), 
have permissive passed LGR policy (Spain in 2007 and Portugal in 2011), and have a choice model when 
it comes to abortion (2010 and 2007). Can the state-church relationship during their authoritarian regimes 
also account for their ensuing sexual rights policy output? Examining the state/church relationship during 
the Franco and Salazar dictatorships can provide an early indication as to whether a state/church symbiosis 
also resulted in the defiance of church influence over the sexual rights policy processes in Spain and Portugal. 
While the Republican state that preceded Generalissimo Francisco Franco’s march to power in 1939 Spain 
was distinctly anticlerical (a formal separation of church and state, secular education and legalising divorce), 
those changes were reversed during Franco’s National Catholic dictatorship, lasting until his death in 1975  
(Behar 1990, p. 86). The beginning of Franco’s regime was marked by “unparalleled privilege of the Catholic 
Church and the ideology of national Catholicism” (Edles, 1998, p. 5), and the Catholic Church’s symbolic 
legitimation of the regime was among Franco’s greatest resources (Perez-Agote, 2010, p. 227). 
The Nationalists re-established the presence of religion in education, abolished divorce, author-
ised jurisdiction in marital cases to ecclesiastical courts, gave public funds to pay clerical salaries, 
and subsidised the reconstruction of churches and convents. Religious symbols dominated the 
landscape. Bishops and priests occupied a prominent place in any official ceremony, and the au-
thorities attended ex officio religious ceremonies. (…) The intellectual life, media, and school 
textbooks were subject to government censorship to exclude any criticism of the church. The 
state had become in many areas the secular arm of the church, while the church contributed to 
the legitimation of the regime. (Linz, 1991, p. 162) 
It is noteworthy that, as everywhere else, the church did not act monolithically during the dictatorship. 
Towards the last few years of the regime, there was a growing opposition against the regime amongst 
militant Catholics and Priests (Perez-Agote 2010, p. 228). However, overall, it can be reasonably argued 
that an ideological symbiosis of state and church is among the main characteristics of Franco’s rule. 
A similar mutually beneficial relationship between state and church was also present in the Salazar dicta-
torship in Portugal. After the military coup in 1926, the regime reintroduced religious education and 
handed previously confiscated property back to the church, among various other acts of generosity. 
“Meanwhile, the church supported the consolidation of authoritarian rule. And was content to see the 
regime adopt Catholic principles in its activities, ideology and symbolism” (Pinto & Rezola, 2007, p. 360). 
Salazar and Cardinal Cerejeira were close personal friends and shared ideas for Portugal as a country. 
‘God, nation, authority, family’, was the new regime’s creed, revealing the ideological underpinnings of 
Portugal’s last authoritarian period of rule (ibid., p. 363). 
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The Catholic Church was a crucial contributor to the ideology of Salazar’s regime. Not only did the regime 
have the church hierarchy’s explicit approval to use Catholic symbolism, but it also actively pursued a 
policy of ‘Catholicising’ institutions and the education system.” (Pinto & Rezola 2007, p. 365–366) 
As an overview of the co-variation between state/church relations during authoritarianism and sexual rights 
policy output after democratisation in Spain, Portugal, South Africa, Argentina, Poland and Chile, Table 16 
contrasts the identified state/church relationship with overall patterns of regulatory permissiveness. 
 
Table 16. State/Church Ideological Relationship during Authoritarian rule & Patterns of  
Sexual Rights Regulations in six countries 
Country State/church  
ideological 
Opposition 
State/church  
ideological 
Symbiosis 
Overall Restric-
tive Pattern of 
Sexual Rights 
Overall Permis-
sive Pattern of 
Sexual Rights 
Argentina  X  X 
Chile X  X  
Poland X  X  
Portugal  X  X 
South Africa  X  X 
Spain  X  X 
 
We observe a regular co-occurrence of state/church opposition during authoritarianism and restrictive 
overall patterns of sexual rights policy output, On the other hand, state/ church symbiosis and overall 
permissive regulatory patterns co-occur together. This tentatively suggests a more general association be-
tween state/church relations during authoritarianism and morality policy output that mediates the rela-
tionship between the religious stratifications of polities and morality policy output. Tracing the causal 
process in other third wave democratisation countries would no doubt be an exciting avenue for further 
research. 
On a more abstract level, it would also be interesting to investigate beyond strictly Christian religio-
political alliances, and whether the relationship of an institutionalsised religion with a specific regime bears 
significance for the level of political secularity after regime change. For example, will Iran undergo rapid 
political secularisation if the regime was to democratise, and thus undo 40 years of Islamic-political sym-
biosis? Or does China await a revival and politicisation of religion in a potential post-communist future? 
These questions are as interesting as they are controversial, and surely worthy material for future research. 
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8.3 Implications  
What do the results of this study imply for morality policy research, literature on religion and politics, sec-
ularisation theory in general and the lived experience of women and LGBT in South Africa and Argentina? 
First, the results suggest that there is not just one path towards regulatory permissiveness of morality 
issues. While in Western Europe permissive morality policies have been argued to be a function of societal 
modernisation and secularisation and corresponding value changes in the population, Argentina and South 
Africa represent a path towards permissiveness that circumvents public opinion and structural measures 
of societal modernisation and secularisation. That means that the moral regulatory developments in South 
Africa and Argentina not only call into question the Western-centric case selection in the field, but they 
also demonstrate that explanations for morality policy output are more context-dependent than the uni-
versal aspirations of our theories have taken into account. Especially the timing of democratic transition 
constitutes important context condition for the way in which religious institutions were blocked from 
influencing policy output. This underlines the need to step down the ladder of abstraction and develop 
typological theories that explain a limited set of cases only. 
Second, there is no simple linear relationship between structural measures of religious parameters and 
policy output. Strong religious convictions in the population can translate into restrictive morality policy 
output, as it does in Poland and Chile. However, in other cases such as Argentina and South Africa, public 
policy is relatively unaffected by religious populations. High rates of religious affiliation and church at-
tendance by the population, or societal importance of religion in general, should rather be thought of as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for policy influence. Churches backed by religious populations and 
societal importance can gain institutional access to shape policies when the historical genesis of the state 
has fused the nation and the church, as Grzymala-Busse (2015, 145, 330) argues for Poland and Chile. 
However, when the historical context provides for a separation of democratic constitutional identity and 
religion, as in South Africa and Argentina, the church’s influence is greatly diminished. When social move-
ments can frame their claims as human rights issues, they can overtake the influence of even societally 
powerful churches. 
Third, the results support the accounts that stress the importance of the informal aspects of a state/church 
relationship to matter for policy output, rather than the formal ties (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Hennig, 2012; 
Htun, 2003; Knill & Preidel, 2014). In South Africa and Argentina, the formal relationship between reli-
gious institutions and state hardly changed during both countries’ transition towards democracy. 
The ability of churches to access the political system and influence public policy, however, drastically 
declined after democratisation, as the relationship between the state and church transformed from an 
ideological symbiosis to an ideological independence/separation. This illustrates the critical importance 
 
- 195 - 
of the informal ties between church and state that represent the ideological, personal and institutional de 
facto points of contact and collaboration that facilitate certain identitarian constructions and narratives of 
legitimacy, which in turn either foster or hinder the influence of stakeholders in the policy process. 
Fourth, the results of this study also have implications for secularisation theory in general. What we see 
in post-authoritarian South Africa and Argentina is an abrupt political secularisation, not mirrored by so-
cietal secularisation. The investigation revealed a virtual relocation of religion by human rights in its func-
tion for political legitimacy and identity. 
Thomas Luckman’s Invisible religion postulates not an inevitable decline of religion in general but rather a 
loss of traditional societal functions (Luckmann, 2014 (1967)). In a similar vein, Casanova’s (2008, p. 13) 
conceptions of secularisation entails “the ‘passage’, transfer or relocation of persons, things, functions, 
meanings, and so forth, from their traditional location in the religious sphere to the secular spheres.” These 
accounts stress a differentiation between the public and the religious that becomes relegated to the private 
sphere. South Africa and Argentina lend support for these conceptions of secularisation, which argue for 
a privatisation of religion to occur, rather than an inevitable decline and provide an interesting illustration 
of how such privatisation looks in practice. 
The privatisation of religion manifested in South Africa and Argentina such that churches remained pow-
erful socially, maintaining high rates of adherence, mass attendance and the ability to influence the moral 
values of their members. At the same time, what followed democratisation was a total political disem-
powerment of institutionalised religion. When confronted with religious arguments, democratic politi-
cians in South Africa and Argentina relegated religious doctrine to the private sphere. In the final debates 
on abortion, same-sex marriage and LGR policies, MPs in both countries stressed their privately held 
religious beliefs, in contrast with their political stance on sexual rights issues using human rights, as the 
decisive values informing policy decisions, not religious sentiments. 
The ideological symbiosis of state and church in the past triggered a sudden relegation of religion into the 
private sphere, and the emergence of a new constitutional identity that displaced religion in its function 
for identity, legitimacy and guiding principles with new secular raisons d’états. In other words, what we 
see is that political secularisation does not have to go hand in hand with societal secularisation. Rather, 
they are distinct phenomena. In South Africa and Argentina, religion did not disappear but rather became 
de-monopolised as source of values for policy making, moving from a position of symbiosis with the state 
and into just one of many interest groups in a pluralistic political system during and after democratisation. 
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A final question worth asking is how much permissive abortion, same-marriage and LGR policy output 
actually matters for the real life experience of women and LGBT people in South Africa and Argentina. In 
other words, what are the effects of such alternative paths towards permissiveness that do not come about 
via societal value change, and thus confronts permissive policies with conservative patriarchal societies?  
The lived reality of unequal societies can hinder parts of the target population from reaping the full benefits 
of permissive sexual rights regulations. Despite the permissive abortion law in South Africa, access to 
abortion services on the ground is severely limited. Discrimination by service providers, a dearth of clinics 
in rural areas, social and religious stigma surrounding abortion and a lack of knowledge of the legality of 
abortion among parts of the population and service providers makes legal abortion inaccessible, and thus 
unfeasible, for many women (Mhlanga, 2003). 
When it comes to same-sex marriage, the circle of direct beneficiaries is quite limited, targeting gay cou-
ples that wish to marry only. Perhaps this is only a small victory in light of the common practice of cor-
rective rape in South Africa, the sexual violation against lesbians to “cure” them of their homosexuality. 
The same applies to the state- of- the- art gender identity law in Argentina that is put into perspective 
when seeing it as embedded in a society in which LGBT people still face police violence and societal stigma. 
Permissive regulations do not directly better the lives of all women and LGBT people. However, the 
indirect effects of public policy can make an invaluable contribution to creating more equal societies. 
Policy can normalise issues in the eyes of the public and contribute towards eventual acceptance and can 
increase visibility. For the relatively privileged, legal provisions can also serve as the basis to fight discrim-
ination with legal means. However, like their constitutions and general human rights commitments, sexual 
rights in Argentina and South Africa must be seen as an aspiration for the future, rather than an expression 
of equal societies.
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